



Cover Page



REPRESENTATION TO PANCHAYAT RAJ INSTITUTIONS OF DOWNTRODDEN PEOPLE IN TELANGANA

Dokala Demudu Naidu

Assistant Professor of Public Administration, SRR Government Arts & Science College, Karimnagar, Telangana, India

Abstract

It is more than seven years since the Constitution 73rd Amendment Act 1992 came into force. Most of the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) constituted under the new Act are completing their first five-year tenure. It is during these 70 years that a single reddy family accumulated about 1,000 acres of land; its members acting as the village officers of Gulam Mohammed Khan. The ‘patwari’ or karnam (a brahmin) acting as the revenue officer accumulated about 200 acres of land. The method was often simple. It is argued that absence of green revolution and rapid development of the productive forces such as irrigation is the main reason why the dominant castes could not strengthen their hold between 1960-96. On the other hand the backward castes and lower castes emerged to take political power for precisely the same reason. Most significant in reforming governance in India from particularly Dynaism of Backward Caste in Panchayat Raj institutions is one of the popular studies in the Political Science. This trend towards the emergence of the backward castes however is a nascent one and is limited to grass roots level only. This article argues that the further consolidation of backward and lower caste struggle for power needs another round of land reform which would reduce the unequal power held not only by upper castes but also by some backward castes. This research paper to be discussed about the “Representation to Panchayat Raj Institution of downtrodden People in Telangana.”

Key Words: Political Dynamism, Emergency of Caste, Social Consciousness, Lower Caste Politics, Caste Solidarity, Political Power.

Statement of the Problem

“When the panchayat raj is established, public opinion will do what violence can never do.”

— Mahatma Gandhi

Commercialisation of the village political economy has also not led to the process of creation of ‘capitalist landlords’, who combine traditional caste power with modern economic power, for two reasons. First, there has been no drastic development of infrastructural facilities or productive forces such as irrigation canals, etc. Second, there were other pressing social reasons such as heavy dowries for upper caste endogamous marriages and division of landholdings among heirs. This led to decline of landlords economically, socially and politically.

At the political plane the periodic panchayati raj elections with reservations for OBCs and women have contributed much to the forming of caste solidarity among backward castes challenging upper castes. The emergence of backward castes was confirmed by the fact that in the June 1995 gram panchayat elections 14 out of 20 villages in the Ramannapet mandal elected backward caste sarpanches; five elected scheduled caste sarpanches and only one village elected a forward caste candidate to a seat reserved for women. Thus by 1995, 19 out of 20 villages were under the political control of backward and scheduled castes. This was partly due to state intervention such as enforcement of panchayati raj and reservations partly due to autonomous lower caste development. The process was partly state-induced and partly historical. Finally, was there a proletarianisation/ polarisation process in the field area? The answer is no. The process observed was deconcentration of big landholdings and strengthening of small and middle holdings and thereby the backward caste peasants.



Cover Page



Semi-Feudal Class – Caste Dynamism

The semi-feudal class consists of upper caste landlords in the region. In the field area they come from the reddy and brahmin castes. It will be shown that their economic, social and political importance has declined owing to the emergence of back-ward castes. But we have also noted that the state could not carry out thorough-going land reforms and these semi-feudal classes still command some economic power though declining. But why such decline? Why does economic growth not benefit these classes more than it does the other classes?

Political economists like Utsa Patnaik have argued that after the green revolution the traditional semi-feudal landlords have become capitalist landlords. But we have noted that such a phenomenon did not take place in the field area. This is owing to a combination of reasons. The historical dilemma of the semi-feudal classes is that either they modernise and compete with the emerging classes, castes, or they decline under the pressures created by the larger polity, economy and society. In our field area the semi-feudal classes started to decline because they could not modernise – by modernisation we mean modernisation of productive forces – and thereby strengthen their economic position. The state has also not strengthened the productive forces by improving the infrastructural facilities such as irrigation and canals. The physical conditions of economic production have not changed much over the last 30 years. In these conditions the semi-feudal class could neither accumulate much capital nor re-invest existing capital. This is the reason why the reddy and brahmin landlords could not become affluent capitalist landlords. This also explains why the phenomenon of capitalist landlordism is more pertinent to green revolution areas than to non-green revolution areas.

Semi-Feudal Politics

Thus the semi-feudal class in the study area had either to modernise – which it could not – or decline. As noted earlier the social pressures within these castes, such as heavy dowries during marriages and partitioning of family lands have contributed further to the decline of these classes/castes. The pressure to get the younger generation educated and placed in urban employment was added to this. Many landlords spoke with great anxiety about the difficulty of getting their sons and daughters educated and employed. So did the youth belonging to the landlord families for many of them have graduate or postgraduate degrees but no jobs. How do landlords ensure their survival? How do they ensure their reproduction? First, they make use of whatever ‘free’ labour is available. Second, they too make use of whatever advances have taken place in productive forces – electric pumpsets and tractors. It is by both making use of the capital-istic labour relations as well as the modest advances in productive forces that the landlords of the erstwhile semi-feudal class ensure their reproduction. For the back-ward castes family labour and the traditional caste occupation are great strengths in ensuring reproduction. These arguments are illustrated in the two case studies below.

The ruler showed no interest whatsoever in the development of the Community. He and his ancestors were primarily interested in the land revenue and the product from their personally owned lands. They left the village largely to the vicissitudes of nature. Chronic drought, at times near famine conditions, prevailed. Failure of crops, inability to remit land revenue in time, were usual features of the condition of the peasantry. This as we see below led to the evolution and shaping of the agrarian structure in the village in the succeeding period. As the ‘dora’ (landlord) of the village Gulam Mohammed Khan performed three functions: (a) collection of the land revenue, (b) collection of various taxes, and general village administration. This included law and order administration. As an absentee landlord and according to the administrative system of the nizami, i.e., the ‘vatandari’ system, Gulam Mohammed Khan appointed, on hereditary basis, three village officers. He ruled through these village officers. They were the ‘patwari’ (or a brahmin karnam); a ‘mali patel’ (reddy); and a ‘police patel’ (reddy).

Rural Politics in Telangana

It is during these 70 years that a single reddy family accumulated about 1,000 acres of land; its members acting as the village officers of Gulam Mohammed Khan. The ‘patwari’ or karnam (a brahmin) acting as the revenue officer accumulated about 200 acres of land. The method was often simple. Whenever a peasant could not pay the land revenue



Cover Page



owing to drought, or some other misfortune, that land was transferred, in the records, into the account of either of the village officers. Oral accounts inform us that exorbitant taxes of the dora were often the other reason why land shifted into the hands of the patels. The reddy patels would pay the dora the taxes of those who could not pay and then take control of the land of that taxpayer. Thus one family, the gampala reddy, acting as village officers accumulated around 1,000 acres of land (which was later partitioned among five brothers).

Caste was no hindrance to this predatory process. Often fellow caste members were also victims. But it was mostly the other backward castes and untouchable castes who bore this burden. As is well known through any study of Telengana of this period the domination of the patels (and of the doras) was not just economic, but was also social and political. Landowner-ship operated as the objective basis of socio-economic and political oppression.

The end of the dominance of the jagirdar came with one, the larger political struggle of the Telengana movement; and two, owing the abolition of zamindari by the central government. But Gulam Moham-med Khan did not relinquish his landed interests easily. Whatever was left by him was taken over by his erstwhile village officers. In the struggles that followed one patel was shot dead by the 'razaakars'. Eventually, the struggle ended in favour of the local reddy patels, particularly the gampala family of reddy. And the influence of pateldom continued. Land continued to be concentrated in the hands of five gampala reddy brothers. With the solidarity of fellow caste members they continued to dominate village affairs.

Not all reddy patels in Bogaram village were big landlords. By 1950 more than 50 per cent of the reddy owned land-holding of less than 25 acres. And often the land they owned was not productive. The absolute productivities of even big landholdings were dismal. It may be remembered here that in pre-green revolution period no Borlaug-packages were available. But what is important to note is that neither class differentiation nor low level of absolute standards of living affected caste solidarity. Considerable number of reddy families were self-cultivating but when it came to social relations with the other lower caste families, they were certainly discriminatory or semi-feudal. There was a strong element of dominance at the superstructural level even when it did not exist at the economic level.

Dynamism in Village Politics

The period between 1950 and 1975 was a period of the continuance of the traditional patron-client relations. Though the dora Gulam Mohammed Khan was dispensed with, the gampala patels continued to rule the village. In this the mobilisation of caste solidarity was quite important. The first gram panchayat elections were held after the formation of Andhra Pradesh state, in 1959. In these elections Gampala Ram Reddy was elected as sarpanch of the village. He continued as village sarpanch for another term. Thus the single gampala family continued to dominate, *de jure* from 1959 to 1970. And *de facto* till roughly around 1975. In this period, and till today, the gampala reddy family was, and is, associated with the Congress Party. The productive forces of the village were not much developed during this period. The land was concentrated in the hands of patel reddy families. And the nature of productive forces supported this social structure. We can take irrigation for example. The entire village depended to a large extent on well irrigation. This means that in a period during which there was no electricity, it was the big landowners who took advantage of whatever technology that was available. The oil engines which were used to pump water were within the means of big landholders only. Family farms and small holders certainly could not afford oil engines. The small peasants had to rely on 'mota bavis', a moat worked by oxen.

There was little or no state intervention to augment productive force. Electricity came to the village in 1982. State intervention even in other rural development programmes was minimal during this period. The gram panchayat sarpanches wielded political power, often backed by social domination, but they lacked public, governmental funds of any kind.



Cover Page



During this period the gampala reddy families, as headmen, arbitrated the vil-lage affairs and, quite importantly, the village disputes. Besides this they man-aged their own substantially big farms through, what appears to be semi-feudal labour relations. Vetti of the untouchable castes in particular seems to have contin-ued, in however feeble form, till 1970. Backward castes/classes in the village, though numerically preponderant, were not politically assertive during 1959-70. First, they were divided along caste lines. Secondly, the socially dominant and numerically important among them, the weavers, lacked economic power. During this period the weavers were only weaving cotton/handloom cloth for the local mar-ket which was not lucrative. The handloom industry had not yet found a world market. We will argue below how the globalisa-tion of handloom industry led to the crea-tion of a class structure among the weavers which in turn led to their political assertion. But we should hasten to add here that the assertion of the backward castes took place much before the political ascendance of the weaving caste. The political asser-tion of the backward castes occurred basically against the gampala reddy.

Downtrodden Castes Identity

The first sarpanch Gampala Ram Reddy worked from 1959 to 1970. The de facto domination of the gampala reddy family continued till 1975. But the emergence of backward castes took place prior to 1975. In 1970 pachayati raj elections, all the backward castes worked against the vatandari gampala families. A toddy tap-per was elected as sarpanch and continued in the post till 1981. The weavers in the village were a numerous and politically important caste. But they were united against vatandari reddy. Weaving till 1980 was only meant for the local market. The raw materials yarn, chemicals, etc, used to be brought from Hyderabad and finished cloth used to be again marketed in Hyderabad. During the tenure of the toddy tapper sarpanch the most significant achievement was village electrification. This meant that even small peasants could buy pumpsets for their wells. This in turn meant that the back-ward class small peasants could strengthen their family farms. Interestingly during this period, from 1975 till as late as 1988, the party configurations did not change much. Both the vatandari gampala reddy and the backward caste leaders fought each other as different factions of the same Congress Party. The weaver caste which independently asserted itself in politics later was also a part of the Congress Party.

By 1980, the occupation of weaving became a lucrative one. The local weavers started sending their cloth to metropolitan cities such as Bombay, Delhi and Madras. The premium quality cotton cloth they produced was being exported from these metropolitan cities to America, Europe and Eurasia. Some cloth was also exported to Asian markets such as Japan. Along with cotton cloth of high quality they also produced silk cloth and saris. This process of internationalisation was complex and has produced a class structure among the weavers. This is at first reflected in the emergence of master weavers and then to a stratifi-cation among the weavers. Firstly, the enterprising among the weavers started bringing in the raw materials and distri-buting among the middle-working weav-ers. The middle-working weaver in his turn employed a worker-weaver from any labouring caste of the village. The work was divided up as follows: master weaver – distributes raw material and markets the finished cloth; middle-working weaver – applies colours, dye, etc, and hires labour; and wage-worker weaver – weaves the cloth on either daily wage basis or piece rate basis. This structure worked, and still works, in favour of the first category of master weavers. The second and third category of weavers do not get more than their daily wage. This wage fluctuates with the fluctuating prices of finished cloth in the world market. What this system produced between 1980 to roughly about 1990 is an affluent master weaver class which also started asserting its dominance over not only the weaver caste, but over all the backward castes.

The affluence of the master weavers is visible in their houses. They own modern trucks, scooters, refrigerators, air coolers, etc, and a phone is also to be found in the house of every master weaver to facilitate his communications with the local and metropolitan businessmen. None of these consumer durables are found either in reddy caste houses or in the houses of lower caste weavers. The standard of liv-ing indicated by these consumer durables is very high by local standards. More importantly the master weavers started investing their money into buying lands, mainly from the reddy and some-times also from other backward castes. Thus one master weaver who combines his government job with his master weav-ing activity has accumulated more than 100 acres of land. He is now one of the two big landlords of the village. The deconcentration of land among the dominant reddy families appears to have taken place owing to two



Cover Page



important reasons. First, land partition among family members; second, increasing cash dowries during marriages. Dowries in reddy caste often run into lakhs of rupees. This is one important reason for the sale of lands by reddy.

Representation Dynamism from Community

The weavers of the village are also organised into a co-operative society. Elections do take place for the society. But the entire society is dominated by master weavers. During the elections for the co-operative society money, liquor, etc, are lavishly used. The master weavers literally invest in these elections and in turn later use the co-operative society for furthering their business interests. In these elections weavers do fight among themselves on party basis. The master weavers were united under Congress Party and presently they are under the Telugu Desam Party.

Though the weavers are divided by class, when it comes to panchayati raj elections, they mobilise caste solidarity for electoral purpose. But even during the panchayat elections it is the handful of master weavers who dominate their fellow caste members. Since master weavers are engaged in the circulation of raw materials and marketing the finished product, they enter into patron-client relations with the other lower caste weavers. These patron-client relations help them in mobilising caste solidarity. Thus on its face it appears as if all the weavers belong to the same class and represent the same interests; but in reality they are divided into classes and contain inter-class exploitative relations.

In 1981 elections the master weavers asserted their political power. This time one master weaver got elected as sarpanch on Congress ticket defeating the toddy tapper candidate belonging to the rival faction of the Congress Party. It is clear that by this time though the vatandari gampala reddy in the village were supporting Congress Party they had lost their place in the political scenario of the village. Certainly, a decisive shift took place on the social basis of political power from reddy to that of backward castes; and within the backward castes in favour of the master weavers.

In 1988 gram panchayat elections, the earlier sarpanch and master weaver changed over to Telugu Desam Party and mobilised his caste as well. Thus the anti-reddy feeling has also turned into anti-Congress politics. One can see the photographs of Congress leaders hanging on the walls in the houses of gampala reddy family but not in the houses of any backward caste villagers. Thus presently the backward castes are organised under the master weavers supporting the Telugu Desam Party.

Awakening of Consciousness in Downtrodden

The nizam had three types of ruling systems: jagirdari, khalsa and sarf-e-khas systems. In the jagirdari system the jagirdar owned much or all the land of the village. In sarf-e-khas system the entire land was owned directly by the nizam's family and the land revenue went to their personal expenditure. In khalsa system, the land ownership rested with the villagers. It was much like the ryatwari system of the presidency areas under the British. The significant difference with the other two land systems was that the villagers owned the land in their names and the land revenue went neither to any individual jagirdar nor to the nizam but to the treasury of the nizam government.

Village administration in all three types of land systems was run through the vatandari system. It meant a system of village officers who consisted of the vatan: these were the patwari, the mali patel and the kotval or police patel. Janampally by 1990 had vatandari system. Under the system the patwari or village revenue officer belonged to a brahmin-karanam on hereditary basis. The mali patel and police patel posts belonged to a reddy family which lived away from the village. By 1990 the mali patel and police patel vatans were transferred into the hands of local yadavas, regionally called the gollas. The yadavas' basic occupation is sheep grazing. But one family, the meda family of yadavas, accepted the vatans. While the brahmin-karanam family ran revenue matters, other matters concerning village administration were run by the meda family of yadavas. Thus in this village, backward caste leadership has existed for 95 years. Unlike in the case of Bogaram village, it cannot be said in Janampally that the backward classes, emerged in village politics at a particular time after independence.



Cover Page



Village Political Dynamism

In order to run the village administration the downtrodden educated themselves to some extent. But this is only true of the meda family of yadavas. The rest of the yadavas continued to be illiterate and backward.

Though the mali patel and police patel posts were held by the yadavas it is the brahmin-karanam and his family which dominated village politics from 1900 to as late as 1970. In this village there is no significant evidence that the vatandari families accumulated land during the nizam period under consideration, i e, 1900-50. Two reasons appear to be important for this: first, ownership of land existed in the name of the villagers, and second, the karanam patwari was himself a progres-sive man who participated in the struggles against nizam rule as a Congress Party worker under the umbrella of Andhra Maha Sabha. He even participated in armed struggle against the nizam. Thus unlike in Bogaram village the village officers did not resort to accumulation of lands or encroachment on lands.

The khalsa system itself allowed less room for accumulation of land by village officers. There was less arbitrariness in the land related accounts. This meant that in the Janampally village the possibilities of accumulation of land by village officers were much less than in the village Bogaram. Another reason for this was the village productive forces. The productive forces of Janampally village are better situated than that of Bogaram village. The village has 1,200 acres of land and a big tank and four small tanks. Both tank irrigation and well irrigation played important role in somewhat stable and assured subsistence for small peasants. Thus the politically progressive nature of local elites and better productive forces worked against the concentration of land in the hands of a few village officers. Thus in this village the agricultural scenario is characterised by the preponderance of the small peasants. Another important reason for the relative absence of much feudal or semi-feudal dominance is that village did not have dominant caste dora. Though there were some reddy in the village they were not the village officers and therefore their economic power was neutralised by the political power of the backward castes and therefore whatever upper caste domina-tion existed in the village was that of the brahmin-karanam. But the progressive and politically active nature of this village officer also diluted the semi-feudal content of the social dominance. Thus the brahmin-karanam family had about 75 acres of land. They continued to dominate the village affairs partly.

Dynamics of Dominance

It was difficult to obtain much details about the period from 1990 to 1970 regarding social relations or political dynamics. It became clear that owing to the absence of the dora from the village scene semi-feudal practices like the vetti were not prominent. The upper caste domination was also unnoticeable because of the fact that the two village officer posts were in the hands of local yadavas.

In reputed panchayat elections a brahmin was elected as sarpanch. Again in elections another brahmin-karanam was elected as sarpanch. Both won the panchayat elections as candidates of the Congress Party. It should be noted that it is these people who participated in Telengana armed struggle against the nizam under the Andhra Maha Sabha. So they carried the popularity of having fought against the nizam. By the same token, as the interviews with them show they were also conscious of upper caste domination – particularly of reddy domination. It would not be correct to hold that the reddy doras were alone oppressive. But the main cause which ignited the Telengana armed struggle was reddy oppression. Having been conscious of the causes and con-sequences of the armed struggle the brahmin-karanams of Janampally were more liberal.

Nevertheless, the brahmin patwari and other karnams continued to be the top landowners in the village; they owned more than 75 acres of land. But they culti-vated this land through hired labour rather than through tenants. This land was later partitioned within both the families.



Cover Page



DOI: <http://ijmer.in.doi./2022/11.02.60.1>

What need to be done?

The most significant experiment in reforming governance in India from a participatory democratic decentralisation perspective has been the introduction of the *Panchayat* system through the 73rd Constitutional Amendment in the early 1990s. It was expected that the newly created *Panchayat* system, drawing strength from the Constitutional provisions, would emerge as an effective tool of local self-governance and would strongly further the primary objectives of economic growth and social justice. Unfortunately, these expectations have remained largely unfulfilled. The journey of *Panchayati Raj* in India over the last decade has been extremely complex, slowed by institutional and bureaucratic resistance, lack of political will and support, lack of awareness and capacities at grassroots, inadequate finances and the continuing unequal and non-democratic sociopolitical organisation of rural society. The experiences of the *Panchayat* system across India have been varied, depending on several factors including political will, nature of bureaucracy and prevalent socio-economic conditions in the region.

Telangana is viewed by many as one of the better performing states with respect to its initiatives for democratic decentralisation through *Panchayati Raj*. The most significant reason for this impression is a strong political will at the top level for strengthening and supporting the *Panchayat* system to take its due place in the system of governance. The strong political will and government support to the *Panchayat* system can be clearly seen in the framing of progressive Acts, and continuous delegation and devolution of powers, authority and roles to *Panchayat* institutions. Despite these efforts and initiatives in Telangana, the *Panchayat* system continues to be plagued by immense difficulties and faces stiff resistance from several quarters.

This study strongly brings out the contradictory realities of the *Panchayat* system in Telanana. On the one hand, there is very progressive legislation, policies and guidelines for the *Panchayats* backed by strong political will. On the other hand the ground reality clearly indicates weak and ineffective implementation of the *Panchayat* system, leading to little progress on the path of real democratic decentralisation. The study clearly identifies three broad sets of issues that are hampering the development of an effective *Panchayat* system in the state. First is resistance and non-cooperation from the bureaucracy and the existing institutions of governance, evident inadequate financial devolution, the framing of rules contradicting the spirit of *Panchayats*, and red tapism and corruption. In effect it indicates that the state and the ruling classes are still not ready to devolve powers and authority to another level of governance due to diverse vested interests developed over time and therefore they use multiple strategies and mechanisms to stall the process of democratic decentralisation. The second set of factors are resistance from the political class, and the socio-economic and political elites of rural Telangana, which view *Panchayats* as a serious threat to their interests and hegemony.

Summing up

The study strongly presents the problems of the Dynamism of Backward Castes in *Panchayat* system. However, the study also brings out another layer of reality – the process of empowerment of representation of the marginalised and effective use of *Panchayats* for sincere participatory democracy, albeit not so forcefully. The cases of empowerment of women, *dalits*, collective community decision-making, altering the development priorities in favour of the people's needs and aspirations discussed in the report are all very significant examples and raise hopes for the *Panchayat* system, despite its shortcomings. These achievements in the context of a state largely constructed on a colonial model and unequal nondemocratic social and political order are extremely significant. As proactive participants in the process of democratic decentralisation it becomes critically important to highlight these successes. In tune with this perspective, a large number of Dynamics of Downtrodden represented to civil society actors have identified the problems and successes of *Panchayats* and are working to consolidate the gains from the *Panchayat* system for people-centric development and effective democratic self-governance. Due credit has to be given to the government of Telangana for its dynamism representation sincerity, openness and commitment to democratic decentralisation.



Cover Page



DOI: <http://ijmer.in.doi./2022/11.02.60.1>

References

1. Athreya, V B et al (2000): *Barriers Broken: Production Relations and Agrarian Change in Tamil Nadu*, Sage, New Delhi.
2. Bedford, I (2018): 'The Telengana Insurrection: A Study in the Causes and Development of a Communist Insurrection in Rural India (1946-1951)', unpublished PhD thesis, Australian National University, Canberra.
3. Beteille, A (1996): *Caste Class and Power: Changing Patterns of Stratification in a Tanjore Village*, OUP, Delhi.
4. Beteille, A (1974): *Studies in Agrarian Social Structure*, OUP, Delhi.
5. Breman, J (2015): 'Between Accumulation and Immiseration: The Partiality of Fieldwork in Rural India', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, vol 13, no 1, October.
6. Breman, (1993): *Beyond Patronage and Exploitation: Changing Agrarian Relations in South Gujarat*, OUP, Delhi.
7. Breman, J et al (eds) (1997): *The Village in Asia Revisited*, OUP, Delhi.
8. Byres, T J (1995): 'Political Economy, Agrarian Question and Comparative Method', *EPW*, vol 30, no 10, March.
9. Das, A N (1996): *Changed: the Biography of a Village*, Penguin Books, New Delhi.
10. Frankel, F R and M S A Rao (1989): *Dominance and State Power in Modern India: Decline of a Social Order*, 2 vols, OUP, Delhi.
11. Grey, H (1970): 'The Landed Gentry of the Telengana, Andhra Pradesh' in E Leach and S N Mukherjee (eds), *Elites in South Asia*, CUP, Cambridge.
12. Patnaik, U (ed) (1990): *Agrarian Relations and Accumulation: The 'Mode of Production' Debate in India*, OUP, Delhi.
13. Rajasekhar, D (1986): *Land Transfers and Family Partitioning*, Oxford and IBH New Delhi in association with CDS, Trivandrum.
14. Rajasekhar, D (1986): (1992): 'Economic Mobility of Rural Households: A Study of Kurnool District in Andhra Pradesh (Circa 1860-1989)', unpublished PhD thesis, CDS, Trivandrum.
15. Reddy, Ram M (nd): 'Agrarian Relations: A Case Study in Telengana Region', unpublished PhD thesis, Department of Economics, Kakatiya University, Warangal, Andhra Pradesh.
16. Srinivas, M N (2020): *Village, Caste, Gender and Method: Essays in Social Anthropology*, OUP, Delhi.
17. Srinivasulu, K (1988): 'Telengana Peasant Movement and Change in Agrarian Structure: A Case Study of Nalgonda District', unpublished PhD thesis, Jawahar Lal Nehru University, New Delhi.
18. Yugandhar, B N (1996): *Land Reforms in India: Andhra Pradesh – People's Pressure and Administrative Innovations*, Sage, New Delhi.