Searching for the truth.

Number 12, December 2000

S-21 prisoner


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KHMER ROUGE ARTS
Khmer Rouge Song: Breeze ...................Back Cover
Most people do not know that most of the 20th century’s worst genocides, in fact, have been carried out by communist regimes. Scores of millions of victims by Stalin, tens of millions by Mao, and the list of atrocities by Marxist-Leninist henchmen all across the world goes on and on. But we should also remember that in other terrible genocides, as in the cases of Hitler’s Holocaust and the very recent case of Rwanda’s Hutu Power Movement, other political systems have also generated the incomprehensible. The Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation not only educates about the past, but perhaps more importantly, can create awareness for the future, helping to build a determination among human beings that, working together, we can prevent the crime of genocide from happening.

The Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation was created in a spirit of bi-partisanship, as exemplified by our honorable co-Chairmen, Senator McCain and Senator Kerrey, here tonight. Contrary to rumors during the late election campaign, I have found in my own work that bipartisanship in Washington does exist, and that it is indispensable when you seek to accomplish great ends. On that note, let me take a moment to thank three people in Washington who have helped my work, Deborah DeYoung of congressman Tony Hall’s office, Jim Doran of Senator Jesse Helms’ office, and Louisa Coan Greve of the bipartisan institute, “the National Endowment for Democracy.” They, along with many others in Washington, have worked for years to bring about an end to the impunity of the Khmer Rouge. But we have not yet achieved our goal, and we must not rest until we do. For although genocide is a crime beyond human comprehension, one that can destroy millions of lives, it is not a crime beyond human prevention. At our home in Texas, or here tonight in Washington, DC, everything seems so peaceful and normal. In places like this, it is impossible to imagine such a thing as genocide; impossible to believe it could ever happen here, that it could happen to you. But survivors of genocide know different. It CAN happen to you. It can happen anywhere. Last year, I visited the War Documentation Center in Amsterdam, and I also went to see Anne Frank’s house. Though I deal on a daily basis with the horror of genocide, I was totally shocked to see the things that happened 50 years ago also happened in Cambodia during my generation. This served to reinforce my determination that we all need to educate each other about genocide, about how to prevent it from happening, and about sharing this knowledge with the public. Everyone needs to realize that genocide is about human beings - about all of us! That’s why we must come together as human beings to prevent this highest and most heinous of all crimes, and try to prevent it everywhere. Peoples across the world have different cultures and speak different languages, but they all share one thing in common; they all want to live, and to raise their families in peace. Genocide destroys that basic common hope, sometimes for the many generations it takes to heal the social wounds, and sometimes, for some families, it destroys hope forever. We must end the crime of genocide. Today—this morning—the President of the People’s Republic of China, Mr. Jiang Zemin, is on a state visit to the Kingdom of Cambodia. China shares responsibility...
for what happened during the Khmer Rouge regime, and thus it bears a responsibility to help Cambodia to overcome its dark past. The Chinese now say they want to remain neutral among Cambodian political factions. The best way to do that is to support the Cambodian people, rather than any political party. And every survey that has ever been done on this topic shows that the overwhelming majority of the Cambodian people want a Khmer Rouge tribunal in conjunction with the United Nations. So tonight I make a sincere and honest appeal to the leaders of the People’s Republic of China to think of Cambodia’s future, and Cambodia’s development. China itself is in the process of implementing a legal framework for the rule of law. They should know that the best way to help Cambodia do the same is to begin by ending impunity for violations of the law. And this must start with the Khmer Rouge who, in their zeal to make a perfect world, abolished all law, and then proceeded to violate every law of man and god. Just as the Chinese President visits Cambodia, in neighboring Vietnam, tomorrow President Clinton and the First Lady begin a state visit aiming to reconcile with our former enemies. This is one of the most important roles the US can play in the world - not only to keep the peace, but to make peace. As the strongest and richest nation that has ever existed, the United States has unique responsibilities. This does not mean that the United States should be the global policeman and always poke its nose into everybody’s business, and it does not mean that the United States is always going to be able to stop every genocide from happening. But it does mean that when we have a chance to prevent genocide, we must try. President Ronald Reagan invoked the spirit of our founding fathers when he spoke of the United States as a “City on a Hill,” a beacon of hope to all the peoples of the world. In this spirit, I think we have a responsibility to lead by our example, and there is no greater example than to work to extinguish the flames of hatred before they flare up and consume entire peoples. These flames

Approximately 16,000 victims forced into confessing and executed at S-21
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nearly destroyed Cambodia. The authors of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide never envisioned a situation where the leaders of a country would try to exterminate their own kind. But that’s exactly what the Khmer Rouge did. Our research at the Documentation Center of Cambodia shows that of a population of approximately 8 million, about two million people died during the Khmer Rouge regime. In less than five years we have documented more than 20,000 mass grave pits all across the country, all containing victims of the Khmer Rouge. Although the Khmer Rouge say that they waged their revolution in the name of the poorest of Cambodia’s farmers, astonishingly, the facts show that the majority of the people they killed were simple farmers, people who only wanted to tend their rice fields and raise their families in peace. The war in Cambodia is over, but peace has not yet come to the country. Peace requires more than the absence of armies in open combat. A peaceful society is a just society, and the Cambodian people have not yet found justice. Peace will not truly come to Cambodia until there is real justice for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge regime. People in Cambodia still have fear in their hearts, because every day they can see living freely all around them the same people who committed genocide against them. When we fail to prevent a genocide, as in Cambodia, we must bring the perpetrators to justice. Our work at the Documentation Center of Cambodia involves collecting information about what the Khmer Rouge did during the Cambodian genocide. We acquire documents, study mass graves, take testimonies from victims and gather other kinds of information relating to war crimes, genocide and other crimes against humanity. Of course, the Khmer Rouge do not approve of our work, and they have ways of letting us know that they think we are like some kind of demons from hell. When that happens, I always remember the words of President Harry S. Truman, who said, “I never give them hell. I just tell truth and they think it’s hell.” Nowadays the Khmer Rouge like to talk about forgetting the past. But when they had power, they did not want to forget the past; they remembered everyone from the past society, and tried to kill them all. The Khmer Rouge like to talk about “national reconciliation,” but during the Khmer Rouge regime, they did not want to reconcile with anyone; it was obey, or die. The Khmer Rouge like to talk about how developing the economy is the only priority; well, the reason the economy is so underdeveloped is because the Khmer Rouge destroyed it instead of building it. The Khmer Rouge like to talk about how “stability” and “preserving the peace” are the most important things, when what they are really doing is threatening to resume their war in order to intimidate people from acting on their hunger for justice. So I think the Khmer Rouge do not speak honestly, they do not speak the truth from their hearts. Instead, they speak in code words, designed for their own interest, rather than for the interests of the nation as a whole. For real peace, for real national reconciliation, for real development, and for real stability, Cambodia must confront the truth and find justice. This can only be done if those responsible for the genocide are brought before the court and are made to explain themselves, and defend their actions before the people, if they can. Only then can Cambodians put their terrible past behind them and begin to build anew future. The Khmer Rouge genocide regime has been defeated in war, but it has not yet been defeated by the law. Cambodia cannot become a nation with the rule of law until this happens. And without the rule of law, Cambodia will not develop into a peaceful and prosperous nation. That is why I remain dedicated to the cause of finding genocide justice in Cambodia. It is not about revenge; it is about truth. It’s not about the past; it’s about today. Help me put the perpetrators of one of the worst communist genocides in history where they belong: in jail. Youk Chhang
JOINT STATEMENT BY THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE FRAMEWORK OF THEIR BILATERAL COOPERATION

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the kingdom of Cambodia and the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as “the two sides”) on 19 July 1958, China-Cambodia friendship fostered by the successive generations of Chinese leaders and His Majesty King Norodom Sihanouk has grown stronger and the bilateral relations have become closer. The frequent exchanges between the two sides in the political, economic, cultural, education and other fields have cemented China-Cambodia friendship and solidarity.

The two sides stress that China-Cambodia relations are based on the mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty, independence, culture and traditions, mutual trust and mutual support. Enjoying the support of the two peoples, this age-old friendship is holding out great vitality and tremendous potential of growth. To further consolidate the existing friendly relations and cooperation between them serves not only the fundamental interests of the two countries and the two peoples, but also regional peace, stability and prosperity.

The two sides believe that this growing deep-rooted traditional friendship between the two countries and people will be carried forward for future generations. At the beginning of the new century, the two sides are determined to foster closer bilateral relations and to open up greater opportunities for their respective socio-economic development. To this end, the two sides wish to make the following statement.

I. The two sides affirm that the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter, the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, the principles set forth in the Treaty of Amity and cooperation in Southeast Asia and the universally recognized principles of international law should be the basic norms guiding their bilateral relations.

II. The two sides agree to maintain frequent exchange of visits and contacts between top leaders of the two countries. The two sides also agree to further strengthen the friendly exchanges and cooperation between their governmental institutions, parliaments, political parties, armed forces and non-governmental organizations with a view to enhancing mutual trust and friendship and promoting an all-round, steady and in-depth development of the bilateral relations.

III. The two sides agree to strengthen their annual diplomatic consultation mechanism and the exchanges between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two countries at various levels to exchange views on the bilateral, regional and international issues of mutual interest. The two sides stress the need to step up cooperation at such international forums as ASEAN, East Asia cooperation mechanism and the UN as well as cooperation in the joint socio-economic development of the Greater Mekong sub-region.

IV. The two sides attach great importance to their bilateral economic and trade relations. The agree to explore all the possibilities of expanding these relations on the basis of equality and mutual benefit and pursuant to the relevant national and international laws.

V. The two sides agree to create favorable conditions and a sound environment for increasing economic cooperation and trade in accordance with their relevant laws and regulations. To this end, the two sides agree to set up a joint economic and trade commission at an appropriate time.

VI. Under the bilateral agreement on the promotion and protection of investment, the two sides will encourage various forms of mutually beneficial cooperation in the development of agriculture, industry, tourism and other fields of mutual interest.
VII. The two sides will further expand tourism exchanges and cooperation and promote friendly contacts and mutual understanding between the two peoples. The Chinese side agrees to designate Cambodia as a destination for outbound tourist. The two sides will finalize through discussion concrete measures for implementation with a view to facilitating the sound development of tourism of the two sides.

VIII. The two sides will increase exchanges and cooperation in the fields of culture, education, public health and sports and strengthen their coordination and cooperation in the UNESCO and other relevant international and regional organizations.

IX. The Cambodian side reaffirms that it will continue to adhere to the One-China policy and recognize the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and Taiwan an inalienable party of Chinese territory. And it will continue to support China’s cause of peaceful reunification. The Chinese side reaffirms that it respects the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia.

X. The two sides share the view that the current international situation is undergoing profound changes, peace and development have become two major themes in the present-day world and democratization of international relations reflect the common demand of all countries in the world. The two sides stress that the purposes and principle of the UN Charter, the Five Principles of the Peaceful Coexistence and other universally-recognized norms governing international relations must be respected by all countries and that the leading role of the UN in international affairs should be maintained and strengthened. The affairs of a country should be handled by its own people, no country should be allowed to interfere in the internal affairs of any other sovereign state on whatever excuses. The two sides undertaken to strengthen the solidarity and cooperation among developing countries and safeguard their rights and interests.

XI. The two sides agree to closely cooperate with each other on cracking down on the cross-border organized crimes, drug trafficking, money launching, illegal immigration and any other criminal activities committed by nationals of one side in the territory of the other in accordance with the bilateral treaty of extradition and other relevant international conventions.

XII. The two sides reaffirm that all countries should have the rights to choose their own political and social system and to demand the establishment of a fair and equitable new international political and economic order to ensure world peace and stability.

Done in Phnom Penh on 13 November, 2000
AN INTERROGATOR AT S-21 WAS ARRESTED

By Sophearith Chuong

The following is extracted from the “confession” document of Vong Sam At, who was interrogated under torture at what is now known as Toul Sleng Prison, the former Office S-21 torture center of the Khmer Rouge regime.

Alleged activities of Vong Sam At from 1970 to the period before 1975

Before his arrest, Vong Sam At, alias Vong Oeun, 19, served as interrogator at S-21. He was born in Stok Tra Nich Village, Trav Punlork Sub-district, District 14 (Tuk Phos District), Kampong Chhnang Province of Region 31, Western Zone. In 1970, Vong Oeun served as a spy for Chhum, chief of monastery of Wat Toek Chum. Chhum convinced Oeun: “How can you become a novice monk as your parents are so poor. So, you can be so as long as you follow me.” Chhum went on with his enticement: “Now our country is fraught with Khmer Rouge. Soon there will be no worship or anything like that as the Khmer Rouge are non-believers. If you do what you want to do, I will help you to reach your goal. Even better, you will be promoted in the future.” Vong Oeun was truly convinced. Vong’s job was to 1) collect intelligence from the Khmer Rouge; 2) grasp hold of those who appeared to be recruitable; and 3) recruit as many spies as possible. At that time Vong Oeun was introduced to Nen (combatant), Chhum (monk) and Soh (former village chief).

Chum created conditions for Vong Oeun to contact Chhuon (monk), while Soh asked Oeun and Nen to contact a person named Heng, owner of a rice mill, for anti-revolutionary activities. Soh told Vong Oeun: “Oeun, if I’m not around, please make contact with Heng if there is any problem.” After the interaction with Heng, Vong Oeun was introduced to another person named Ny. Nen, Ny and Oeun were assigned to counter revolutionary forces at any place they could find the Khmer Rouge.

Early in 1971, soldiers were coming up from Banteay Meas barrack to Khse Khnum Village, Chaong Mong Sub-district. With fear that their son might be forced to join the army, Oeun’s parents decided to bring him to Stok Tranich Village, Trav Punlork Sub-district, District 14, Region 31. During this period of time, contacts between Oeun and his partisans were cut off and he had no chance to carry out any anti-revolutionary activities.

In mid-1972, Vong Oeun met with Soh again, who instructed him to go on with traitorous activities, including: 1) wrecking Angkar’s equipment; 2) recruiting as many (counter-revolutionary) forces into the revolutionary ranks as possible to capture power from the revolution in the near future; and 3) search for and make contact with former network elements. Then Soh told Oeun to contact Kiet, former sub-district chief, to practice activities.

In 1973, Vong Oeun was convinced by a person named Kang to hate the revolution and to contact another man named Yiep, sub-district militiaman, to destroy the revolution. In mid-1973, Vong Oeun and Yiep were assigned by Angkar to the battlefront, where he managed to spoil a certain...
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amount of ammunition. By the end of 1973, Yiep introduced Vong Oeun to Hin and Ruos. After being in contact, they arranged for a meeting to plan activities against the revolution. At that time, Vong Oeun and Yiep were taken by Angkar to the rear. In October 1973, Angkar reinforced the battlefronts, which created favorable conditions for Vong Oeun to meet with Nen, a former network element since 1970.

In 1974, Yiep introduced Vong Oeun’s partisans to the network elements of You, a militiaman, who in turn introduced Oeun to another element named Tit, also a militiaman. Vong Oeun and Hin then made contact with the new line and jointly carried out planned activity of shrieking combats while enemy soldiers launch shock assaults. As described by Hin: “Now, when soldiers are coming up, we don’t need to fire at them, allowing them to mistreat the people so that they put no trust in the revolutionary organization.” By the end of 1974, Angkar prepared for an integration of all sub-district level militiamen and Division 218 soldiers into the army of District 14. During the hospitalization there, Vong Oeun committed an alleged moral offense with a woman named Vien, medical staff member of District 14, and encouraged the patients to have continual contradictions with the medical staff: “We don’t know when we can recover from illness, as the medicines are nothing but rabbit-dung-shaped tablets”. (Thnam Ach Tun Say).

Alleged activities of Vong At after the liberation in 1975 up to the day of his arrest early in 1978

After leaving the hospital, Vong Oeun was introduced by Yiep and You to another person named Sarim, deputy secretary of Battalion 214, who was based in District 14. After the liberation of April 17, 1975, Vong Oeun was transferred to the army of District 14, where he was able to contact Sarim. Sarim educated him: “Now the whole country has been liberated, yet we still have no enjoyment. You will have no chance to enjoy happiness, as you have seen that the revolution causes more and more difficulties year-by-year. Later on you will have no appropriate clothing to wear, and we will all be assembled to experience collective life with rationing of rice-one can in the morning and one can in the evening. Collective life is not as easy as private life.”

Later, Vong Oeun was introduced by Sarim to certain elements, including Chhauy, Yan, Cheng, and Kry, in search of network elements and for carrying out anti-revolutionary activities. After Angkar took Vong Oeun’s partisans to Phnom Penh, Sarim introduced them to Saom (guard), Khom (interrogator), and Thet, Thon, Vann, and Oeun (security guards), saying: “When Angkar arrests traitors from Region 31, Kampong Chhnang, you must release them. If Angkar catches and question you, you must not implicate each other.” Upon arriving in Phnom Penh, Vong Oeun’s partisans began to tie, beat, and starve children and poison pigs in an attempt to wreck the revolution. In the same year, 1975, Angkar took Vong Oeun’s partisans for technical training in Division 703. After the training session, Vong Oeun’s network elements were out of contact with certain individuals such as Chauy, Cheng and Thlork. Then Vong Oeun, Thet, and Yan were assigned by Angkar to serve in a fifty-member unit with Kosal, who had set forth a plan to starve children.

In January 1976, Vong Oeun assigned Khom and Thon to encourage children to defecate at the Economic Support Unit and provoke anarchical activities. In February 1976, Vong Oeun and his partisans received a plan from Kosal to starve and poison children through fruits. As a result, two children were starved to death. In March 1976, Vong Oeun and partisans were taken for technical
training courses at S-21, where they had a chance to meet and discuss the following plans: 1) to burrow; 2) to catch and put soldiers with no offenses in jail; and 3) sleep on night duty and pretend to be sick.

In 1976, Angkar assigned Vong Oeun, Che, and Ho to burrow within Division 502 in search of treacherous elements. However, they hid and did not report the traitorous activities to Angkar. By the end of 1976, they were transferred to Phnom Penh (S-21). At that time, Vong Oeun, Thet, Cheng, and Oeun, who were in one line, threw pieces of earth and yelled there were people breaking in. Such activities went on.

In February 1977, Angkar assigned Vong Oeun to work with the interrogation group. Yet, before starting the work, Ho instructed him to wreck the revolution in the same ways revealed in the enemy’s confessions. With such instructions in mind, Vong Oeun interrogated and asked enemies to implicate revolutionary forces. Later, Vong Oeun was assigned to work in the documentation group. Vong Oeun then became close with Kakk, who was the group chief, and they jointly carried out traitorous activities against the revolution. As a result, security guards were in a confusion of contradictions, did not examine documents, and reduced time on core tasks so that they would have more time to question female enemies about their moral issues. In September, 1977, Vong Oeun tortured enemies, causing loud screams of pain penetrate from one room to another, thus causing enemies to become nervous and feel uneasy. Another trick used at that time was to mix up the documents and lose them, and then blame the security guards and imprison them. Even worse, Vong Oeun committed villainous acts such as undressing women and piercing their vulvas with sticks.

In 1978, Vong Oeun provoked troubles in the unit and did not follow the Angkar’s instructions to be clear and thorough in documentation. However, Vong Oeun paid no attention to the documentation process, and he tried to create complicated issues for Angkar to work out until February 1978, the time of his own arrest.

This 37-page confession document, written by Vong Oeun, was finished on March 7, 1978 under the interrogation of comrade Tit. Attached to the document is a list of 32 names of people implicated by Vong Oeung’s response. Among the 32, nine were marked “arrested”. The confession document bears thumbprints identified as being Vong Oeun’s, and a note by comrade Duch that appears to have been intended for higher levels. The note reads: “Respected Brother, this contemptible person, in interrogation group, also carried out treacherous activities at S-21. His response relates only to his interrogation group and security guards at S-21, which is different from those of the former. Respect, Duch, March 26, 1978.” Another note from higher levels reads: “Received, March 26, 1978”.

The confession document was summarized in five pages by Comrade Tit, signed March 8, 1978. The conclusion of the summary reads: “Based on my examination of the confession of Vong Oeun, it is clear that he writes his systematic accounts of his activities since 1970. And now he is still active, especially in (19)75 when he was in technical section of [unit] 703. Besides the arrested elements, his answer implicates Van, Saom (guard) who are apparently under the leadership of Kosal. And their activities are not different from those of Ron and Thon, even the act of poisoning children by fruits. However, for those whose names appear here, we cannot take any view, but note that his accounts are systematic. Therefore, decision is hinged on the party on the basis of tangible situation. To respected Angkar.”
MASS GRAVES IN BATTAMBANG PROVINCE

By Sophearith Chuong

Ek Phnom District

1) Wat Samraong: A former security facility, prison, execution site, and memorial of victim’s remains massacred during the Democratic Kampuchea regime. Wat Samraong is situated in Samraong Village, Samraong Sub-district, Ek Phnom District, Battambang Province, approximately five kilometers from the provincial town. It is located at longitude 103°31’05.87” east and latitude 13°07’44.27” north. The data recorded with our Global Positioning System is classified as files No. 20501/2/3 and R050208A.

Mr. Chhan Sovath, 57, recounted that during 1970-75 he was a Buddhist monk, but that in 1975-76 the Khmer Rouge forced him out of the monkhood at the point of a bayonet. The Khmer Rouge converted the Buddhist monastery into a security facility and the eating hall of the monks into a prisons. The Meditation Hall was transformed into an interrogation center. The execution site was adjacent to the meditation hall. After being interrogated, victims were brought to be killed and placed in the mass graves that are still clearly visible.

Mr. Chan Sovath, who is a potential witness, claimed that in 1975 the Khmer Rouge assembled about 300 monks from all monasteries and places to the Wat. In 1976, the Khmer Rouge forced the monks to get involved in farming and the Wat was used as a security facility and killing field up to 1979. The victims targeted were government employees, civilians, soldiers, police, military police, their families, and those who had (political) tendencies or who were related to soldiers.

Mr. Chan Sovath went on to say that in 1979 he was the first to begin repairing the Wat. At that time, he observed bodies in cuffs lying in dried pools of blood. He affirmed that most of victims were slaughtered and that few survived. In 1980, he dug the killing pits and found skulls in the pits. Each pit, he estimated, there were about forty to sixty pieces. The site covers an area of forty square meters. He said at the time of his first visit, he saw about 90 to 100 killing pits and a well in front of the Wat. Sovath recounted that based on the documents available in 1979, victims totaled 1008. Unfortunately, he did not keep it.

Mr. Nhim Vann, 69, told our researchers that most of the victims, both women and men, were brought from many places and viciously executed there. After slaughtering them, the Khmer Rouge placed the corpses against tamarind trees and put cigarettes into the mouths of each body.

2) Wat Ek Phnom was a security facility, prison, and execution site where victims of the Democratic Kampuchea regime were incarcerated and killed. Wat Ek Phnom is situated in Ta Korm Village, Peam Ek Sub-district, Ek Phnom District, Battambang, approximately five kilometers from the district headquarters. It is located at longitude 103°11’22.39” east, latitude 13°09’48.2” north. The data recorded with our Global Positioning System is classified as files No. 20504 and R050205A. At the execution site of Wat Ek Phnom there are about 200 graves.

In Pol Pot’s time, Mr. Khut Nguon, now 73, lived in Ta Korm Village, Peam Ek Sub-district, Ek Phnom District, Battambang Province. He recounted that in the Khmer Rouge era, Wat Ek Phnom was converted into a security facility, prison, and execution site, which is approximately 300 meter in front of the monastery. Khut Nguon went on to say that Chamkar Krauch, covering an area of one square hectare, had been covered with graves containing so many bodies that the salt from them killed the orange trees that grew there. This informant claimed that the victims taken to be killed there were those evacuated from cities between 1975-1976, as well as those who committed moral offenses, such as stealing food to eat. Other people targeted included those brought from Region 4. The Khmer Rouge used the temple and monks’ dining hall as a prison, while the execution site was behind the temple.

Banan District
1) Site Between Phnom Kdaong and Phnom Sampeou
This place was used as a security prison, and execution facility during the Democratic Kampuchea administration. It is situation in Sampeou Lech Village, Phnom Sampeou Sub-district, Banan District, Battambang Province. The site is about 14 kilometers from the provincial town and is located in between Phnom Kdaong and Phnom Sampeou at longitude 103º05’36.00” east, latitude 13º10’080” north. The data recorded with our Global Positioning System is classified as files No. 20101 and R050205A.

2) La-ang Kirirom
This place used to hold the remains of victims of the Democratic Kampuchea. Situated in Sampeou Lech Village, Sampeou Sub-district, Banan District of Battambang, La-ang Kirirom is adjacent to Phnom Sampeou Kdaong. It is located at longitude 103º05’597” east, latitude 13º01’16.50” north. The data recorded with our Global Positioning System is classified as files 201102/3/4 and R050208A.

Mr Prak Rom recounted that in Pol Pot’s time, he farmed land in Phnom Kdaong about 200 meters from the prison. He witnessed slaughters there, but told us that a few victims survived the mass killings by disguising themselves as farmers. At that time, Prak Rom asserted, the offense of stealing fruit resulted in children being executed. Old people were assigned to make earth-moving basket and raise pigs.

In 1977, the Khmer Rouge assembled and brought victims from various places to this prison on a daily basis. Rom went on to say: “At four or five in the evening, the Khmer Rouge tied victims in groups and walked them to the top of Phnom Kirirom for interrogation and execution. No one could escape. Before being killed, victims were starved for a period of time.” The witness emphasized that before 1978-79, the Khmer Rouge sent prisoners accompanied with lists of the prisoners’ names here. In 1977-78, prisoners including children were killed shortly after being sent in. As for old people, their throats were cut open immediately after interrogation, leaving the cliffs stained with blood. Rom said there were no graves as the execution site was surrounded with such deep valleys that there was no need for the Khmer Rouge to make any pits. The Khmer Rouge killed and then dropped the bodies down. Rom claimed that the number of victims killed here is up to 15,700. The prison and execution site is located to the north of the mount in between Phnom Sampeou and Phnom Kdaong. Rom maintained there were seven execution sites: one is at the La-ang Kampoul Phnom; another one is at La-ang Teng Khluon; two are at La-ang LKhaon; and the other three are on the top of the mount.

Some killing pits have disappeared due to natural erosion, while remains have disappeared as a result of anonymous burnings. The shelter constructed to preserve the remains is on the brink of ruin.
HISTORY OF COMRADE MON  
(DAUGHTER OF SON SEN)  

By Sopheap Cheung  

1) Personal background:  
- Original name: Sen Soriya  
- Revolutionary name: Mon  
- Worked in Revolutionary Hospital 1, Ministry of Social Affairs.  
- Born in 1961 in Phnom Penh  
- Female. Marital status: Single  
- Ethnicity: Khmer  
- Prior the coup member of proletarian class  
- Earned living with a cousin  
- Studied in Wat Koh School, Phnom Penh  
- Later entered Wat Dam Nak School in Siem Reap Province  
- Occupation before and after the coup did not change  
- Never joined any political organization before entry into the revolution by unknown introducer in 1971 at Office 307 in Tuol Khsach Village, Peam Sub-district, Kampong Tralach District (Kampong Chhnang)  
- Reason for the entry: Did not understand the revolutionary line and was taken by others  
- Not promoted into the core organization of the party  
- Used to work at Office 305  
- Moved to Art Performance Section 306, whose responsible was Long  
- In 1974-75 worked in Kampong Cham Province, Central Zone at Office 24 B-7  
- After liberation worked at Office K-2, K-1, K-3, K-17. The supervisor of K-17 was Saran (revolutionary traitor)  
- Assigned to do bilingual translation of Khmer and Chinese at Office 31  
- Education background: Grade 9 in previous educational system.  
- Characters: loyal to the revolution, had non-revolutionary behavior, created so much funny things and stubborn.  
- Loved collectivism, revolution and the party  
- Clean morality of living. Adhered to the-middle-of-the-road-consciousness and did not dare express ideas  
- Aggressive  
- Tried to improve and change certain defects and model herself upon the collective and give up the habit of middle-of-the-road consciousness  
- Morality in terms of ideology and materialism before joining the revolution: clean morality of living, no travel for free contact  
- Never used equipment frivolously  
- Morality after the revolution: Even better than before  
- Had a stand of economization, hygiene, and proper order.  

2) About parents:  
- Father’s name: Son Sen. Revolutionary name-Khieu  
- Ethnicity: Khmer  
- Lived with Yun Yat, of Khmer ethnicity, whose revolutionary name was At  
- Class before the coup: teacher  

3) About siblings:  
- There is one brother  
- Brother’s name: Sen Rasmei. Revolutionary name: Mei, 20 years old and single  
- Original classness: bourgeois student  
- Sister: Sen Soriya  

4) About cousins:  
- There are three cousins: one females and two males: 1) Moeun Tepy. Revolutionary name: Poul, female. Lived with parents; 2) Moeun Bopea. Revolutionary name: Pech, male. Lived with parents; 3) Pei (original and revolutionary name) lived with parents. No one joined the any political organization, but the revolution.
(Continued)

7. A Staunch Revolutionary Stance in Terms of Making and Reviewing a Biography and a Revolutionary Outlook on Life

First of all, every party member has to have a correct stance and grasp the requirements of building the revolution and of reviewing a biography and a revolutionary outlook. The aim of reviewing a biography is for every party member to know his or herself clearly. What does it mean by knowing his or herself? It means to know his or her original classness, personal social interaction, personal characteristics, and good and bad points, that is to constantly grasp our own internal contradictions in terms of political, ideological and organizational stance in order to build up ourselves and receive supporting assistance from the collective. The review on biography is to comprehend the worldview of every party member. What are our comrades’ stancepoints? If one can grasp his stancepoint, he will have right awareness of his outlook on life.

Building party members to have worldview and outlook on life is to build up basic foundation for our party members and our party. If it is to indoctrinate and consolidate political, ideological and organizational stances of the party, there must have staunch foundation, basically, the idea of revolutionary standpoint and revolutionary outlook on life. From our experience, if any comrade is industrious in reviewing revolutionary stance and revolutionary outlook on life by his or herself or by collective, mostly he or she really has the basic stance. Once meeting obstacles, the comrade will not lose control of ideology or be too proud of him or herself.
Reviewing revolutionary outlook on life is to remind us of what for we are living and who we are doing the revolution for. If the revolutionary outlook on life is constantly sharpened so that it is most cutting and powerful, there would be no complicated issues concerning private ownership. Some of our comrades are deeply involved in private ownership as a result of their unsharpened revolutionary outlook on life.

What are the tangible revolutionary standpoint and revolutionary outlook on life that we must have for the present as well as for the future? As for the revolutionary standpoint, we see clearly that Kampuchea is under the invasion by the Vietnamese enemy of aggression, territorial expansion, and racial extermination. We are also clearly aware that the people of Kampuchea under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea are bravely eliminating Yuon and springing to life in socialist construction. As a result, continual victories are being gained.

If we have such crystal revolutionary standpoint, how can we avoid contradictions in terms of the determination of our revolutionary standpoints, that is our living, political, ideological, organizational, sentimental stance? The most correct and appropriate revolutionary outlook on life is absolute stance of attacking Yuon enemies, socialist revolution, and socialist construction following the guideline of the party. Do not bow your head like a dog that is humble and serves the contemptible Yuon, while people throughout the country are attacking Yuon enemies of aggression. While all people in the country are actively involved in socialist construction, do not sleep in the hammock for pleasure and play Tror (Khmer traditional musical instrument) without a chili or citronella being planted. Is it true? Yes, our party points out clearly that a staunch revolutionary stance must be built up by reviewing biography and our revolutionary outlook on life.

Every party member must have correct and staunch revolutionary stance with high responsibility for reviewing and building revolutionary biography as well as revolutionary outlook on life. Be honest in reviewing our own biography and revolutionary outlook on life and improving and strengthening merits as quick as possible.

8. A Staunch Revolutionary Stance in Terms of Classness

The party request is that any class who joins in the revolutionary and party ranks must get rid of the stance of original class, by averting to build a staunch stance of worker class. It is good that we do our best to overcome for the sake of the revolution and as a result we have honor to become party member of the communist party of Kampuchea. Yet, for further credit, we must build up ourselves to be a party member for the rest of our lives. Some comrades have joined in the revolution since they had black hair until white hair without paying attention to self education on the stance of worker class of the party. They do not make any progress, besides centering around private ownership, rankism, influence, familyism, etc. Some others left the revolution and joined the party. From this experience, it is worth praising our comrades of all generations who have tried their best to refashion themselves under the leadership the party. These comrades love, consider their parents and children, love the party and consider the interest of the party, interest of the nation and the people above all else. What they do is for the sake of the party, nation, people and the revolution no matter to what extent they must sacrifice, even their lives. These comrades work constantly with the masses, performing as good examples in the field of agricultural production for the settlement of problems of living conditions regardless of
difficulties, facilities or whatsoever. Albeit they have made such great efforts, they are still polite, do respect the organizational disciplines unconditionally and humble as an ordinary communists for criticism for improvement by the people.

Our party is so warm with such comrades, who are trusted by the party and the people and masses. This is their reward, which is excellent and cannot be compared with rank, influence, salary or other things. Only through efforts to get rid of the stance of original class and build the party’s worker class can each party member and the party as a whole be clean and strong.

9. Staunch Revolutionary Stance in Terms of a Clean Morality of Living and Cleanliness in Political Terms

Any party member with good and clean morality of living, no corruption or debauchery, and who does not owe some sort of political debt to enemies, may have positive effect and favorable conditions in the construction of the party’s political, ideological and organizational stances. If there is no improvement, the revolutionary lives of those candidate party members would go conversely against the revolutionary current. "Proviso number nine" cannot be underestimated. Especially, cadres with hierarchical authorization of each level have to be strongly impressed by proviso number nine not to be subjective. So far we have seen so many bad examples. Some cadres have served the revolution for quite a long time. But when they have authority, they become overwhelmed with joy, forgetfulness, and carelessness, leading to the commission of immorality of living. As a result, lower levels, people, and masses do not believe that complicated issues can be worked out.

Our cadre working along the Vietnamese border have to have high vigilance in terms of morality of living. From our experience, Yuon enemies use their girls to lure our cadre, causing corruption and debauchery with the aim to serve their policy of aggression, expansion, swallowing territory, and exterminating the Kampuchean race. This is the policy of Le Duan and Pham Van Dong.

Enemies burrowing inside are identified as C.I.A, dog-like agents of Yuon, and K.G.B agents who are aiming to attack the revolutionary stance in terms of morality of living, attack the revolution, and to extend their traitorous forces. If revolutionary stance of morality of living is toppled, political, ideological and organizational stance will vanish accordingly. Through experience, unclean party members are usually those who likely have free nature in the morality of living. They don’t respect the role model of collective living. Our party cadres have to see clearly the pitfalls of such unclean revolutionary stance in terms of morality of living.

10. Possibilities for Building Themselves Up and Taking on the Role of Leadership When the Future Comes

Our Communist Party of Kampuchea has been leading the people to follow the revolution. We must fight against Yuon enemies of aggression, territorial expansion and extermination of the Kampuchean race from one generation to another. Thus, all party members must build themselves up to ensure the staunch leadership of the party.

In order to receive duty of leadership in the future, one must temper his or herself in the current revolutionary movement. Must be polite. Do not be snobbish. Must endure and overcome hardship. Must examine qualifications in terms of political, ideological, solidarity, unity, and organizational aspects...Based on what we have so far, what are the possibilities of building up ourselves and what are possibilities of responsibility of leadership in the future?
“During the interrogation, I cared nothing besides beating. I did not ask [prisoners] for any details. I just tried to inflict severe injuries so that the prisoners could not work any more. As a result, four prisoners died at my hands,” admitted Sim Mel alias Man. Mel’s confession shows the vicious acts by the interrogators at Tuol Sleng against innocent prisoners.

Man served at Tuol Sleng as an interrogator as of July 1976 until March 1977. After his termination date limited by the Party, Man was assigned to do farming at Prey Sar (S-21 Kh or Office-24)—Tuol Sleng Branch—until the day of his arrest. He was brought to Tuol Sleng, his former workplace, on October 28, 1977. As an inmate, Man was interrogated by “Chhin” and “Von” from November 3, 1977 to January 13, 1978. According to his response with twenty-two different dates, it can be presumed that Man was interrogated twenty-two times. After the interrogation, Man was still detained until January 30, 1978 date on which he was executed. Man’s 97-page long confession has been preserved to date.

During his eight months of employment, Man, as an interrogator, mistreated and slaughtered several educated inmates.

The following is a citation of Man’s response describing the activities of prisoners.

I beat a prisoner named Mam Keng alias Sakk so hard to the point that Sakk became seriously injured and could not work. [I] questioned Ke Meas, royal palace official, but he refused to answer. So I, along with Horng, beat him until he could not function and eventually died in the prison. I and Horng beat a person named Chhoeun from a Battalion, Division 920 and Chhan, chief of group 310, who refused to say until he could not work. I beat a person named Phen until he died in P-98 Hospital. Leng in association with Horng beat a contemptible Major from Ministry of Demography until he could not answer and died. Moreover, I interrogated Tea Meng Tek from Malaysia. Then I questioned a person named Nin, chief of medical staff of P098 Hospital.

In March 1977, the Party transferred Man to work in Reeducation Camp at Prey Sar. There Man was assigned as member of Company 13 of Office 24 or S-21 Kh. In August 1977, the Party was brought to work as member of Agricultural Committee of Office 24. One day, the Committee Chief named Huy (Huy Sre) was about to arrest Man for his failure to keep up with getting water in rice fields for rice growers. However, Man, sensing the arrest, managed to escape to
Region 25. On October 24, 1977, Man rode a bike along Road N0.38 with an aim to meet Brother Chea, secretary of Region 25 for his refuge, because there Man’s friends might help introduce him to Brother Chea through a letter in Man’s hand. The letter reads: “Propose Brother Chea, secretary of Region 25, to help hide Man as the Party of Reeducation Camp at Prey Sar is planning to arrest this letter bearer.”

While Man was in the west of Sa-ang District Office, local militiamen stopped him. “I sensed unusual situation before the militiamen came to check me. I bore no letter of permission for travelling and then they catch me,” recounted Man. Man was brought for four-day detention at Koh Kor, Roka Kphuos Sub-district, Sa-ang District, Kandal Province. Then he was sent to Tuol Sleng, his ex-work place. In this point, Chim Aminah, currently living in Baren Krom Village, Svay Prateal Sub-district, Sa-ang District, Kandal Province, who witnessed Man’s arrest, asserted contrarily to the said confession. Aminah claimed: “Man arrived at my house at dawn about 4 a.m. At the movement, my house was located in Veal Village known as Damrei Slap Village. In my house there was only a bike, a hammock and a pair of (rubber-sole) sandals. I asked Man what was happening. Man immediately asked me not to say anything as he was being targeted for execution. Man said they were intending to kill individuals based on their hierarchical lines. He said he was once with Brother Nat, but now Brother Nat and Brother Pin had already been executed. Man told me it was his reason for being present at her home.” Aminah went on to say: “Khmer Rouge used to declare that if there were any soldiers or relatives from anywhere, [we] had to inform them. But, in this case we could not inform them. If we did so, Man would have been killed immediately. So I just tried to hide him under a trench for two days. And I always took rice secretly for him to eat...seeing the bike, they [Khmer Rouge] felt suspicious. Then they entered and accidentally saw Man...they tried to catch him, but he tried to escape. They chased him to a place where I could not see him. So I was not so sure of whether Man was arrested. I dared not stand and see him being followed.”

After the incident, the whole Aminah’s family was accused of conspiracy to hide enemy and was brought to Koh Khach Tonlea until 1979. Based on Aminah’s assertion, two people were chasing Man, and now the tow guys are alive.

Albeit Man’s confession contains different information from what the witness has claimed, there is no doubt that Man was exactly arrested in Damrei Slap Village. After his arrest, Man was incarcerated at Tuol Sleng, Room 11, Cell 5. As he used to work at the prison, Man had few friends for secret contacts. He was told the ways to get military uniform so that he could disguise himself and try to lock the door and escape. This is the plan giving Man much hope to survive. However, there were few obstacles that Man had to overcome by himself. No one dared help Man. So he had to break the door lock by himself.

One night, his friends show signals suggesting a situation favorable for him. Then Man tried to break the lock repeatedly until the cuff moved out of his angles. “I managed to break a lock and move from the cell. Then I helped break a prisoner’s cell lock. After that I tried to look for Brother Vang (Man used to know Vang before his being imprisonment) in his cell, but I didn’t see him. At the moment, there appeared guards coming from the south. After our fighting, there occurred chaos inside the prison. Then medical staff came to catch me,” confessed Man.

In the end, Man could not survive the incarceration and continued to be tortured at Tuol Sleng. He had no ways to liberate himself, but had
to suffer the torture all the time and face the same conditions he had once imposed on prisoners for confession. This time Man could not escape from his sin no matter how far he would go. Man was “smashed” on April 30, 1978.

Man served as Khmer Rouge soldier in 1971 in Sa-ang District, Kandal Province because he was angered by the way Lon Nol’s soldiers bombed his village, leaving many villagers dead and several houses burnt. One thing which inflamed his anger the most is the fact that his grandmother was killed during the bombardment. Before 1975 Man used to be a messenger of Ta Nat who was a commander of Division 11 (later changed to Division 703). Before 1975, Ta Nat and his messenger Man stationed in Damrei Slap Village, Sa-ang Phnom Sub-district, Sa-ang District, Kandal Province.

Man’s original name was “Sim Mel”. He, 22 years old by 1977, was born in Baren Village, Svay Prateal Sub-district, Kandal Province. His father’s name was Sah Kae. His mother was Keah. There were seven brothers and sisters in his family. In his childhood, Man studied Islamic writ in his home village and with famous Tuon (Islamic teachers) in Cambodia. His schooling took place in various places ranging from Chroy Changva, Phnom Penh, Chum Nik Village and Trea Village of Kroch Chmar District, and in Rokar Por Pram in Tbong Khmum District, Kampong Cham Province. After the coup d’état against Sihanouk in 1970, Man left school and returned to his homestead. A witness named El Him, one of Man’s friends, affirmed that Man was well educated in Islam. Currently El Him lives in Cham Kraom Village, Prek Thmei Sub-district, Koh Thom District, Kandal Province. He is a teacher and village religious leader. In the Islamic Koran, Chapter 16, Verses 126, Allah states: If you punish (take revenge on your enemy), you have to inflict the same damage as you have suffered. However, you would be awarded if you can be patient”.

It would be a different concept with reference to Buddhism. Buddhism states “Human beings have to avoid taking lives of others, even creatures.” In this sense, albeit Man was a murder, the Buddha doesn’t allow human beings or his victims seek vengeance against him and prefers Man to hold all his responsibilities.

Article 2 of “CONVENTION ON PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF CRIME OF GENOCIDE” approved and proposed for signature and ratification or accession General Assembly Resolution 260A (III) of 9 December 1948 states: “Genocide is composed of the following three elements (at least one of the five genocidal acts enumerated in Article II of the Genocide Convention): a) killing members of a group; b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of a group; c) deliberately inflicting on a group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within a group; and e) forcibly transferring children of a group to another group.

In this case that Man, ethnic minority killed another minority and majority, is it possible for his act to be included in any form of crimes under international law? Is it a genocide crime against ethnic minorities themselves or crime against humanity against ethnic minorities and majority?

KHMER ROUGE SLOGAN

◆ How does an elderly, insane man remove a mountain? His son will follow him and when his son dies, his grandson will go on with the model. As for the two mountains, they can not grow any longer no matter how big they are. On the contrary, once we gradually remove mountains from regime to regime, they will be lower and lower (Tai Haong Mountains). (Notebook Nhok, p.60)
Patriotic youth is the special force of the Khmer Rouge organization established to carry out spot-check along the roads and villages and necessarily needed military support. Based on file number N5289, a person named Sokh Sakhan, 20 (in 1973), born in Prey Chheu Teal Village, Svay Tran Sub-district, Svay Teap District of Svay Rieng, fled from the liberated area (controlled by the Khmer Rouge) to territory controlled by the Khmer Republic under Lon Nol’s administration on November 12, 1973. He was chosen to be a regional soldier. Sakhon told the Sub-Military Region 6 of Svay Rieng: “I was an eighth-grader of Wat Rum Duol Primary School. After that I was recruited by the village chief of Chheu Teal to be a village-based patriotic youth.”

In file number N528, a person named Roath Veasna, alias Nguon, 21 (in 1973), who served as village-based youth unit and lived in Prey Rum Duol Village, Prasaut Sub-district, Kampong Ro District, Svay Rieng Province, said: “Patriotic Youth Organization was created by communist Khmer early in 1972 in Prey Chheu Teal Village, Svay Ta San Sub-district, Svay Teap District, Svay Rieng Province. The organization has a staff of 30 under the command of Kong Put, chief, Mao Sut, deputy, and Saret, acting administrator. Sokh Sakhon affirmed that the village-based patriotic youth organization had been selecting unmarried youth aged 16 and up since 1973 to join the
movement. In the case that a youth was married, he had to be integrated into a militia unit.

According to file number N5287, Prum Pisei, alias Prum Vanthan, 20 (in 1973), who was living in the same village as Roath Veasna, wrote the patriotic youth organization of the communist Khmer was to register village youth and assign their work without any military strategic training. The only one who had been trained by higher level was Kong Put, chief of the organization. The selected youth only worked in their own village. Sakhon went on to say: “Since I became a youth based in Prey Pra Teal Village about seven months ago, I have never seen the organization provide or supply our group. On the other hand, the organization demanded two riel from us every month.” The Patriotic Youth Organization’s job was to make spot-check in association with sub-district militiamen and patriotic women group in the village. They were charged with examining letters of travellers who might move from one village to another. Another job was to control smuggling of utensils and goods without permission. Anyone caught had to be sent to their supervisor. Their daily guard shift included two male and three female youth. They were supposed to work from seven a.m until five p.m. During the guard shift, instead of using guns, the village youth used knives or axes. In case there was any unusual phenomenon in the village, the supervisor of the organization needed to make oral report to the village chief, who would in turn report to the sub-district chief responsible for settlement of the case. If the case was not solved, it would be sent to a higher level immediately. The male and female youth were supposed to go home after the guard shift.”

Prum Van wrote that besides guard duty, the patriotic youth had two other main tasks: to do farming and be ready to carry the wounded. The farming included the cultivation of several crops used as supplies for soldiers in the front battles. In a time of war, the patriotic youth were obliged to dispatch food supplies from the rear to the front battles and carry the injured back to the rear or to another village. The organization was required to hold a weekly meeting under the chairmanship of the chief of male and female youth with the participation of women in the rear. The aim of the meeting was to criticize those who had made mistakes, in order to improve them. If anyone was identified as having committed unredeemable mistakes, he or she would be reported by the chairman of the meeting to the village chief immediately. The meetings were not organized in a regular location. But, mostly they were held at villagers’ residences. The patriotic youth were obliged not only to carry food supplies and the injured, but also to be drafted into the district army.

Prum Vanthan added that before the selection, a person Saphan, chief of Kampong Ro District, did not make contact with people, but with village chiefs who then called the villagers as well as village youth to be enticed to become regional soldiers. The recruiting took place for one day in each village. Most of the people targeted for the selection were youth and volunteers serving in the movement as teachers or poor peasant people. In June 1973, the organization was able to recruit 200 people to be soldiers of Region 203. Prum Vanthan concluded that: “The village youth were not only selected as soldiers but sometimes also as sub-district militiamen. The selection process was resented by some youth and their families. Some expressed their dissatisfaction, but were ruthlessly brought in to be educated.”
In Cambodia, the killing campaign was curtailed in June 1975 by the Pary Center. Soon afterward more formal and more extensively documented procedures for dealing with “enemies,” centered on santebal, came into effect. From October 1975 onward, instead of being summarily put to death, people suspected of working against the revolution were interrogated and required to prepare confessions. Prisoners included officials of the defunct regime, Cambodians who had studied abroad, deserted, malingerers, Khmers with links to the deposed Thieu regime in Saigon, and the so-called Hanoi Khmer, who were viewed by the Party Center with particular suspicion and had been subjected to CPK purges since 1972.

In 1976, as the purges gathered momentum, the Khmer Rouge worked hard to consolidate their control over the country and to burnish their reputation overseas. In January, Democratic Kampuchea’s constitution was promulgated. In April national elections were held, a central government was formed, and steps were taken to set up a national army. Phnom Penh Radio announced that a “rubber plantation worker” named Pol Pot, unknown by that name to anyone outside the Party, was the country’s new prime minister. In May, santebal shifted most of its operations to Tuol Sleng. Soon afterward, the second wave of purges began.

Because Tuol Sleng functioned as the capital’s main political prison, the sorts of victims targeted earlier continued to be brought in, questioned, and killed, but as Elizabeth Becker has phrased it, “The Party leaders [now] shifted their attention from eliminating or transforming the bourgeois to eliminating the bourgeois tendencies in the Party.” The alteration ushered in a full-scale reign of terror that continued until the collapse of DK. As Hannah Arendt has suggested, “Only after the extermination of real enemies has been completed and the hunt for ‘objective’ enemies begins does terror become the actual content of totalitarian regimes.

The Second Wave of Purges

The new search for enemies was accelerated by two unnerving, inexplicable events. On 25 February 1976, an explosion occurred in the city of Siem Reap, accompanied by sightings of foreign aircraft. In early April a series of what were probably random explosions in Phnom Penh seemed to Pol Pot and his colleagues to foreshadow a full-blown coup d’etat. Exactly what happened on these two occasions is still unclear. Publicly the regime blamed the Siem Reap explosion on “CIA agents”—a charge sustained as late as 1978—and the incident in the capital on DK troops manipulated by Vietnam. In private, the Party’s leaders suspected the secretary of the Northern Zone, Koy Thuon (alias Khun), of involvement in the Siem Reap explosion. They also came to suspect the secretary of the Eastern Zone, the veteran revolutionary Sao Phim (alias Sovanna) of masterminding in the capital. Both men, remained at large, although soon after the explosion
Koy Thuon was summoned to Phnom Penh, ostensibly to take charge of the nation’s foreign trade but also to be questioned about alleged sexual misconduct. On 8 April 1976, less than a week after the explosions in Phnom Penh, Koy Thuon was placed in protective custody in a “special building” (sala pises) near the Royal Palace, not far from the heavily guarded building occupied by the “upper brothers.” In May and June, the second wave of purges began in earnest.

In presenting the sequence of these purges, using data drawn to a large extent from successive confessions, I have taken no position on the truth of the texts or on the prisoners’ innocence or guilt. Because these decisions may disappoint readers looking for a reliable history of opposition to DK, my rationale needs to be spelled out.

First, without corroboration from other sources, very few of the “facts” contained in the confessions, aside from strictly autobiographical ones, can be taken at face value. Whether prisoners told the truth under torture, said what they were told to say, said what they thought their interrogators wanted to hear, or produced a melange of truth, half truth, and fantasy is impossible to determine. It is safe to assume, however, not only that in their broad outlines most confessions were fabricated to suit what S-21 officials assumed to be the wishes of the Party Center but also that strands of genuine conspiratorial narrative, and actual angry conversations are sometimes woven into the confessions.

Second, very few documents have survived about the decisions made by the Party Center regarding “enemies.” We can seldom determine why prisoners were arrested, aside from tracing their associations with others already arrested or with units that had performed badly and had come under suspicion. For low-ranking prisoners, the essence of their “crimes” was often the company they kept. Higher-ranking prisoners, on the other hand, were made to confess to planning to overthrow or sabotage the revolution by forming rival parties, plotting to assassinate the Party’s leaders, or openly criticizing the Party Center’s policies. Whether these conspiracies were genuine, or the conspirators accurately named, is impossible to determine.

Although there were no courts or judges in Democratic Kampuchea, the confessions resemble briefs for the prosecution, or more precisely the kinds of evidence assembled for an examining magistrate under the French system of justice practiced in prerevolutionary Cambodia. The confessions were prepared at S-21 for the invisible “judges” in the Party Center. Because of the infallibility asserted by the Party Center and the secrecy surrounding S-21, the possibilities of error, innocence, and release were all foreclosed.

Moreover, using the words “guilty” or “innocent” to describe the prisoners at S-21 is misleading. Using these words lends judicial legitimacy to a macabre project whereby all the prisoners, regardless of their actions and before they started talking, were condemned to death. Procedures followed at S-21 indeed sometimes seem to have been inspired by the Red Queen in Alice in Wonderland or by Kafka’s The trial. At another level, those prisoners genuinely “guilty” of opposing DK might well deserve to be seen—in hindsight, to be seen—as heroes, while those victims who were “innocent” of opposition and thus complicity in the regime’s guiding ideas and practices should not necessarily be honored as law-abiding citizens of a...
The diverse responses of French citizens to the German occupation in World War II provide a useful parallel to what happened in Cambodia, with diverse meanings opening up for “selfish-ness,” “nationalism,” and “betrayal” depending on who was involved in politics as well as where, when, and to what extent. To extend the comparison, it certainly occurred to a number of CPK cadres after 1977, or even earlier, that some form of foreign, (Vietnamese) patronage or even a more “Vietnamese” style of revolution would be preferable to the ongoing depredations, endemic poverty, and apparently random, open-ended violence of DK. By 1978 thousands of Cambodians were cutting their losses, drawn to the greater power of the Vietnamese and the possibility of new patrons. None of them, it seems, had judged DK as evil from the start. Similarly, very few French citizens had opposed Petain in 1940, whereas many had come to do so by 1943. In DK in 1977 and 1978, however, the defectors from DK, like latter-day Gaullistes, became guilty, from the government’s perspective, of choosing what turned out to be the winning side. The purges of the Eastern Zone in Cambodia in 1978, which aimed to stamp out resistance and prevent more people from fleeing to Vietnam, had the unintended effect of generating opposition among survivors. Those who escaped these purges, including such post-1979 Cambodian luminaries as Heng Samrin, Chea Sim, and Sar Kheng, joined surviving “Hanoi Khmers” and some earlier defectors to form the regime that took office after the Vietnamese invasion.

Finally, the awesome cruelty of the DK regime toward its citizens, so vividly documented in the archive of S-21, does not foreclose the possibility that Pol Pot and his associates in some cases (but which ones?) had evidence about real conspiracies to overthrow them. As Steve Heder has suggested, many of the confessions ring true, even without corroboration, and it would be wrong to label all the prisoners at S-21 “innocent” of involvement in conspiracy because their confessions contain absurdities, because the regime was evil, or because they were all so cruelly treated.

**Rationale for the Archive**

Putting questions of justice, truth, innocence, and guilt aside, we still need to ask why the S-21 archive was so voluminous and why it was maintained at all when its contents were kept secret, so much of the material was untrue, and all the prisoners were killed.

We now know that DK was far more heavily documented than observers had thought likely in the 1980s, when hardly any DK documents except those from Tuol Sleng were accessible to outsiders. Impressed at the time by the sheer bulk of the S-21 archive and the supposedly primitive character of the regime, many of us believed that other documentation from DK, if it existed, would not alter the general picture that was emerging from survivors’ descriptions. Since 1994, however, hundreds of thousands of pages of DK materials, including thousands more dealing with S-21, have come to light. Most of these were released by the Cambodian government to the Cambodia Genocide Program managed by Yale University. Others were discovered at S-21 itself after the microfilming of the archive was completed in 1993.

Many of these recently discovered documents are typed; some survive in several carbon copies. The clatter of typewriters in derelict buildings, indeed, was probably one of the few sounds of human activity in Phnom Penh. Moreover, we know that the mountain of DK material now accessible to scholars represents only a fraction of what was produced. Sizable collections of DK documents still closed to outsiders are known to exist in Cambodia and Vietnam.

The S-21 archive, therefore, is not unusual in its volume or its technical sophistication, but why it was maintained? Why were such lengthy and detailed confessions extracted from people already condemned to death and kept on file after the prisoners had been killed? (Continued on page 29)
Excerpts from certain articles relating to amnesty in the memorandum of understanding reached between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia for prosecuting crimes committed during the period of Democratic Kampuchea:

The draft law dated July 5, 2000 has been painstakingly discussed by the United Nations delegation headed by Mr. Hans Corell and the Cambodian delegation led by State Minister Sok An. The discussion resulted in a draft law on July 7, 2000, signed by Mr. Hans Corell and State Minister Sok An. Article 9 states: “The Parties agree that there shall be no amnesty for the crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. An amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Chambers shall not be a bar to prosecution.”

In the draft law dated July 7, 2000, article 9, there is a note reading: “On 20 March 2000 the Head of the United Nations delegation was informed in writing by the Head of the Cambodian delegation as follows with respect to decisions already taken regarding amnesty for the Khmer Rouge. The Cambodian Constitution gives the right to His Majesty the King to grant amnesties (Article 27), and also to the National Assembly to approve the law on amnesty (Article 90). To date, His Majesty King Norodom Sihanouk has only exercised this right with regard to the Khmer Rouge when requested by the Royal Government of Cambodia, on the condition of a clear endorsement by two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly. Draft Law (Article 40) makes a clear statement of the government’s intent not to request an amnesty for any person who committed crimes described in Articles 3-8 of that Draft Law. This indicates our intention to make a clear break in the cycle (of impunity). As to the past, I can inform you that, with regard to matters covered in this Draft Law, there has been only one case, dated 14 September 1996, when an amnesty was granted to only one person with regard to a 1979 conviction on the charge of genocide.” (See page 34 of the statement of the Royal Government of Cambodia on Draft Law).
In particular, Son Sen told leading military cadre that they must “have an absolute standpoint about purging counter-revolutionary elements; don’t be half-baked.”

Mut and Met also listened to reports from other leading division cadre, such as Division 310 Secretary Sbauv Him alias Euan (later purged), who not only reported again on the earlier arrest of a boy at Prek Kdam, but also that “a number of traitors” had been “discovered” in the division through what Euan described as “the concrete situation” and as a result of “responses from the outside”, possibly a reference to “confessions” extracted at S-21. He explained that “theft activities continue one after the other” and included thefts that were “political”, “not something usual”. He complained that although “re-education” to deal with such problems worked for “the good ones”, who “mostly” improved, others “remain intractable and resist improvement”. Moreover, despite more general political education, “one section of Party members” were “still not loyal” and were even “betraying the Party” because they were “dissatisfied and unhappy with the Party’s Four Year [Economic] Plan”, which had been under discussion at Party’s highest levels since July 1976.

In his own report, Mut lamented that there had been “powerful changes” for the worse with regard to “enemy situations” in September. First, he said, “thefts of everything have emerged.” Second, somebody was
“whipping up the word that there are tigers” about in Division 164’s areas of operation. Third, “seven combatants from the motor pool set up a liberal unit of organization with their own commissar, commander and person in charge of logistics.” Fourth, “combatants and cadre who have been hospitalized walk around freely.” Finally, “some cadre” were fooling “their subordinates by saying the Organization has summoned them to a meeting, and then go motorcycle riding for fun.”

For his part, Met reported an “enemy situation” involving the discovery by Division 502 of a carbine in a place where a political study session was to be convened. This discovery had led him to “surmise ... that the enemy intended to kill our cadre while they were studying.” He was happier to report that “no-good elements” in the Northwest Zone army who had been guarding an airfield near Batdambang town had been purged by the “grassroots” there. On the other hand, while most of his own cadre and combatants were “good and active in building socialism, ... some individuals” were “still kicking back and insubordinate”. In particular, one company cadre who had been assigned “to guard enemy women” had been accused of “being mixed up in problems of morality”, that is sexual impropriety.

Mut evidently remained in Phnom Penh for some time after this meeting, and while there received reports on Division 164 actions from its Deputy Secretary, Hoeng Deuan alias Deum (later purged). In a telegram on 24 September 1976, Deum explained that after the division had taken unspecified “measures against the enemy” that Mut had “decided”, five of them “fled into the forest”, but had been “pursued and arrested”. A few days later, another telegram from Deum to Mut reported the division had arrested “a boy, aged 16” on the night of 23 September who had “confessed” to being “an informer conducting reconnaissance for ... bandits” whom he said were armed with automatic rifles and pistols.

Arrests by Division 502 were reported at a 30 September 1976 meeting of the General Staff presided over by its Member, Siet Chhae alias Tum (later purged). Under the agenda item “enemy situations”, the minutes record that Met’s unit had been “able to arrest 15” combatants who had “deserted in September” and were now confined as “elements with tendencies and who are liberal.” On 9 October 1976, Met’s deputy, Nhém San, sent a report to the General Staff on a new enemy situation that had resulted in Division 502’s arrest two days previously of one Ov Pring, who had “responded” during interrogation that he “had conducted activities in Boeng Thom subdistrict, District 52, Sector 33, with the intention of conducting a
demonstration on 12 October 1976 to oppose the revolution.” Pring had also “revealed” the names of some 33 “of his cronies”, all of which were listed in the report.

Mut and Met themselves then attended a 9 October 1976 meeting of division cadre convened by Son Sen. They heard Division 450 Secretary Suong speak of problems with “cadre whose parents have been swept out” before listening to reports by their deputies Deum and San. Deum reported three recent arrests by Division 164. The first was that previously reported by telegram, that of the boy who was the son of a soldier and had been kidnapped by bandits who took him to live with them and made him come and reconnoitre. This boy said the command post of these bandits was on the summit of Phnum Kandal, where there are five of them living in a camp where they’ve pitched tents and set up camp beds.

The second was of “a 13-year-old girl in the Toek Sap area” of Prey Nup district, who “was among a group who had just gone into the forest recently.” The third was of “a rice thief at the Kampung Saom pier, who said he had come all the way from Veal Rinh” in Prey Nup district. The fourth was of a combatant who had allegedly “tied five grenades under the bed” of a Division cadre, but this last detainee had escaped.

San referred to “some arrests on the 502 front”, including that of Ov Pring. He reported that Pring “was part of a group that was about to hold a demonstration when they were arrested by the grassroots”. He also reported that Division 502 suffered from “desertion to the grassroots” and contacts with bandits. In this connection, he gave as an example “the contemptible Sok, from whom we got a number of answers, but then he hung himself to death” before interrogation was complete. Another problem was a company level cadre who was complaining that “when we transplanted [paddy] during the national democratic revolution there was progress, but when we transplant in the socialist revolution, we retrogress. Before we ate rice by the bushel, now we eat rice by the can.” Finally, he reported that “more than 80 elements with political tendencies” had “already been removed” from the Division.

More dramatic was Son Sen’s own presentation on how the “duty of defending the country” had been carried out with regard to a “certain number of traitors in the Party whom we have been able to arrest”. He promised to inform those present of the “measures” taken in this connection “and a number of experiences we have deduced with regard to the task of defending the country.” He added that “from the responses of these guys, we know of a certain number of their plans”.

Son Sen explained:

The traitorous links we have arrested one after the other comprise three networks, but at the end of the day, there is but a single network. First, we arrested the traitorous links in Division 170. ...

At that time, our analysis with regard to the enemy to the West was that it was evolving toward becoming inconsequential. The victories of the revolution were improving our capabilities. ... we didn’t take much notice of the enemies who were conducting activities to attack us from within.

Son Sen now gave a full explanation for the arrest on 19 May 1976 of Chan Chakrei. He said:

there were the incidents of guns being fired near the Fine Arts School and leaflets being thrown near the Palace. Then in early April 1976, they threw grenades and threw leaflets again. We felt these were enemy activities. Those implicated in the answers of those we were able to arrest went right up to Chakrei. Before he was arrested, we had seen two pieces of evidence. First, the letter written to Sophan saying his wife was about to give birth and that he should find her a Khmer healer from the East, and then Sophan’s responding letter saying that he would respect everything his elder brother wanted.

Describing the results of Chakrei’s interrogation, SonSen revealed that

Upon arrest he responded clearly that he was a [Khmer] Serei link and that his boss was Chhouk, the Secretary of Sector 24. We arrested Chhouk, and he responded that he had contacts with a Vietnamese to make arrangements to attack our Party’s leading apparatus. They would attack from the inside while Viet Nam attacked from the outside. The Yuon was named Bai Map. Chhouk’s responses ultimately implicated Ya. We arrested Ya, and he responded that he had been a traitor since 1962 along with somebody else named Kaev Meah. This network had created a new Party back
in 1962 .... We could then see clearly what had been going on with the unrest in Kah Kong and the problem of contradictions between Sector 25 and Sector 33.

Son Sen declared that “we have basically smashed the leadership links” of this supposed three-in-one traitorous network. Using an established codeword to describe those who were condemned to death, he said these leadership links “were big historical super-traitors to the nation and Party”. Those who had been “basically smashed” included such “CIAs on the inside”, along with “the major traitorous forces belonging to them”. He warned those present, however, that “their henchmen still exist”. Thus, he instructed,

In terms of our perspective and standpoint, we must further heighten our spirit of revolutionary vigilance. Previously, we had raised this problem, but we as yet had nothing in terms of documentation that was as clear and alive as this new documentation. It is therefore imperative to have lofty revolutionary vigilance and ensure defence of the Party and the army.

Concretely operationalizing revolutionary vigilance means having a firm grip on our units of organization, ensuring that the enemy is unable to burrow from within, and doing whatever needs to be done to make our army clean. Both the American imperialist-CIA side and the Y uon-Soviet-revision side have their plans for burrowing from within to create a new Party to oppose us.

On the theoretical front, Son Sen explained, those present must “have a firm grasp of contradictions in Kampuchean society, because the contradiction between us and the exploiting classes is more acute than before.” These were manifest in and manifestations of “contradictions between a correct revolution and a counterfeit revolution, contradictions between a revolution and American imperialism, contradictions between a stance of independence and a stance of lackydom.” Therefore, those present must indoctrinate subordinate cadre and combatants in their units “so that they understand the state of contradictions arising from the enemies burrowing from within and from the enemies’ tricks.” They must “purge absolutely no-good elements”.

Division 164’s Deum was the first to declare that he “would like to be in unity with the Organization’s presentation,” adding, “before, I had suspected some and not suspected some because all these individuals held important leadership posts. I have now therefore heightened vigilance even more.” He explained:

In the past, the enemy conducted activities in the Division, but there were shortcomings in attacking the enemy, to which not a lot of attention was paid. With regard to this problem, if you think about it, the activities of one or two enemies on the inside can wreck the strength of the revolution. For example, they could burn down storage depots, for a start.

I had known something about this problem of the enemy creating a new Party from the instructions one after the other of the Party, but it didn’t go so deep as the information I’ve now heard from the Party.

From an examination of my forces, from 90 to 95 per cent of them are reliable, those who are loyal to the Party. But if you want unsullied faith that the army is clean, it seems not yet to be clean, and it is imperative to follow up with more purges.

After listening to more such statements by leading cadre from other units, Mut himself then spoke up to applaud the measures Son Sen said had been taken and to vow he would clean up Division 164. Mut declared:

I would like to say about concern with the activities of the traitors within the Party, that this has been a great victory for our Party. This lesson has strengthened another degree the standpoint of revolutionary vigilance.

We have been indoctrinated with the Party’s standpoint that a correct standpoint analyzes these enemies as being American imperialists and revisionists with plans to attack our revolution.

As for the problem of the grasp on the unit of organization, cadre and combatants, it is not yet firm. No-good elements or enemies are still camouflaged and infiltrated in the rank-and-file. The most important factor is the grasp of the everyday ideology of the Core Organizations.

It is imperative to make arrangements to take measures so as to seize the initiative in advance. On this I would like to be in total agreement and unity with the Party. Do whatever needs to be done not to allow the situation to get out of hand .... and not to let them strengthen or expand themselves in the least.

(Continued)
THERE appears a need to clarify the status of various versions of the Draft Law on the Khmer Rouge tribunal, as some confusion may result from the Phnom Penh Post October 27-November 90, 2000 article “KR tribunal secrecy denounced” by Anette Marcher and the Post’s release on to the Internet of a text described as reflecting “the changes agreed upon by United Nations Undersecretary-General Hans Corell and the Minster of the Council of Ministers Sok An on July 7 2000”.

The texts released by the Phnom Penh Post on the Internet of the Draft Law and on the draft Memorandum of Understanding (or Articles of Cooperation) differ in a number of points from those presented by Mr Hans Corell on July 7. It should also be noted that the July 7 texts could not possibly have been endorsed at the negotiations, as meetings were held only on July 5 and 6.

Both texts of the Draft Law from the July negotiations have a cover letter stating clearly that they are the text which “the UN and the Cambodian delegations have agreed to work on”, and neither bears the signatures of the parties as agreed documents. The Royal Government of Cambodia still considers the January draft endorsed by the Council of Ministers to be the official version under discussion by the National Assembly together with a number of proposed amendments that have emerged over the ensuing months, particularly those reached in the two further rounds of negotiations with the UN.

During the July negotiations both parties agreed that they would not publicly release any new texts precisely because these subsequent document did not have any official standing, and that the next step would be the release of the Law as eventually adopted by the National Assembly, to be followed by the signing of the Articles of Cooperation by both parties. At the four meetings so far held with the Legislation Commission, Minister Sok An, Head of the Task Force, has been discussing article by article the January text, along with the proposed amendments, points raised by members of the Committee and also comments made by a range of other parties, including NGOS.

As to the charges of delay, like most other activities of the Cambodian Government, these meetings with the Legislation Commission were suspended during the recent floods and the parliamentary recess, but will soon resume, and the Prime Minister has on several occasions stated that is one of the Government’s top priorities in legal issue.

It is to be hoped that further such misleading reports are not published, as they do nothing but sow confusion and obstruct the proper procedures for drafting and adopting an important and sensitive piece of national legislation that has deep implications and significance for all Cambodians.

(Continued from page 23)

An obvious, perhaps overriding answer is that workers at S-21 wanted at all costs to avoid the wrath of their superiors. Playing it safe, they processed the regime’s “enemies” as thoroughly as they could and maintained the voluminous files as proof of their hard work. Another likelihood is that the administrators of the prison, every one a true believer, were genuinely curious about betrayals of their “beloved Party” and hoped, by documenting what the prisoners confessed, to plum the depths of counterrevolutionary schemes. A third possibility is that prisoners hoped by spinning out their confessions to avoid or postpone torture and execution. Finally, its seems clear that Son Sen and the other former schoolteachers running the prison wanted to administer a modern, meticulously documented security operation, worthy of an internationally recognized Communist regime and pleasing to themselves.

(Continued)
The Far Eastern Economic Review reported that in 1989, U.S. “officials warned that if Thailand abandoned the Cambodian resistance and its leader Sihanouk for the sake of doing business with Phnom Penh it would have to pay a price.” Soon after, the American ambassador in Thailand stated that the Khmer Rouge could not be excluded from any future government of Cambodia. The Bush Administration’s Secretary of State, James A. Baker, proposed the Khmer Rouge be included.

**The Paris Agreement**

Another factor was the decision to move the negotiations on Cambodia from the Jakarta regional forum, involving all the Southeast Asian countries, to the world forum in Paris instead. In 1989, the talks were expanded to include the Great Powers. China’s presence brought the Khmer Rouge back to center stage.

The terms of the negotiations, requiring unanimity for any agreement, also effectively gave the Khmer Rouge a veto. Pol Pot consciously used it, according to defectors’ reports of briefings that he gave to his commanders in 1988. He revealed plans to delay any elections until his forces controlled the country, and Khieu Samphan, Pol Pot’s delegate to the negotiations, stated: “The outside world keeps demanding a political end to the war in Kampuchea. I could end the war now if I wanted, because the outside world is waiting for me. But I am buying time to give you, comrades, the opportunity to carry out all the tasks. If it doesn’t end politically and ends militarily, that’s good.”

The years 1988-91 saw the watering down of diplomatic criticism of the Khmer Rouge genocide. At the first Jakarta Meeting on 28 July 1988, the Indonesian chairman’s final communique had noted a Southeast Asian consensus on preventing a return to ‘the genocidal policies and practices of the Pol Pot regime.’ But on November 3, 1989, U.N. General Assembly watered this down to ‘the universally condemned policies and practices of the recent past.’ Then the February 1990 Australian proposal, on which the final U.N. Plan was based, referred only to ‘the human rights abuses of a recent past.’ And the U.N. Plan emasculated this in August 1990, vaguely nodding at ‘the policies and practices of the past.’ Pol Pot would enjoy ‘the same rights, freedoms, and opportunities to participate in the electoral process’ as all other Cambodians.

The Paris Agreement was signed in this form in 1991. However, the US and Australia promised at the signing that ‘we will support efforts to bring to justice those responsible for the mass murders of the 1970s if the new Cambodian government chooses to pursue this path.’

Under the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia from 1991 to 1993, the Khmer Rouge were allowed to establish a political presence in Phnom Penh for the first time since 1979, in a new compound behind the royal palace. Under U.N. auspices, Khieu Samphan and Son Sen, president and deputy prime minister in the genocidal regime, were appointed to the Supreme National Council, a body that now enshrined Cambodian sovereignty.

Meanwhile, the U.N.’s Human Rights Commission was to consider a draft resolution on Cambodia. The draft referred to “the atrocities reaching the level of genocide committed in particular during the period of Khmer Rouge rule,” and called on all states to “detect, arrest, extradite, or bring to trial those who had been responsible for crimes against humanity committed in Cambodia, and prevent the return to governmental positions of those who were responsible for genocidal actions during the period 1975 to 1978.”

However, the chairman of the Subcommission of Human Rights decided to drop this text from the agenda after speakers said that it would render a disservice to the United Nations. (Ten years later, this same official was appointed to run the UN office responsible for persuading Cambodia to support a new UN policy, that the Khmer Rouge should be brought before an international tribunal.)

Though they profited from the Agreement’s
protections and concessions, the Khmer Rouge declined to abide by it. They refused to implement the cease-fire, disarming of their troops, or demobilization. They refused to allow any U.N. presence in the territories that they controlled, which they expanded while the other parties generally respected the cease-fire. This allowed the Khmer Rouge to harvest valuable timber for sale to Thailand.

The Khmer Rouge also boycotted the 1993 election and tried to sabotage it. They failed, but continued their military campaign against the elected Cambodian government, a new coalition between the royalists and the former communists led by Hun Sen. In 1994, Cambodia outlawed the Khmer Rouge. It was only now that international action slowly began to build against them.

1994 to the present

Also in 1994, the U.S. Congress passed the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act. It was now U.S. policy to bring to justice the perpetrators of the crimes against humanity and genocide in Cambodia. The State Department commissioned legal studies, and funded Yale University’s Cambodian Genocide Program to collect the historical evidence.

In 1997, a joint appeal to the U.N. by the two Cambodian prime ministers, Hun Sen and Norodom Ranariddh, called for the establishment of a tribunal. As a result, the Secretary General’s Special Representative for Human Rights in Cambodia ushered a resolution through the U.N. General Assembly which condemned the Khmer Rouge genocide. A year later, the U.N. commissioned its Group of Experts to examine the evidence against the Khmer Rouge and to recommend whether a tribunal should be established.

In March 1999, the Experts’ report was issued by the Secretary General. The report recommended the creation of an international tribunal, but in Manila, or Canberra, or the Hague—not Cambodia, where most of the documents and witnesses could be found. In the meantime, though Pol Pot and Son Sen had died, the surviving Khmer Rouge leaders had all surrendered or been captured.

What has happened now could not easily have been predicted five years ago. Russia, France, Britain and the United States are all in favor of a tribunal; China stands alone in threatening to veto it. A tribunal could be established through the General Assembly, where China doesn’t have a veto.

Negotiations are now underway between the U.N. and the Cambodian government, which initially requested an international tribunal but now wants to try the Khmer Rouge leaders itself. Cambodia is now preparing charges of genocide against Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan as well as Mok. The former Khmer Rouge security chief, Kang Khek Iev, alias Deuch, has also been apprehended and sent for trial in Phnom Penh.

Cambodia and the United Nations continue to negotiate a ‘mixed’ national and international tribunal. There will likely be a legal accounting in some form. But it is also important to remember that from 1979 to 1994, an international coalition saved the Khmer Rouge from being brought to justice when they were still a threat to Cambodia militarily, and when Pol Pot was alive to face his accusers.

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To outsiders, and often to ourselves, Cambodia looked peaceful enough. The farmers bound to their planting cycles. Fisherman living on their boats ... The wide boulevards and the flowering trees of our national capital, Phnom Penh. All that beauty and serenity was visible to the eye. But inside, hidden from sight the entire time, was kum. Kum is a Cambodian word for a particularly Cambodian mentality of revenge - to be precise, a long-standing grudge leading to revenge much more damaging than the original injury. If I hit you with my fist and you wait five years and then shoot me in the back one dark night, that is kum . . . Cambodians know all about kum. It is the infection that grows on our national soul.

−Haing Ngor, A Cambodian Odyssey

To dig up grass, one must also dig up the roots.

−Khmer Rouge saying

Both Cambodians and foreigners ask: why were so many people killed during the Pol Pot period? There is no one easy answer. Instead, we must look at a variety of factors, ranging from the civil war to Pol Pot’s paranoid destruction of “strings” of enemies. Another important factors involves the Khmer Rouge mixing of Marxist-Leninist theory with traditional Cambodian ideas of holding a grudge (kum), revenge (sangsuk), and completely destroying the enemy (kar pchan phchal).

Let us think back upon the conditions in Cambodian society before and during the Pol Pot period. As illustrated by the Samlaut rebellion, the Khmer Rouge movement could appeal to a small, yet growing base of impoverished peasants and their children. Some were landless; others remained heavily in debt or owned just a small amount of land. These numbers undoubtedly rose as the civil war progressed and the U.S. bombing of Cambodia intensified. Many of these people had a great deal of anger toward the rich and urban dwellers and quickly embraced Khmer Rouge ideology about class struggle.

One major source of resentment was the disrespectful way in which some rich people treated the poor, evaluating them (aoy tamlei) as “inferior” (an) and looking down upon (moel ngeay) them, making them lose face. The memory of such shameful incidents were “buried in the heart” and led some peasants to desire revenge. A second grievance the poor had against the rich was a sense of the relatively greater suffering they had to endure, frequently as a direct result of exploitation by the rich and powerful. While many Cambodians were indebted to money-lenders who frequently charged an interest rate of more than ten percent, the extreme poor were often forced to farm for
a landlord. Even those who owned land were resentful of how little they received for their hard work in comparison to the rich.

Finally, the civil war itself was a source of great anger for the poor. After being deposed and allying himself with the Khmer Rouge, then Prince Sihanouk appealed to his rural “children” to take arms with him against the traitorous and illegitimate Lon Nol government. One Khmer Rouge perpetrator named “Khel” (not his real name) recalled that he and many other youths in his village joined the Khmer Rouge because “the people loved the King and he was the head of the Khmer Rouge military front.” U.S. bombing also greatly increased rural discontent. During the course of the war, American bombers dropped more than 540,000 tons of explosives on Cambodian soil, resulting in economic destabilization, the deaths of up to 150,000 people, and the displacement of tens of thousands of others. Many Cambodians joined the Khmer Rouge out of anger at the destruction of their homes and the deaths of loved ones. Khel explained, “The American B-52s dropped too many bombs. It made the people become seized with painful anger (chheu chap) and want to fight against the Lon Nol regime.” Khmer Rouge ideology took the resentment stemming from all of the aforementioned sources and gave it a common focus (class struggle) and target (the urban population). Political education sessions were often focused on creating “class ardor and fury.” Recruits were taught basic communist doctrine which held that the suffering of the poor (vonnah âtun) was due to the exploitation (chih choan) of the capitalist class (vonnah neaytun). Criticism and self-criticism meetings, propaganda sessions, disciplinary precepts, and revolutionary songs, slogans, and plays, attempted to develop this proper revolutionary “consciousness” (sâte’aram) that would be filled with “burning rage toward the enemy.”

The very notion of “class struggle” (tásoù vonnah) invoked the cultural idiom of “warriors” (neak tásoù) who “struggle/fight bravely” against the enemy. The poor were supposed be filled with anger and heroically fight back against their arrogant oppressors. Thus, while a person like Khel might have joined the Khmer Rouge because Sihanouk was overthrown, he was quickly indoctrinated into communist ideology: He recalled, “their political education consisted of telling us to be seized with painful anger against the oppressor class. They spoke about this all of the time.”

The dispossessed and the young, who were likened, in a Maoist metaphor, to “a blank page on which we can write anything we want,” proved most susceptible to this propaganda. Upon returning from political indoctrination sessions, many of these recruits were described as dedicated and well-disciplined “fanatics.”

Khmer Rouge ideology attempted to focus the “burning rage” of these fanatics upon the cities, the centers of capitalism. This goal was often not difficult to achieve given the initial resentment many of the poor felt toward rich city people who looked down upon them, enjoyed a much easier life, and supported Lon Nol who was responsible for the overthrowing of Sihanouk and the carpet-bombing of the countryside. Khmer Rouge propaganda employed slogans such as “trees in the country, fruit in the town” to further inflame this rural animosity toward the cities whose rich and powerful inhabitants were said to be responsible for the exploitation of the poor. As one
government official explained, “They brainwashed people to believe that the Lon Nol regime was a capitalist regime, and that the very poor, who had been oppressed and swindled by the rich, had to fight bravely to defeat Lon Nol.” Moreover, the cities were portrayed as corrupt and immoral centers of undue foreign influence. On the one hand, rich city people were reported to spend their time living in luxurious houses, eating well, sipping cognac, and visiting prostitutes (the “cognac and concubine circuit”) while the peasants toiled in the countryside producing their “fruit.” On the other hand, Phnom Penh was said to be filled with “American lackeys” and to contain a disproportionately large number of ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese. City people were not only capitalist exploiters, but also not “real Khmer”—a hated enemy who should be “crushed” (kamtech khmang) by “class ardor and fury.” By drawing on pre-existing resentment and focusing it on the city, Khmer Rouge ideology effectively fostered a rural class grudge (kumnum vonnah) against the urban population.

This class grudge facilitated a great deal of violence during DK. By the end of the war, the “ignited class anger” was burning at full force. In Battambang province, for example, Khmer Rouge appeared “contemptuous and aloof” just after liberation and later reportedly admitted that they had been “fired by uncontrollable hatred” for members of the ‘old society’. ‘We were so angry when we came out of the forest’, one speaker allegedly said, “that we didn’t want to spare even a baby in its cradle.” This hatred was quickly directed upon the first target of revenge—the Lon Nol government and military. Leading officials were rounded up and executed, and a concerted attempt was made to identify other potential enemies. Urbanites being evacuated out of the cities were asked to give background information about their former occupations. Many who told the truth were taken away to be killed. Others were sent to be “re-educated” in special camps or through rural peasant life. Tens of thousands of people were killed during this first wave of DK killing.

Instead of ending the vengeance after this initial period of violence, the Khmer Rouge attempted to keep the class grudge inflamed. Haing Ngor, who was a “new” person during DK, related how, during a public propaganda dance, costumed cadre would pound their chests with clenched fists and repeatedly shout at the top of their lungs: “BLOOD AVENGES BLOOD!” . . . Blood avenges blood. You kill us, we kill you. We ‘new’ people had been on the other side of the Khmer Rouge in the civil war . . . Symbolically, the Khmer Rouge had just announced that they were going to take revenge.” In fact, the color of blood, red, was a prominent theme in Khmer Rouge propaganda and thus provided a metaphoric call for revenge.

The national anthem contained numerous references to spilled “blood” which provided a reason for people to maintain their “unrelenting hatred.” In a September 27, 1977 speech, Pol Pot explained that a “blood call has been incorporated into our national anthem. Each sentence, each word shows the nature of our people’s struggle. This blood has been turned into class and national indignation.” Similarly, the Khmer Rouge flag was red and glorified by “The Red Flag” song often sung before meetings: The Red Flag…”

(Continued)
AMNESTY

By Jan van der Grinten

Cambodia has an international reputation for being a country where impunity reigns supreme. The most heinous crimes, particularly those committed by the Khmer Rouge before, during and after the DK era, have gone unpunished even to this day. One of the “official” expressions of that impunity consists of amnesties granted in the past to (former) Khmer Rouge members. Amnesties under the Law on Outlawing from 1994 and the amnesty granted by Royal Decree to Ieng Sary have attracted the most attention. That the government has up to now let the notorious criminals Nuon Chea and Kieu Samphan walk around free is a form of de facto amnesty which, however, does not carry the status of a formally proclaimed amnesty.

In this article, I will make a few comments regarding the concept of amnesty. I will then discuss how domestic amnesty relates to obligations under international law.

In principle, “amnesty” can relate to two separate phenomena:
- amnesty before prosecution;
- amnesty after prosecution which resulted in a conviction.

In the English-language literature, these phenomena are respectively called “amnesty” and “pardon”. In contrast, Khmer legal terminology uses the same word for the two phenomena: loeklaengaouh. I will briefly explain the differences.

Amnesty before prosecution can be regarded as a promise by the government to an individual or a group of people that they will not be prosecuted for (specific) crimes, usually under certain conditions. The crimes will therefore never have to be proved in court; the guilt of the persons involved is not established in a court of law. This may leave the victims feeling extremely dissatisfied. Arriving at the truth in a criminal trial can, after all, help the victims or their survivors come to terms with the pain inflicted. An example of such amnesty is provided by Article 5 of the Law on Outlawing of 1994. This provision grants immunity from criminal prosecution to persons who meet the condition described in the provision: defection to the side of the government within six months after the effective date of the law. The amnesty provision, however, does not apply to KR leaders (Article 6).

Amnesty after a conviction means that the perpetrator of an offence does not need to, or need only partly serve, the sentence imposed upon his conviction. One example of this type of amnesty is the Royal Decree of September 1996, in which Ieng Sary was granted a pardon for the death sentence he received in a trial conducted in absentia in 1979. As an aside, I note that this trial was generally regarded as a show trial, which in no way satisfied the requirements of due process. For example, Ieng Sary’s own attorney requested that his client be given the death sentence!

The King has the power under Article 27 of the Constitution to grant such an amnesty. This article states:

“The King shall have the right to grant partial or complete amnesty”

A recent article in the Phnom Penh Post (Vol. 9, number 16, p. 11) Bora Touch argued that the presumption of innocence included in Article 38 of the Constitution precludes a royal amnesty from being granted before prosecution. The aforementioned constitutional article, however, does not state that the King may only exercise his power after someone’s guilt has been established in a court of law, and as we saw above, granting amnesty in the sense of refraining from prosecution is an instrument that is more often used for strategic reasons. Moreover, I would say that the provisions in Article 38 are solely for the protection of the accused, and that these provisions therefore do not preclude amnesty from being granted to the accused in advance. All of this, however, is a matter of legislative (constitutional) interpretation. For example, in the United States, President Ford interpreted his constitutional power to grant amnesty as unlimited, so that it could thus extend to offenders prior to their conviction. On this basis, he considered himself as having the power to grant a pardon to former President Richard Nixon, saving him from impeachment proceedings commenced by the Congress after the Watergate scandal (Geoffrey Robbertson, Crimes Against Humanity (London 1999) p. 239).

Whatever the power of the King may be under
Article 27, however, a domestic amnesty is not always consistent with international law obligations to institute criminal prosecution.

**Amnesties and obligations under International Law**

Just like other countries, Cambodia is a party to numerous international treaties. These treaties create obligations, which a state cannot avoid by invoking its national legislation. This follows from, inter alia, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (entered into force on January 27, 1980), which was signed by Cambodia. Article 26 of this treaty contains the so-called Pacta sunt servanda principle:

“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” Article 27 of the treaty states that “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty (…)”

Many treaties create jurisdiction with regard to violations of the norms included within these treaties. Since World War II, however, the power to prosecute based on an international norm has increasingly moved in the direction of an obligation to institute prosecution. As regards several crimes that are considered international law crimes by the international community, there is thus an obligation to prosecute the perpetrators. Due in part to the provisions of the Vienna Convention cited above, this obligation has consequences for the granting of amnesty by a national government. Specifically, a law or a Royal Decree that grants amnesty before any form of prosecution and conviction of the alleged perpetrator has taken place may be in conflict with the obligation under international law to prosecute, which supersedes national law. In certain circumstances, then, such granting of amnesty cannot be considered.

Below, I will briefly examine the question of when international law requires prosecution. I will limit myself to the most important obligations that might be relevant for a tribunal trying members of the Khmer Rouge. Obligations to prosecute may exist under treaties and under what is called “international customary law”.

**Treaty obligations**

Treaty obligations to prosecute crimes fall into three categories:

1. some treaties specify the obligation of states to prosecute and punish perpetrators of acts defined as crimes under international law;
2. authoritative interpretations of broad human rights treaties hold that states parties fail to ensure and respect the substantive rights protecting individuals’ physical integrity if they do not affirmatively investigate, prosecute, and provide redress;
3. the right to a remedy included in many human rights instruments provides a strong basis for inferring an obligation to investigate, prosecute, and provide redress.


Below, I will focus analysis on the first and strongest obligation, which is included in two treaties to which Cambodia was has been a party since before the DK era.

1. **The Geneva Conventions**

Cambodia is a party to the four Geneva Conventions of August 1949. The Conventions apply “to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.”

The four Conventions offer protection to the

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**Pol Pot**

© Photo: Roger Pin
following groups of persons in the event of an armed conflict:

- the wounded and the sick in armed forces in the field;
- wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of the armed forces at sea;
- prisoners of war;
- civilian persons in time of war.

All four of the conventions contain nearly identical provisions concerning the obligations of contracting countries in the event of “grave breaches”. This includes the provision that “Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons regardless of their nationality, before its own courts.”

Grave breaches to which the foregoing relates “shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.”

Based on the January 2000 draft law for setting up the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (the KR tribunal), war crimes fall within the tribunal’s jurisdiction. Given the fact that during nearly the entire DK era, there were armed conflicts with, among other countries, Vietnam, it is likely that the Conventions apply to a large number of acts which occurred during this period. The historical record leaves no doubt that crimes were committed which can be categorised as grave breaches. Conviction for war crimes of Khmer Rouge members brought before the Tribunal is therefore very conceivable.

Given the mandatory norm in the Conventions to prosecute, the prosecution will have to take the position before a tribunal that any amnesties that defendants who are charged with war crimes try to invoke are contrary to the obligations in the Geneva Conventions and therefore cannot be considered.


This Convention from 1948 (in effect since 1951) makes the following acts criminal offences:

**Article III**

- genocide;
- conspiracy to commit genocide;
- direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
- attempt to commit genocide;
- complicity in genocide.

The Convention contains a number of provisions with regard to the obligations of the Convention parties, which I will repeat here:

**Article IV**

Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutional responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.

**Article V**

The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitution, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.

**Article VI**

Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the state in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.

In my opinion, it can hardly be doubted that the leaders of the Khmer Rouge must be charged with genocide or one of the crimes relating to it under Article III. As the provisions quoted above show, there is an express obligation to bring persons accused of genocide before a court and to punish them if they are found guilty. A legislative or non-legislative amnesty for the crime of genocide is thus contrary to the Convention. If one of the defendants invokes an amnesty granted to him or her, the public prosecutor will then have to take the position that the conflict between such amnesty and international law means that the amnesty provision is invalid and without authority.

(Continued)
Front Cover: Poster by Ministry of Propaganda, Information and Culture of the State of Cambodia
“Tivear chang kamhoeng” or the Day of Anger, observed on May 20, continues to be a significant commemoration day in contemporary Cambodia. In the main, the Day of Anger is dedicated to enlivening and strengthening the strong emotions held by Cambodians about the period of Democratic Kampuchea or “the Pol Pot period” – 1975-1979. Instigated by the government of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) in the early 1980s, the May 20 event has bearing on three groups: the individuals who died during this period; the individual survivors of the period; and the ‘national group’ as it was being reconstructed in the post 1979-period.

May 20 1976 is generally agreed upon as the date of the Khmer Rouge leadership’s decision favoring a policy of total agrarian collectivization of the entire nation of Democratic Kampuchea (hereafter DK), a decision that was to have disastrous consequences for Cambodia’s agricultural land system and population. This collectivization decision, and its clear implications of death by famine and overwork, has been widely considered (by the PRK and later governments) to be the chronological and ideological point at which the Khmer Rouge transmuted from progressive communist revolutionaries to an extremist regime. This historical analysis, one which gives primacy to the date
of May 20 1976, considers the period subsequent to this date as having been fatally compromised by the mindset and actions of Pol Pot and his closet aides. However, this historical view—and the year the decision was supposed to have taken place—is often confused, for example the Sapordamean Kampuchea bulletin (English version) of May 21 1988 stated:

May 20 1975 has gone down in Kampuchea’s history as the Day of National Hatred against the Pol Pot regime because only a few days after it took power, the Pol Pot gang chosen [sic] that day as the begging of its genocidal campaign which brought death to millions of Kampuchean people (SPK, May 21 1988: 3).

In more recent media reports, there have also been suggestions that May 20 is widely considered to have been Pol Pot’s birthday, but historical authorities have effectively and publicly dismissed this notion.

During the People’s Republic of Kampuchea and State of Cambodia periods (1979-1989 and 1989-1991) the Day of Anger was a prominent and well-organized public holiday, with significant ceremonies held in Phnom Penh, provincial cities and villages throughout the country. After the Peace Accords between Cambodia’s warring political groups was signed in Paris in 1991, the May 20 commemoration were no longer formally promoted by the Cambodian government. However in 1998, 1999 and 2000 May 20 has been revisited by Municipal government promotion and large gatherings of people at significant memorial sites, especially the Choeung Ek Center and others in and around Phnom Penh. The changes in the May 20 commemoration over Cambodia’s recent history form part of the subject matter of this article. There are also many interesting religious and cultural aspects to the phenomenon of the Day of Anger. Through examining a number of documents held by the Documentation Center of Cambodia (hereafter DC-Cam) pertaining to May 20 commemorations from 1986 to 1991, it is possible to sketch a few of the interrelated practices that have sought to acknowledge Cambodia’s recent and traumatic past through the May 20 events.

In the PRK and SOC periods the May 20 commemoration was part of the formal policy of the state and the Day’s activities were centrally coordinated by the Front [for the Solidarity, Reconstruction and Defense of Kampuchea] in cooperation with various Ministries, especially those responsible for cultural development. For provincial, district and village authorities, the Front decreed that any place that had ‘witnessed’ killing, torture, burial or forced labor during the Democratic Kampuchea period (1975-1979) was considered an appropriate place for the May 20 commemoration. In 1990, factories, schools, hospitals and other enterprises in provincial centers were instructed to make banners and posters condemning the crimes committed by the Pol Pot regime. These banners and placards were to be carried to the public meetings and other commemoration events—to be held at local memorial sites (Instructions to organize May 20, 1990–DC-Cam doc.331).

During the May 20 public meetings, ‘victim representatives’ were asked to come forward to reveal and condemn the crimes of the Pol Pot clique known personally to them—both the crimes committed under the Democratic Kampuchea period as well as crimes committed by remnant Khmer Rouge forces in the year after 1979. Detailed documents from Phnom Penh and district authorities suggest a significant continuity in the organization and demonstrations involved in the May 20 meetings—the 1989, 1991 and 1999 ceremonies all included wreath laying, song, prayers and other religious offerings to the dead, speeches by official representatives and personal stories of individuals and families in the local area (Report from Stung District, Kampong Thom May 20, 1989–DC-Cam doc.no.581, Day of Anger, May 20 1991, Stung Treng–DC-Cam doc.no.498 and Cambodia Daily May 21, 1991: 1).

These and other documents suggest that the emotional emphasis of an individual’s retelling—a very singular declaration of memory—was balanced by an official rhetoric which emphasized the necessity of a unified emotion and vigilance against forgetting as being essential to national reconstruction. As was the desire of the Front, ceremonies were held in the exact place where, during the DK period, killing or incarceration had occurred; or at local memorial stupas built specially for the containment of victim’s remains and for May 20 commemorative purpose.

In one sense, the Day of Anger always memorialized a traumatic political period that was not strictly ‘past’, or certainly had not been neutralized. While the early ceremonies served to acknowledge the)
then estimated) 3 million deaths attributable to the ‘Pol Potists’, as tragically past and irretrievable, they also took place at a time when the perpetrators still obviously threatened Cambodia—organizing and attacking from the northern and western border areas. The emphasis place on the strong emotions cause by remembering and sharing memories, rather than the memories themselves, served to activate this day and the populace in the service of the new national movement:

Beloved comrades and friends and those who died are reminding us to be vigilant, to strengthen our solidarity and practice revolutionary activities. We must be on the alert against the cruelties and poisonous tricks of the enemies, even though they try to hide themselves in multiple [political] images (Speech of Comrade Chea Sim, May 20 1986).

In 1990 in Phnom Penh, major May 20 commemorations were held at both Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocide and the Choeung Ek Center of Genocide Crimes in Dang Kao district. In the stated aims for the 1990 May 20 commemoration, the Front declares that the day must also “make people realize the current crimes committed by the Pol Pot clique, and be dedicated to the prevention of the return of the regime” (Instructions to organize May 20, 1990 – DC-Cam doc.no.331).

In this sense, it is somewhat incorrect to term the Day of Anger a day of memorialization. Although traumatic memories were invoked as a key aspect of the Day, another central appeal was to the crowds’ capacity to carry their strong emotions into the active and current project of the reconstruction and defense of the new Kampuchean nation. Through the formal, public celebrations of the day, there was significant emphasis given to Vietnam’s support of Cambodia in the decades before—and especially the period after—DK, and of the resultant “fraternal” bond that bound the two nations together. There can be no doubt that the invocations to remember the traumatic experiences of the Democratic Kampuchea period were always calls to remember the indebtedness of Cambodia to Vietnam. They also recalled the necessity for a continuing solidarity between the two nations (or three when Laos was included, as was often the case). This was made all the more personal and explicit when expressed directly as a statement of to the Vietnamese soldiers and, beyond them, the Vietnamese people, as occurred in 1986 when Chea Sim paid homage to

Vietnamese of three generations, who have sacrificed [themselves] in our territory and for the sake of our people...[We] would like to convey our respect and gratitude to the Vietnamese mothers and sisters who have sacrificed their children, grandchildren and husbands to fulfill a glorious [strategic] international obligation in our country (Speech of Comrade Chea Sim, May 20 1986).

Thus the May 20 commemoration was also a time when people’s attention turned to international concerns. Chea in 1986 spoke of the “foolish, dark tricks” of the regrouped Khmer Rouge in the newly formed “tripartite government” on the Thai border. Chea’s delineation of Cambodia’s international enemies was then balanced by a discussion of Kampuchea’s good relations with Vietnam, Laos and the Soviet
Union. Reports suggest that even the local memorial commemorations, especially during the 1980s, replicated this insistently international outlook. The international geopolitical situation is reported as having been discussed at district-level memorial ceremony of a few thousand people at Tuol Phlorng Memorial in the Report from Stung District, Kampong Thom May 20, 1989–DC-Cam doc.no.581.

In 1990, the Front emphasized the need to “courageously [involve] monks and temple committed members, aged people, intellectuals and ethnic minorities” in the discussion and condemnation of the Pol Pot clique, and that this condemnation was “aimed at revealing the character of the ‘tripartite coalition’ of the time”. This policy, and its expected successful outcomes, was effectively a “petitioning of the international tribunal in the Hague and religious figures the world over” to concern themselves with the State of Cambodia (Instructions to organize May 20, 1990–DC-Cam document no.331).

While it is clear that although the practices and spoken words of the Day have always “turned outwards” to questions of international geopolitical alliances, the constitutive nations of Cambodia’s international audience have changed significantly over the last two decades. In the first decade the Day was most attuned to an international audience of proximate, ‘fraternal’ nations (Vietnam, Laos) and the larger socialist community (European nations and Soviet Union). By the late-1980s and throughout the second decade (1990s to the present) the Day had also become an important opening in which representations and protestations were lodged with non-communist nations and the General Assembly (and other bodies) of the United Nations. For example, Cambodian intellectuals meeting in a run-up conference to the May 20 commemoration of 1988 condemned the Pol Pot regime and unanimously passed a petition to this end. The petition was reportedly sent to the United Nations and the World Peace Council.

The petition...called on these organizations and the world public to take measures against the universally condemned criminals Pol Pot, Leng Sary and Khieu Samphan and their associates and denounces the dark schemes of certain countries and forces for giving material support and moral assistance to the genocidal Pol Pot clique in its attempt to return to Kampuchea to massacre the Kampuchean people and undermine the national revival. (SPK, May 18 1988: 3).

The opportunity for international petitioning that May 20 presents continues to be taken up by organizers of the commemoration to this day. The increased popularity of the Day in 1999 and 2000, both with official and non-official sectors of Cambodian society, could be seen as obliquely indicative of a perception that the UN and the so-called “world public” did not—and continue no to—adequately recognize the horror of the DK period and the violence and uncertainty that persist despite, or resulting from, various international interventions into the Cambodian territory both before, during and after the 1975-1979 period. For example, the Associated Press report of the 2000 observance opened this way:

Frustrated by sluggish progress in negotiations for a genocide tribunal, hundreds of Cambodians gathered today to pray for justice during an annual holiday [sic] dedicated to the 1.7 million victims of the Khmer Rouge (Cambodians Pray on Day of Anger, AP May 10 2000)

The “witnessing” available to the international audience via the AP report came from the words of S-21 prison survivor Van Nath who was quoted thus: I have asked myself many times whether I will see justice done for me and those who died...it’s getting late for me and I begin to feel hopeless” (ibid).

In conclusion we may understand that Day of Anger, occurring initially within a decade of active Vietnamese military and administrative presence in Cambodia, did function as an opportunity to recognize (some may argue promote) Cambodia’s close and beneficial relationship with Vietnam. The May 20 commemoration has certainly long revived people’s memories and emotions of the 1975-1979 period, and provided a meaningful and culturally acceptable space for an expression of the anger and pain experienced individually and collectively during and since the DK period. In addition, the Day has been driven by a political imperative—to remind Cambodians of the very recent nature of the DK crimes, such that perpetrators of these crimes, with the support of external governments, have continued to threaten the new-found stability of the nation.
Paris, January 17, 1975

This is the day the Khmer Rouge entered Phnom Penh. I seemed to be so happy with a hope that I will have a chance to reunite with my family after more than one year of separation. It seems to me regrettable that I had to depart only two days before the occurrence of historical events...

Paris, April 17, 1975

Oh! When I heard the war break out again in Kampuchea, I seemed...to be glad with a hope to...meet my parents...in a short time. Oh! respected daddy and mummy, what are you doing now. My sole and beloved mummy, I am, your child is waiting to hear your voice and your good advice. I always win people heart and receive sincere and warm attachment no matter where I am. This is the result of your good deeds to me. When I hear that war ends, I imagine I have met you all. My mind is preoccupied with returning as quickly as possible so that I can talk by telephone with you and recount my nostalgic feelings of separation.

Oh! my mummy, once I work for French I always imagine of working at our home, our country, where it would be more useful. Then I want to stop working immediately.

How have you been doing mummy and daddy? How many days will I receive your information...? I am so worried and miss you, my beloved ones, so much. I can find no time of release.

The war is over, yet I am still far away from...mummy. I am always preoccupied with mummy everyday, as you are getting older. Mummy and daddy, I wonder when I can meet you again.

June 1, 1975

I come to Banlieur (Rueil Malmaison), a huge and pleasant house. I always felt home sick. I was so touched by the calm landscape of a river there that I missed my village.

Nothing is everlasting. Separation will interfere over time. Today I am happy, but tomorrow will bring sadness. I don’t know what my life will be? Am I useful for the nation?

Paris, June 10, 1975

Catching this notebook reminds me of its owner who, in my imagination, seems to be smiling at me. I got to know him/her for a short period of time. I don’t know when we can meet each other again. We were so close albeit we had just got to know each other. It was nice to meet and talk with the friend. I knew the sadness of the friend clearly, but I still cannot work it out at his request. It’s really hard to read the human mind. Nothing can be used to measure it. Mind also changes beyond our expectation although it is one of [our] old friends. This life I almost pledge an allegiance that I am scared of being human.

In just nearly two months of my acquaintance, I seem to have an unforgettable friendship. The red notebook I am holding will be with me forever. I first held this notebook in April, when there was an occurrence of the revolution implementing such red theory as this notebook. When can I meet you again? Once we will meet again, the notebook will be fraught with my crazy theory. Then you will find it ridiculous.

It’s too dark now. No sound was heard, except the one of wind. It’s was a bit hot at day time but when the night comes it turns to be cooler. Calmness makes me so occupied with my friend who is now so far that I cannot call. Well, it’s time to go now. See you all next time.

June 10, 1975.
conditions as before. So, I felt so happy to see you. Unfortunately, when I wake up I tried to find you by touch and found it was just a dream. If my dream came true, I would not so worry. I really want to meet you.

Paris, June 15, 1975

This life I am committed to loving only one person. Actually I love many people, but the one I love the best is only one. Choosing the right person is not easy. I ask myself why I have chosen such a person whose is considered as having much disadvantages. The answer is I want to draw experience. It has been said that love is sorrow. It is very true. For this matter, if I know that [he] doesn’t love me, I will be really convinced that remorse will not take place and I will regard it as my fate. Actually, to arrange a family is tantamount to luring [ourselves] into trouble. It is considered just as a sweet of life. To me, it would better to die in such young age than to live in the world of reappearance.

I may not be seized with pain albeit my love which has been offered is not accepted. Yet, it will be a real reflection of our quality.

[My] love can be offered only once. If it is on the wrong track, I will be alone throughout my life. It doesn’t mean that I will be faithful to you, but rather I may try to win my heart. I will live by the way I have planned for my life with purity until the end of the world, just like a raft which is floating by the water current until it becomes stuck. I will try to live so that I can overcome my life and improve my living conditions with dignity. I live a life of trial in almost places. How about other people’s? Are their’s the same as mine? Is it a game of life!

On June 17, 1975, I arrived in Mortgat.

Mortgat, June 20, 1975

Today I take a tour along the Plage in Mortgat, and the port of Mortgat where the sea rushes to solid shore. It makes me miss my home town as well as my relatives and friends. I wish we would have met each other. It reminds me of the remembrance of March 9, 1975 in Phnom Penh where I met a lot of friends yet felt disconsolate on receipt of words of game worth suffering which affected my good deeds. On that day I seemed to prefer swearing not to make good deeds with people in order to avoid confusion with other people. Frankly speaking, I have done a heart-to-heart deed without any contamination. That’s why I will never dare to do such thing again. Today two French people ask me to take a boat to see Côte Bretagne. They are François and Jean Pierre. I usually consider people I have met as ordinary people joining with our journey. I always try to limit myself to neutrality.
A man came to the Documentation Center of Cambodia and asked for documents relating to the cases of Phok Chhay and Phok Ky, Khmer Rouge inmates incarcerated at S-21. He had learned about these persons through the monthly publication, “Searching for the Truth”. His name is Chhay Mongkul Keo, and currently lives in Battambang. He is the nephew and godson of a prisoner of S-21, or “Tuol Sleng”, named Phok Chhay, alias Touch (a summary of whose “confession” was published in “Searching for the Truth”, issues number 5 and 6).

The Documentation Center of Cambodia has been painstakingly preserving and documenting such “confession” documents of victims held at Tuol Sleng, which total fourteen thousand pages, including Phok Chhay’s 81-page document. According to file D349, Phok Chhay, alias Touch, was sent to S-21 on March 14, 1977. After three months and twenty-two days of coerced interrogation, Phok Chhay was executed by Khmer Rouge cadre on July 6, 1977. Cross-checking against another file entitled “list of execution”, prepared by Comrade Hor at S-21, and dated July 7, 1977, reveals the same information as in file D349. Through this file, I found the name of Phok Chhay alias Touch in the serial number of 123 among the 127 names of people targeted for execution on the same day, July 6, 1977. Before it was decided that Phok Chhay was to be executed, his name had been sent to Angkar for examination and advice. Son Sen, then minister in charge of national security of Democratic Kampuchea, was sent a copy. There is one of Son Sen’s notifications in the Phok Chhay confession. After thorough review, he noted: “A H+CH. already A/K 30/3/77, meaning that ‘already read and sent to Angkar: March 30, 1977’.” From this red note, we can perceive that presumably there may have other people above Son Sen, such as Ieng Sary alias comrade Vann, Khieu Samphan alias comrade Hem and Nuon Chea alias comrade Nuon. For this reason, many confession documents are marked “Comrade Vann”, namely file number J00412, which is the confession of Meak Touch alias Kem, and file number J00451 of Sann Po. The notes “Comrade Vann” may have been written by Comrade Nuon (Nuon Chea) or Comrade Secretary Pol Pot, based on the fact that they are written in a completely different style and pen from the notations by Son Sen (alias Khieu).

NOTES BY CADRE WORKING AT S-21 CONTAINED IN THE CONFESSION OF PHOK CHHAY, ALIAS TOUCH

◆ Note:
1) Reported on April 3, 1977.
2) He tried to avoid six points.
3) Phenomena are not clear.
Duch: April 3, 1977
◆ Mr Touch
1) Rewrite [the confession] to avoid confusion.
◆ Don’t talk about Santebal document, etc.
◆ Don’t conclude other people as one group. Must distinguish between revolutionist and anti-revolution elements.
◆ Certain matters must be made in more detail. Don’t make summary.
2) Be careful with trick of wrecking the revolution.
◆ Keeping traitors to destroy the revolution.
◆ Torture must be carried out gradually until death, that is, die a miserable death.
3) Absolutely keep this original copy.
Pon: April 9, 1977.
◆ Brother Nang, please examine your report again. You are the great man who is good at remembering all issues in detail. If I’m not mistaken, the report has quite a lot of biased points, among which one has been marked and noted by me. Propose your examination and correction for Angkar. Duch: April 23, 1977.
◆ Brother Duch
1) The main points of this text are in the following:
◆ Thuch introduced him to Doeun. When problem occurred, Doeun instructed him to ignore Thuch and assigned him to receive another task of collecting intelligence from the minute for Doeun.
2) After being asked, he described his traitorous activities at Angkar’s office. By writing, he refused again and again. I still kept torturing him for confession which implicated nothing against The or Hu Nim. Under my coercion, he only wrote about [his] connections with Doeun and Phum.
With respect, April 5, 1977, Pon.

PHOK CHHAY’S FAMILY

By Peou Dara Vanthan

A man came to the Documentation Center of Cambodia and asked for documents relating to the cases of Phok Chhay and Phok Ky, Khmer Rouge inmates incarcerated at S-21. He had learned about these persons through the monthly publication, “Searching for the Truth”. His name is Chhay Mongkul Keo, and currently lives in Battambang. He is the nephew and godson of a prisoner of S-21, or “Tuol Sleng”, named Phok Chhay, alias Touch (a summary of whose “confession” was published in “Searching for the Truth”, issues number 5 and 6).

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◆ Mr Touch
1) Rewrite [the confession] to avoid confusion.
◆ Don’t talk about Santebal document, etc.
◆ Don’t conclude other people as one group. Must distinguish between revolutionist and anti-revolution elements.
◆ Certain matters must be made in more detail. Don’t make summary.
2) Be careful with trick of wrecking the revolution.
◆ Keeping traitors to destroy the revolution.
◆ Torture must be carried out gradually until death, that is, die a miserable death.
3) Absolutely keep this original copy.
Pon: April 9, 1977.
◆ Brother Nang, please examine your report again. You are the great man who is good at remembering all issues in detail. If I’m not mistaken, the report has quite a lot of biased points, among which one has been marked and noted by me. Propose your examination and correction for Angkar. Duch: April 23, 1977.
◆ Brother Duch
1) The main points of this text are in the following:
◆ Thuch introduced him to Doeun. When problem occurred, Doeun instructed him to ignore Thuch and assigned him to receive another task of collecting intelligence from the minute for Doeun.
2) After being asked, he described his traitorous activities at Angkar’s office. By writing, he refused again and again. I still kept torturing him for confession which implicated nothing against The or Hu Nim. Under my coercion, he only wrote about [his] connections with Doeun and Phum.
With respect, April 5, 1977, Pon.
DAD WILL NEVER FLY A KITE FOR ME FOREVER

By Sorya Sim

When I was young, my father used to fly a kite for me. But now I don’t have him anymore. Last year, I gazed through the window, watching other fathers flying kites for their children. It was the time when people were playing with kites at Independence Monument in Phnom Penh. At times I saw national police try to stop the people from playing. Some of my friends said the park should be protected for its beauty, while others argued that the players should be free to use it. The argument droned on, but I turned away quietly to another window, where I recalled my mother’s words telling me that my daddy loved me very much, as I was the last child and that occasionally, he was so interested in flying a kite for me that his sarong would slip. Now I am thirty-two. I can still remember his face and the place where we played with kites, all still clear in my memory. The place was called Baraing Village, a provincial town in Battambang.

The day I realized I would have no more chance to play with a kite with my daddy again was the day when my mother caught my hand firmly, her other hand holding a basket of areca palm fruits. I was the shortest of the children there. It was so crowded that the paths could not be seen. My mother told me my father was enraged by the way the Khmer Rouge soldiers had forced him to stop using his motorbike, and that she had tried to calm him down. My father decided to take the wheels off the motorbike and convert them into a cart for carrying and storing personal luggage. The motorbike body was left behind in the vicinity of Ta An School, located on the Sangke River approximately ten kilometers from Baraing Village. We had reached Snao Village, and my father had been quiet since the motorbike had been taken. He had stopped eating much, and was beginning to be very sick. While I was blowing away cotton as a game, I heard my mother shouting in panic, “Your father is dead!” My mother recounted how my father had died shortly after a physician removed a syringe from his body.

I do not want to see the game of kite flying any longer, as it makes me so mournful that I cannot work, thinking of the happy life with my parents that the Khmer Rouge deprived me of. Nothing can remedy the loss of happiness in my life and my family. In my capacity as a researcher of the history of Democratic Kampuchea, I only want to help my father’s soul to rest in peace, and identify those who were the genuine leaders that got him killed—to record the true history and work towards justice, so that the genocide will never return.

Sorya Sim, 1985
Sorya Sim, 1997
A graduate of Yale University

Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam)
Dear Youk Chhang of the DC-Cam,

I am deeply touched by the fact that you have won the Truman-Reagan Award. You deserve it based upon your past achievements and present work. You have worked for refugees in Thailand and the Philippines. Moreover, the documents, especially the publication of the “Searching for the Truth”, are playing a significant role in a possible international tribunal. Your bravery has helped to overcome the ‘illness of defeatism’ in present-day Khmer society. Your position in favor of the Khmer Rogue tribunal is gaining landslide support from Khmer citizens.

Some politicians have adopted the baseless position that most people with dual citizenship are not loyal to the nation. On the contrary, your stance has clearly demonstrated the converse—that it doesn’t matter whether people have one or two nationalities, and that the point is whether they devote themselves to the nation in circumstances of hardship.

You seek justice for the citizens by searching for the truth of the Khmer Rouge genocide. This is the great effort that is contributing to the construction of a Cambodia with peace and prosperity. What the people of Cambodia hate and fear the most is the possible return of the genocidal regime as a result of the failure to seek real justice for the victims of the crimes committed during the period of 1975-1979.

I really appreciate and offer you my heart-to-heart respect for your bravery and efforts, as well as your high devotion to serving the nation and the people. You are a model that other Khmer leaders should emulate.

I would like to wish you good health and success in the course of the service for the nation and the whole of society.

Phnom Penh, November 16, 2000

People’s Representative of Kandal

Phnom Penh, November 6, 2000

Suon Saratt (original name is Ung Khanai)

To Mr Youk Chhang

Searching for family

My name is Suon Saratt (original name is Ung Khanai). I came from Peal Nhek 2 Village, Phteah Prey Sub-district, Pursat Province. My current address is House Number 11E3, Road 173, Group 3, Sangkat Olympic, Khan Chamkarmon, Phnom Penh. My hand phone numbers are 011 956 730 and 012 930 138. I am searching for my husband named Kim Phoeuk Toeung, former military commander of artillery unit of Battalion 2 of the Lon Nol administration. In 1973, the then-government sent him to the United States for training as a Regiment commander of Artillery Unit 1. I had learned that he returned in Cambodia in 1976 in Pol Pot’s time. So far his fate is unknown.

Therefore, please kindly search for my husband.

Sincerely yours,

Suon Saratt

KHMER ROUGE THEORY

♦ Without the force of labor, the revolution cannot move forward. It is only by the force of struggle that favored results can be achieved.
♦ In order to make revolution there must be revolutionary people; and in order for people to be revolutionary they must possess the standpoint and the spirit of the party.

(Excerpts from Comrade Keo’s notebook)
Dear Mr. Director of DC-Cam,

My name is Ruos Bapong. I am 35 years old. I am working for World Food Program (WFP) based in Kampong Thom province.

Recently, I have scanned through the magazine “Searching for the Truth” of issue number one, 2000, through my friend who borrowed from other people. I am so happy to see the Documentation Center of Cambodia established by Cambodia. DC-Cam is very useful for our country and reading materials relating to Cambodian history is my favorite interest. Keeping our ancestors’ heritage is also my observation. So far, I have visited several districts of Kampong Thom. And recently I met a person named Kang Tim, former Khmer Rouge element, currently living in Chhouk Boeng Village, Chhouk Sub-district, Prasat Sambo District, Kampong Thom Province. He recount his history since 1970. Tim’s account has something secret and different from what the magazine of the four issues are holding. Should you have any intention to meet him please let me know. He will be reached at any time.

I would like to take this opportunity to request the Documentation Center of Cambodia for copies of “Searching for the Truth” of all issues published in 2000 (1-12).

All wishes,

Kampong Thom, September 11, 2000
Ruos Bapong

To Mr. Youk Chhang, Editor-in-chief of the “Searching for the Truth”

Dear Sir,

I have read the magazine “Searching for the Truth” from issues number one to five. It makes Khmer children feel so melancholy towards the souls of Khmer people killed during the era of three years, eight months and twenty days between 1975-1979.

Deeply respected Director, I highly appreciate your great efforts to feature articles revealing the truth of crimes of genocide allegedly perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge to Cambodians of all generations.

May you and your colleagues become a long-term brilliant lantern for Khmer citizens in the Kingdom of Cambodia.

Moreover, would you publish more copies of “Searching for the Truth” to ensure they reach villages, sub-districts throughout Cambodia.

May you and you colleagues consecutive success to search for the truth for Khmer citizens.

Sincerely yours,

Keo Someth

Please send letters or articles to
Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam)
P.O. Box 1110, Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Tel: (855) 23-211-875
Fax: (855) 23-210-358
Email: dccam@bigpond.com.kh
Homepage: http://welcome.to/dccam
The Victims
BREEZE IN THE MONTH OF KADOEK

Compiled by Sayana Ser

The breeze in the month of kadoek is moving from the north to the excellent motherland of Kampouchea liberated on April 17.

Dikes are shiny and fraught with fruits of rice of golden color under the red revolutionary ray.

Look! our rice fields are so vast with its clusters hanging down and moving by the direction of the win.

All areas of the Kampuchean countryside is really fruity and we have to be actively involved in harvesting on time.

Start harvest at the time the rice is ripping and heavy. As a result of the virtue of Angkar, our product is sufficient for building a new Kampuchea.

Our ‘Solidarity Group’ is gathering forces for the harvest. We harvest while singing. After harvesting, the rice is immediately sent for being threshed in the main field.

We build dikes with checkerboard pattern to be in self-mastery in the farming in dry season.

We, farmers, are happy to have the yield. However, we must be brave and go on with raising dike.

Refurbish countryside of the revolutionary Kampuchea as shiny as the light of a full moon glittering all over directions in the world. We consolidate together for restoring the country.