Table of Contents

Letter: Mok ..........................................................1

DOCUMENTATION
Tim Sen and his Purported Activities .................2
Class Contradiction and Class Struggle .............5
I Only Want Justice ..............................................6
Killing Pits in Banteay Meanchey .......................9
Statute of Communist Party ..............................11
List of Names of Cambodian Embassadors .......13
Biography Comrade Kong ....................................15

HISTORY
The Tragedy of Koh Phal Village ......................18
Voices from S-21 ................................................22

LEGAL
A Sampling of Documentary Evidence ..............26
Four Ways to Prosecute Torture Committee.........30
Israel v. Etchmann .............................................32

PUBLIC DEBATE
Legacy ...............................................................34
“Amnesty: The Price of Peace in Cambodia?”...37
KR Trial Progress Up to Lawmakers .................38
Mok’s Work ....................................................39
Reclaiming Cambodian History .......................41

FAMILY TRACING
Tonle Sap Lake Massacre .................................45
Unforgettable Episode .....................................48

KHMER ROUGE ARTS
New Scenery of Cambodian Remote............Back Cover

Authors: Elizabeth van Schaack, Craig Etcheson, David Chandler, Jan Van Der Grinten, Steve Heder, Henry A. Kissinger, Peter Maguire, Jaya Ramji, Ronnie Yimsut.
Staff Writers: Kalyan Sann, Sophal Ly, Sopheap Chuong.
Ta Mok became a member of the Standing Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea in 1971 and served as Secretary of Southwest Zone beginning in 1968. In November 1978, Ta Mok was appointed as Deputy Secretary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

On March 6, 1999, armed forces of the government of Cambodia arrested Ta Mok, and he has since been in custody. Ta Mok is now awaiting prosecution before an independent tribunal for crimes committed between 1975 and 1979, during the reign of Democratic Kampuchea.

Before his arrest, Ta Mok once said that on his head there is nothing but a hat. But perhaps Ta Mok forgot to bend his body and look down and recall that under his feet lie the hundreds of thousands of victims executed by his own hand and brain. Now the rule of law is proving to be higher than Ta Mok’s hat, and the victims’ surviving relatives are waiting to see what will be the legal resolution against him. Poun, Ta Mok’s sister, who along with her nephew-in-law visited Mok (from distance) on July 26, 2000, is also eager to see justice. Poun doesn’t believe that Ta Mok, who was once in the Buddhist monkhood, could have killed people. There are, however, at least three sets of documents cited by legal researchers as implicating Ta Mok in mass crimes, in addition to witness testimony and other evidence tending to show that Ta Mok was indeed the perpetrator. Whether or not the truth will ever be known and acknowledged is dependent upon Ta Mok’s standing trial, which is in turn dependent upon his health and life. If those upon whom the health of Ta Mok now depends care about the truth, they will take responsibility for his health.

Youk Chhang
As with all “confessions” extracted under torture at Tuol Sleng, readers are warned that the truth of factual assertions cannot be assumed.

Region 25, which included districts of Lek Dek, Sa-ang and Koh Thom of Kandal Province, was subsumed under Southwest Zone and under the responsibility of Ta Mok. The following is a summarized passage extracted from file number 440bbkkh consisting of 12 pages. It was a “confession” made by a prisoner of Tuol Sleng named Tim Sen alias Set, former secretary of Koh Thom District, Region 25, Southwest Zone:

Based upon his response, Tim Sen alias Set, 44 (by1977), was born in Trapeang Leu Village, Peam Reang Sub-district, District 14, Region 25. Tim Sen joined the Vietnamese Labor Party in 1965, when he propagandized grassroots to support, build up and join the Vietnamese troops. In 1972, Tim Sen agitated people to lodge demonstrations against the revolutionary leaders and managed to slay several demonstrators. After the 1975 liberation, Tim Sen became a secretary of District 18, Region 25, where he provoked turmoil and disruptions in the cooperative, by wrecking equipment and exposing cooperative workers to forced labor, which resulted in diseases and demise constantly. Moreover, Tim Sen acted against the revolutionary plans. All activities led to his arrest by Angkar on March 1, 1977.

Tim Sen’s purported activities are in the following:

Tim Sen went to Peam Reang School, Leuk Sek District, Kandal Province. In 1955-57, he became a worker carrying cement products at port in front of Wat Phnom, Phnom Penh. By 1957, Tim Sen decided to return to his homestead and lived with his parents.

In 1968, Tim Sen was convinced by Tuon Phan, his brother-in-law, to help agitate people to support Vietnamese in term of food and equipment. Tuon Phan tried to show him that Vietnamese had been assisting in fighting enemies in Kampuchea. Tim Sen followed such instruction constantly. Some time later, Tuon Phan sponsored Tim Sen’s membership of Vietnamese Labor Party, through the nomination of Chhun Kry alias Khieu Sam At, chief of District 18, Region 25. After the acclimatization, Tim Sen became responsible for convincing people to believe in and support Vietnamese and recruiting forces for Vietnamese military service.

In March 1970, Sin Sady, chief of Leuk Dek District, Region 25, Tim Sen was appointed as member of Peam Reang Sub-district, while Tuon Phan as secretary of the sub-district. Approximately 3 months later, Tuon Phan was taken away to be killed by Thieu Ky forces. Then Tim Sen was appointed as chief of security of Leuk Sek District, with Voeng acted as deputy, and Eng and Uy Kim as members. Under his management, Sin Dy gave instruction to the four mentioned to encourage people to sell out their cattle and pigs to Vietnam under the pretext that if they were to keep them, there would be no gain, as they would be seized by enemies who might be coming eventually.

Late in 1970, Sin Sy asked Tim Sen, Chum Saret and Uk Nuon to be informed that the authorities of Lek Dek had to transfer weapons and military forces to Region 25. Meanwhile, there was a plan for Chum Saret to prepare militiamen with the purpose of smashing cadre of Region 25 when Tim Sen partisans were coming to conquer the weapons and military forces. However, the plan was aborted due to...
the fact that cadre of Region 25 did not show up as expected.

In 1971, given the rumor that there existed a Khmer Organization based in District 18, Region 25, Tim Sen and his certain partisans, namely Mao Duk, member of security [office] of Leuk Dek, Cheam Eng and Lay Sarim, tried to contact and ask Sok But Chamraen, chief of Region 25, for permission to work within Region 25. Half a month later, when Tim Sen remained in the same position as security chief of Leuk Dek, Sok But Chamraen assigned Mao Duk as Tim Sen’s deputy. A short time later, Sok But Cham Raen called a meeting with seven participants: Sok But Chamraen himself who presided over; Sok, commander of Region 25; Huot Se, security chief of Region 25; Lay Sarim, chief of Kampong Phnom Sub-district, Leuk Dek District; Mao Duk; Cheam Eng and Tim Sen. The concept of the meeting was for participants to make people not believe Angkar and to recruit more forces.

In 1972, Ta Chey, secretary of Region 25, designated Tim Sen to hold military position as secretary of Battalion 12, Region 25. In April, 1972, Ta Chey and Huot Se sponsored Tim Sen and Leat (deputy commander of Battalion 12) to work in the framework of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. In the mean time, Ta Chey and Huot Se gave instructions to the two to recruit new forces and wreck the revolution in battlefields. Some time later, there was a plan to attack enemies at Baren, where Tim Sen and his partisans managed to destroy revolutionary forces by mean of motivating military combatants to storm attack day and night. As a result, 10 revolutionary forces were purportedly killed and 25 injured.

Eventually, Tim Sen managed to recruit several forces, by inviting them to have a meal, cakes and giving them some materials.
In the same year, Sok, commander-in-chief of Region 25 military, assigned Tim Sen and Leat to entice people in Traey Sla Sub-district, and Ta Lun Sub-district. As a result, 50 people were convinced to launch a demonstration against sub-district level leaders of Sa-ang District, Region 25. The demonstrators, headed by a person named Leat, marched from Prek Khlork to the office of Region 25, located in Tnaot Nhy Village, Khpor Sub-district, District 20. As for Tim Sen, he was ordered to act as those who pulled back the demonstrators. Taking this opportunity, Tim Sen managed to arrest all demonstrators and killed ten people. The remaining 40 were released. As Tim Sen admitted: “…I then followed the plan. At that time, I ordered military to catch all demonstrators (50) and kill 10 people. The others were released.”

Late in 1973, Ta Chey appointed Tim Sen as member of District 18, Region 25; Sieng Seng Ly as military commander of Battalion 260, Region 25; and Riel Linh as Chief of Khmer-Vietnamese Coordinating Committee.

In 1974, at a time of fighting at Chrey Thom, in the vicinity of South Vietnamese border, Tim Sen and his two partisans inflicted casualties to several revolutionary forces. After the act of subjugation, Tim Sen ordered the military to stop the operation. Realizing this, the enemies counterattacked intensively. Facing this severe and dangerous situation, Tim Sen ordered the military to withdraw, leaving 15 forces killed and 20 wounded. Later, the three persons encouraged and opened trails for 100 families in the districts of Sampoeu Poun and Chheu Khmao to flee to the enemy-controlled areas. After that, without an attempt to counterattack, Tim Sen partisans allowed enemies to evacuate hundreds of families from Sampoeu Poun Sub-district.

In February 1975, Tim Sen was assigned by Ta Chey as secretary of District 18, Region 25.

In 1975, after Khmer Rouge liberation, Angkar planned to have clean working cooperatives, by prioritizing [poor] classes. “On the other hand,” Tim Sen recalled, “I (Set) tried to provoke turmoil and disruption in cooperatives, by organizing mixed components to work so as to cause troubles constantly over the issues of ownership and labor.”

Maybe in May or June, Tim Sen contacted Ta Chey at Khleang Prak (Silver Storehouse), behind Wat Phnom to acquire equipment for the use in the District. Taking this opportunity, Ta Chey gave him the following instructions: 1) organizing mixed components in cooperatives to incite tumults and complicated contradictions; 2) wrecking communal economy and property; and 3) breaking down revolutionary forces in all fields.

In July and August, 1976, Tim Sen designated cooperative workers to work on a dam in Prek Sdei Sub-district, District 18, Region 25, with an aim to gain yield from corn plantation which covered an area of 60 hectares. Unfortunately, the dam was broken through, leaving the plantation (in which 50 percent reached its mature) flooded and 100 hectares of sowed-rice seedlings.

Moreover, Tim Sen deviated from the guideline of Angkar, by making people work too hard without rest. Tim Sen assigned a person named Be to activate people in Production Squad of District 18, Region 25 to go home one after another so that there would be irresoluble problems.

In March 1977, Tim Sen alias Set was arrested by Angkar and sent to Tuol Sleng prison.

At Tuol Sleng, under the administration of Duch, Tim Sen was interrogated on October 20, 1977 by a person named Than. The documented confession was copied and sent to Mok, secretary of Southwest Zone. A hand-written note on the front page, reads: “Southwest Zone; already sent to Ta Mok; 12/11/77).

The confession text is ended with a list of names of traitors implicated by Tim Sen response. On the list, there are 23 names, including 10 names, which have been marked as “Already arrested by Angkar”. The marked names include such people as Sin Dy, Sok But Chamraen, Huot Se, Chy...However, Sin Dy was arrested separately in 1976.
CLASS CONTRADICTION AND CLASS STRUGGLE

I. Class contradiction

1) Class

In Cambodian society (Democratic Kampuchea), there were five classes, namely: feudalist class, capitalist class, proletarian class, peasantry class, and worker class. In order to determine each class, it is important to characterize production means. Feudalist class has no devotion or mental work that it needs only to collect taxes on everything. For capitalist class, they think of nothing but how to buy things with a good bargain and sell out with high price. On the contrary, peasantry and worker class try hard to fulfill their tasks. Workers are divided into two: old and new. The former are those who worked with capitalists, and the latter are those who are working for collective in factories selected after April 17. Peasants fall into two categories: new and old. The ‘old peasants’ work on their fields for their own life. The ‘new peasants’ are capitalists and bourgeoisie evacuated by the Party from cities to work for collective.

2) Class contradiction

There are two types of contradictions: internal and external contradictions.

a) Internal class contradiction

It is an antagonist arises between our peasants and workers and capitalist elements. All means of production, such as factories, fall into the hand of our peasants and workers. Thus, they are so angry at us that lead to the life-and-death contradiction. Once we assign them to tend cattle, they intentionally cut the cattle’s feet or place them far away from grass so that they had nothing to eat. However, there are also some elements who are not against us, as they are satisfied with our revolution. They are good at recording, but not as good as us who are skillful in cutting and digging. Some bourgeois capitalists are real patriots. They help work out the people’s problems of living. But, if they are not genuine patriots, they will be authentic traitors.

b) External contradiction

We have to have a clean-cut between friend and enemy. Any conflicts between countries against us, such as our neighboring countries, that can not be solved are called counter-contradictions. Therefore, we have to fight so that they could not conquer our territory.

II. Class struggle

Contradictions between proletarian class and feudalism-capitalists are categorized as life-and-death contradictions, because proletarian class is orienting towards collective ownership, while the private ownership is evolving in favor of feudalism-capitalist class. Proletarian class considers the interest of collective. On the other hand, feudalist class ponders over their own interests: individual and its family and a standpoint of high-status and rank-orientation.

In order for them to be subjugated, our collective must spare no efforts to have a long-term absolute and constant struggle. For example, once we see the enemy carries out their activities, we say nothing; and when we see them defecate into (cylindrical shape) bamboo container (for palm juice), we do not try to convince ourselves that they are spoiled persons, but not enemy. This is a critical mistake. We have to make analysis of things from all corners, which can be worked out. Do not let the enemy act against us. (An excerpt by Ea Mengtry from a notebook of political session convened on June 15, 1977 belonged to comrade Khin Sophan, member of Eastern Zone Military Staff).
Ung Poun, 64, is the third child and the only survivor among Ta Mok’s six siblings. Currently, Poun leads a lonely life and earns her living by farming without any assistance from her children. She lives in Trapeang Thom Village, North Trapeang Thom Sub-district, Tram Kak District, Ta Keo Province. Poun told us that since Ta Mok was arrested, there have been a number of journalists coming to interview her regarding her eldest brother. Poun was told by some of these reporters that she would get to see Ta Mok in the custody. At first, she was only brought to Phnom Penh, not the cell where Ta Mok is being detained. However, on July 26 of this year, Poun managed to meet Ta Mok with the help of Ta Mok’s son-in-law. Poun complained that she could only meet with Mok at a distance.

Poun expressed her sadness; “When I heard Ta Mok was arrested, I really pitied him. I want to help him, but don’t know what to do. I want to speak to him.” She went on, with disappointment; “People have said that Ta Mok is a rich man, while others believe Ta Mok gave me a lot of money. In fact, he has never given me any money. I have been living and farming alone.” Poun once meet Ta Mok in Anlong Veng during the UNTAC time (1992-93). She added, “In Anlong Veng, Ta Mok told me that he had no money, that he was not a businessman, but a fugitive. I asked him to return to our home village, but he refused for fear of imprisonment.”

Ta Mok was arrested by the government of Cambodia on March 6, 1999 in Anlong Veng, near the Cambodia -Thai border. Currently, Ta Mok is in prison, awaiting trial before a yet-to-be-established tribunal. Mok’s attorney has claimed that Ta Mok is sick. This fact raises two questions. First, who will take responsibility for the health of Ta Mok, an accused who has not yet been prosecuted and who remains, after all,
Searching for the truth — Documentation

Number 8, August 2000

a human being. The blockade preventing health organizations from providing Mok with health care services must surely be contributing to his reported health crisis, which can only worsen the longer care is denied. Second, what is the objective of Mok’s attorney with respect to his recent statement. Is it an encouragement for the expeditious establishment of a tribunal or just an attempt to cast aspersions on the UN, which is attempting to seek real justice for the victims of the Khmer Rouge, as well as for Ta Mok.

Ta Mok’s original name was Ung Choeun (or Chhet Choeun). He was born in the year of the tiger (1926), in Pra Kiep Village, North Trapeang Thom Sub-district, Tram Kak District, Ta Keo Province. He is now 74. Poun recounted that during his childhood, at the age of eight, Mok lived with his grandmother in Prakiep Village, while she lived with her parents in Ta Peang Kul. Ta Mok grew up in a religious, Buddhist family. Ta Mok’s father’s name was Ung Preak, a former Patriarch of Wat Mohamuntrei, Phnom Penh. His mother’s name was Touch Soch. Ta Mok himself is a rather thin, small, white man. His school years were spent in the Trapeang Thom Wat school, near his home village. At the age of ten, Mok became a Buddhist monk at Wat Trapeang Thom. After one year in the monkhood, his father assisted Mok in pursuing studies with him at the Bali School of Wat Mohamuntrei. Mok spent more than ten years at Wat Mohamuntrei. He graduated from the Bali School before leaving the monkhood. Nget Kheng, the current village chief of Trapeang Thom, who knew Mok when they were monks together, recalled that Mok left the monkhood because he failed the entry exam of Senior Bali School. Kul Mi, a cousin of Mok’s who resides in Trapeang Thom Village, recounted that villagers usually called Mok “Achar Choeun”, and that during his period in the monkhood, Ta Mok was really very good at sermonizing on Buddhist precepts. Finally, Ta Mok met the requirements of his core study of Tripitaka (or Three Baskets, canons or collections of Buddhist Sacred writings), which are: 1) Discipline, consisting of a series of instructions for monks; 2) Things Strung Together, or sermons and addresses to all; and 3) Superior Truths or Metaphysics. Both Puon, Mi, and Kheng claimed that Mok was a gentle boy, with sympathy, and not snobbish. Poun asserted that, “Ta Mok has never slaughtered living creatures, even fish, chickens or ducks.” After the monkhood, Ta Mok married a cousin who lived in Prakiep Village, Trapeang Thom Sub-district. Her name was Uk Khoem. The couple had four daughters: Khom, Ho, Heng and Chhep.

No one in the village knew when Ta Mok’s contacts with the “Struggle Movement” started. However, Nget Kheng hinted that after becoming a monk, Ta Mok started to be leftist, liked to get involved in politics, and contacted Khmer Issarak. One year after his marriage, Ta Mok began to be kept track of by the government. He traded forest products from the jungle at market places, and perhaps he used this work as a cover to contact the Struggle Movement hidden in the jungle. Due to the fact that government agents closely followed him, Ta Mok decided to flee his homestead after having had his second child. After that, Ta Mok ceased contact with his family and parents. Poun recounted: “Ta Mok had never told anyone about his position or whereabouts. Occasionally, he visited the homestead and his parents”. Kul Mi told me that during the struggle movement, Ta Mok frequently went to Vietnam, where he met a close Vietnamese friend named Sun. Ta Mok could speak Vietnamese fluently. Mi added that Ta Mok’s involvement in politics didn’t go well with his father, who consistently adhered to Buddhist rules. Mok’s father called him a “peal” (a contemptible, evil man).

Ta Mok became a District Chief of Ta Keo Province under the control of the Khmer Issarak in 1949, and a member of the Communist Party of Kampuchea in 1963. Ta Mok was appointed Secretary of the Southwest Zone in 1968. In July 1971, Ta Mok became a member of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Kampuchea, whose policies would cause the deaths of millions of people during its almost four years in power. Ta Mok’s younger brothers also held high positions in the Khmer Rouge ranks. Chok (alias Chong), Mok’s younger brother, was a secretary of Prey Kabass District, while Cham served as secretary of Prek Trabek Sub-district. One of Mok’s daughters was assigned as a Regional Deputy Secretary in 1972. Mok’s eldest son-in-law’s name is Khe Mut (known as Meas Mut). In 1973, Meas Mut was a newly appointed Regional Secretary of Brigade 3.

As Secretary of the Southwest Zone, Ta Mok was in charge of the zone military section. Nget Kheng hinted that during the Pol Pot time, he worked closely with Ta Mok. Ta Mok always regarded him as the Construction Technical Advisor for dams, canals, bridges, water gates, and such. Nget Kheng opined that Ta Mok was the bravest military commander, because Ta Mok had never left the front line soldiers alone during the fighting. No one dared ignore or protest against the orders of Ta Mok, not even Vietnamese who were working with him.

During the Pol Pot time, Ta Mok resided with his wife and children in an immense villa in the provincial town of Ta Keo. Mi claimed that in the Pol Pot time, Ta Mok was called “Ta 15” due to the fact that he was born in Ta Keo Province with ID code number “105”. Mi recalled, “During the Pol Pot period, Ta Mok attended a meeting at Wat Trapeang Thom with Angkar’s high levels, district chiefs and sub-district chiefs. Soon after the meeting, he returned home without even a glance at the villagers.”

Nget Kheng didn’t believe the accusations of Ta Mok’s involvement with executions. “How can Ta Mok have killed people when his own nieces and nephews, as well as other relatives, were also killed. Why? The executions had something to do with lower level organizations, such as district, sub-district, and militia elements. Ta Mok doesn’t know anything about the slaughter of millions of people.” Poun argued that “It cannot be decided whether it is true or not, as we didn’t see this alleged conduct with our own eyes.” Mi, who lost her beloved elder brother, a pilot in Khmer Rouge time, gave her own explanation. “It’s hard to believe that a person who never used to harm any living creatures later became a killer of millions of people.

However, Ta Mok killed people.” Mi was eager to hold Ta Mok responsible for the acts he is alleged to have committed. “Ta Mok is an enemy,” added Mi. When asked whether she wanted to have a tribunal for Ta Mok, Mi responded, “Ta Mok cannot live a comfortable life, because he killed millions of people. What he had done is completely wrong. Ta Mok must face the consequences of his actions. Buddhism states that good deeds will be praised, while misdeeds must be punished.”

As for Poun, regardless of the dimensions of her brother’s misdeeds against the people of Cambodia, Ta Mok remains her blood. “Although people say he killed people, I still regard him as my elder brother. I really want them to release him and for him to return home”. Through her sobbing, Poun explained, “If I have him back, I will endure hardship and suffering to feed him. I will do whatever I must, no matter how hard, just so I can see his face.” I have missed him to the point of losing memory. I really want to see his face. I’m afraid he will die because he is so old.” In an attempt to gain forgiveness for her brother, Poun added: “No one realizes what they are doing while they are doing it, but his wrong doings will teach him....”

In response to a question concerning the proposed tribunal for Ta Mok and the other Khmer Rouge leaders, Poun finally admitted, “I know nothing about the tribunal, as I haven’t been educated. However, I need only the truth. Whether or not Ta Mok killed people, I need the truth. If he is found guilty and he rejects the verdict, it will also not be real justice.”
KILLING PITS IN BANTEAY MEANCHEY PROVINCE

By Sophearith Choung

(Continued)

3) Wat Banteay Neang

Wat Banteay Neang was an execution site and prison located in Phnom Village, Banteay Neang Sub-district, Mongkul Borei District, Banteay Mean Chey Province within latitude 13°30'4094" north and longitude 130°00'5054" east. The data recorded by Global Positioning System is classified as file No. R042909A. A field research on this location was conducted on April 29, 1997, at 4:40 p.m.

An elderly man named Khun Say, 58, experienced imprisonment by Pol Pot regime in Thom Village, Banteay Neang Sub-district, Mongkul Borei District. He was detained from 1976 until 1977 in Chamkar Khnao Prison, Serey Sophoan District. Another possible witness named Sraep Thlang, 60, living in the same village as the former, also shared his experience with us. He recalled the criminal center, consisted of prison and interrogation office, was converted from Buddhist monks’ quarters of Wat Banteay Neang. Thlang affirmed that the prisoners were taken to be killed in front of the monastery. Obviously, the informant also invited us to examine the killing pits remaining, which were nearly washed out by nature. There were approximately 100 to 200 pits, which were about one meter from each other. The killing pits cover an area of a square hectare. A trench about 500 to 1000 meters long was riddled with pits. Thlang estimated that about 20 to 25 or even 30 victims were believed to have been executed and buried in each pit. In 1979, Vietnamese took cuffs by trucks from the temple, while the temple walls were being stained with blood. In front of the temple, there was a main killing pits into which people in this village were about to killed and buried. The villagers were deluded into eating Cambodian noodle communally before a meeting scheduled to be
taken place in two days time. Fortunately, the country was liberated before January 7, 1979. The people victimized at Wat Banteay Neang were of different types, including government civil servants and ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese. Thlang estimated approximately 3,500 to 5,000 people or more were killed.

4) Cham Kar Ta Ling

This site is located in Chuop Village, Chuop Vary Sub-district, Preah Net Preah District, Banteay Mean Chey Province within longitude 103°10'4707" east and latitude 13°35'5637" north. The data recorded by Global Positioning System is classified as file No. R043002A. Cham Ka Ta Ling is about 100 meters from Wat Preah Net Preah, which was once transformed into a hospital in Pol Pot time. A field research was conducted on April 30, 1997, at 9:45 a.m.

Mr. Tum Soeun, 45, claimed that he used to dig up killing pits here and found 110 to 120 bodies. There were 6 main pits which are four square meters and two meter deep. So, he affirmed, there would be about 660 to 720 victims executed. They are approximately 50 meters behind a prison. There, in Pol Pot time, there stood a tile-roofed house to hold prisoners. After old prisoners had been slaughtered, new prisoners were brought in subsequently. Concerning types of prisoners, Tum Soeun added most victims were 45 years of age down, according to the exhumation of skulls. There were mostly male civil servants evacuated from cities. Tum Soeun came to conclusion that the remains fell into decay and had already been cremated.

5) Prey Ta Rut

Prey Ta Rut execution site is located in Chuop Village, Chuop Sub-district, Preah Net Preah District, Banteay Mean Chey Province within longitude 103°10’4334” east and latitude 13°37’3836” north. The data recorded by Global Positioning System is classified as file No. R043003A. The site is about 100 meter behind a hospital of Preah Net Preah Hospital. The jungle was used for slaying, not to detain people. Estimate number of victims is 3,890. A field research was conducted on April 30, 1997, at 10: 20 a.m.

Mr. Thlang Thong, 49, claimed that he new nothing about the site beside the fact that it was an execution site. He had no idea from which place the victims were taken. He added the remains were excavated and preserved at Phnom Chunch Chiang Mount, but they disappeared due to the lack of effective measures.

6) Chak Krei Village

The execution site is located in Chak Krei Village, Chuop Vary Sub-district, Preah Net Preah District, Banteay Mean Chey Province within longitude 103°10’4502” east and latitude 13°37’2411” north. The data recorded by Global Positioning System is classified as file No. R043003B. A field research was conducted on April 30, 1997, at 11: 00 a.m.

Information on the execution sites in the eight sub-districts of Preah Net Preah District may be available in various places. However, we managed to obtain some informative accounts from only one site due to the fact that other sites are too far and conditions of the routes leading to them are not favorable. Statistics of the district execution sites and number of victims collected in 1984 was provided by the District Culture Department. Based on the statistics, the total victims in the eight sub-districts is 78,496 and there are up to 33 sites. However, we managed to reach and conduct research only on three locations.

In addition, there is an information confirming the number of victims killed at Phnom Tra Yaung Mount is up to 40,000. Phnom Tra Yaung was used as large prison and main execution site located 20 kilometers from the District Headquarters. Our mapping team interviewed several possible witnesses and their clarifications have been tape-recorded and documented to be taught to younger generations.
Request:

[The aim] is to be aware of the concept of our party’s statute so as to upgrade understanding and quality of our cadre and candidate party members in the field of basic organizational guidelines stated in the statute, which is law and charter of law. The more we are aware of and have qualitative improvement in the statute, the better the implementation. Lack of understanding, in some cases, may result in practice on the wrong track. Thus, it is imperative to pursue more education of both individual and communal session in order to grasp firmly the party’s basic principles and organization.

Commentary Request:

There would be the same haste to work on the theory of such document. But it will not be true in term of practice. Strong and weak points will happen. For example, a report says there are some elements who joined the party without sponsorship or approval from authorities of the organization. They just had a bowl of sticky rice and then said they had joined the party.

Therefore, we have to grasp firmly the party organizational principles and follow up their implementation. By doing so, enemies can not infiltrate and burrow within the party. We must be impressed and strengthen the comprehension of the party’s organizational principles.

Another example focus a provision on the selection of cadre based on the ten-point criteria, which we sometimes fail to examine. Albeit the ‘biography’ is chronologically listed down at the end of the criteria, we have to be vigilant vis-à-vis the thorough examination of biographies of enemy. In some cases, their involvement in the movement is based to save their face. But in the end, they are identified as enemies. Other provisions on implementation of political, ideology and organizational guidelines must also be paid attention to.
**Document Essence**

1) Basic principles and political stance of the party in the new phase of the socialist revolution and of building up socialism.

First, the reason for our party to be named Communist Party of Kampuchea is because it is clean, has no involvement with foreign countries, especially those countries who are intending to pounce upon us.

Second, we know that partisans of the contemptible traitorous element we have already arrested now creating another party named Workers Party with an attempt to be separated from our Communist Party of Kampuchea. The essence covers concept of CIA, revisionists and foreign invading countries.

Third, we publicize our party’s guidelines, which satisfy our friends in the world. They said our party’s guidelines are correct. Third World non-communist countries also think so. Our rationales make them clear and convinced. Leninist parties model upon us. This is our side. As for enemies, they seem to have been pushed an object into their mouth. Thus, when we react openly, no one dare scorn us. In the same time, some enemies become extremely seized with painful anger.

It is meant to show the fight for title, mandate and history of our party founded for our party’s independence, for the sake of our nation, people and our country. However, enemies don’t want us to have self-reliance. They want to belittle our party’s name, mandate, and history as a slavery party.

In 1966, in an open Standing Committee Conference, we came to a decision that there must be a need to make our party independent from now on and the next generations. Based on this principle, we either write about the party and its 13-year long struggle history or define our party name, mandate and history. The younger generations will study the history of the party, which is independent and not the slave of any expansionists.

The concept of independence is correct. Obviously, our people of all generations struggle for independence. Oppressors make the history a step to further oppress and swindle people. On the other hand, we write about the history of our country, struggle history of our party and about our people for the sake of independence not for our people to become slave any more. For example, Angkor Wat have been recorded in the history, which say our people were the creators. In fact it is true. It was built by the people not by kings. And the struggle has also been done by the people. Our people are history makers.

We must have a clean-cut stance on this issue and be proud of our party’s name. For this matter, there would be further struggle. Yet, it is up to us, not the enemies.

2) The basic principles and political stance of the party are the basis for the nine-point provisions, which condense our party’s essence of both political, ideological and organizational concept.

Provision 2 of the statute states “our party belongs to worker class”. If so, the political interest must also be in favor of the worker class. Who does the Worker Party represent? It represents not only workers but also other classes as well as people as a whole. For example, a provision stipulates that after achieving the goal of Democratic Revolution, the party must go on with building the socialist revolution and the revolution.

But the contemptible traitors are against our line of the party’s continuation of socialist revolution. They set up another new program against our party guideline. Thus, we must grasp firmly, practice, and further gather public forces. If we fail to do so, enemies would be able to attack us. To congregating forces, we must solve the problems of people’s living, absolutely purge contemptible enemies based on the party’s guidelines. Do not cause damage to the people.

- Self-reliance is also stated here. Thus, it is imperative to learn it for effective implementation.
- Provision 9 states that our party also strengthens solidarity with Leninist parties in the world based on the stance of internationalism and proletarianism. By doing so, enemies can not isolate us. Our delegation has visited China and Korea. Through the visit, we learn that many countries in the world support us. And politically the enemies could not attack us. They are really angry, but force themselves to shut up. Therefore, we must read and read again for great awareness. One who is against the basic principles, she or he must choose another way towards capitalists, revisionists, and against the party as well as the revolution.

We must read, study, because these basic political principles contain of the whole essence of the party.
# LIST OF NAMES OF CAMBODIAN AMBASSADORS AND DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES INCARCERATED AT S-21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Date of Entry</th>
<th>Date of Smashing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kim Ren</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Second Secretary, Arabia</td>
<td>TSL</td>
<td>June 15, 1977</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ngo Taing Tikea</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Second Secretary, Romania</td>
<td>TSL</td>
<td>June 1, 1977</td>
<td>November 27, 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chann Mon</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Second Secretary, France</td>
<td>TSL</td>
<td>June 1, 1977</td>
<td>March 31, 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Chea San</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Ambassador to Russia</td>
<td>TSL</td>
<td>March 3, 1978</td>
<td>May 27, 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Tann Chhay Heng</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Secretary, Yugoslavia</td>
<td>TSL</td>
<td>May 16, 1977</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Thach Suong</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Second Secretary, Yugoslavia</td>
<td>TSL 108504</td>
<td>December 19, 1976</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Tep Sam An</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Third Secretary, Algeria</td>
<td>T83 TSL 108504</td>
<td>October 23, 1976</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Meak Touch</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Ambassador to Laos</td>
<td>TSL</td>
<td>November 20, 1977</td>
<td>March 31, 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Meas Kien</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Ambassador to Egypt</td>
<td>TSL</td>
<td>October 28, 1975</td>
<td>March 12, 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Yuk Chantha</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>First Secretary, Tansania</td>
<td>Y143, TSL</td>
<td>February 26, 1978</td>
<td>July 18, 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Yuos Thol</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Second Secretary, Laos</td>
<td>TSL</td>
<td>November 20, 1977</td>
<td>March 31, 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Loeung Hong Sour</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Embassy Security, Tanzania</td>
<td>TSL</td>
<td>June 15, 1977</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Sieng An</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Ambassador to Hanoi, Vietnam</td>
<td>S163 TSL</td>
<td>December 12, 1976</td>
<td>October 18, 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Sok Sokhom</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Cook, France</td>
<td>TSL</td>
<td>February 26, 1977</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Hour Someth</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Second Secretary, France</td>
<td>TSL</td>
<td>June 1, 1977</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Huot Sambath</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Ambassador to Yugoslavia</td>
<td>H89 TSL</td>
<td>September 9, 1976</td>
<td>November17, 1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Hay Kirivatt</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Embassy staff, Cuba</td>
<td>TSL</td>
<td>December 8, 1976</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Hay Kim Seang</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Secretary, Cuba</td>
<td>H156 TSL</td>
<td>December 8, 1976</td>
<td>March 18, 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Leng Thach</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Cook, Arabia, Egypt, Korea</td>
<td>TSL</td>
<td>February 27, 1978</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Issoup Ganthy</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Chief of Information</td>
<td>Y149 TSL 108433</td>
<td>September 9, 1976</td>
<td>December 6, 1976</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Hay Kim Seang (No.19) married the daughter (No.18) of Huot Sambath (No.16) in Peking in 1970.
Construction of Cheoung Ek Genocide Memorial in 1980’s
BIOGRAPHY OF COMRADE KONG

Suong Sikoeun

With an aim to be linked with the Chamraen (Progress) Movement, Socialist Movermen and to absorb Leninist doctrine, in mid-1956, I asked comrade Khnol for permission to join the Khmer Marxist Leninist Movement. Comrade Khnol refused my request two times. Yet a few days later, Brother Ieng Sary paid me a courtesy visit. Then, he asked me to write an article for “international forum” for Unity Press (Ek Pheap) chaired by Poeng Say. Sometime later, Ieng Sary told me, as a core person, to attend a meeting held at Brother Vong’s house, where I saw several persons, namely Nut Panara, Tak Heng, Hou Yun and the house owner. Our team chose to attend weekly meetings under the chairmanship of Hou Yun or Ieng Sary. Later, the team was separated, and I had to join the meeting at Chamraen Vichea instead. My new team included Nut Panara, Tak Heng, A Mean San, and chairman Ieng Sary. At that time, I was assigned to spy on a contemptible traitorous person named Koam Ret and make weekly reports to Ieng Sary.

I continued to teach in Chamraen Vichea School and share my revolutionary activities until my departure to France on October 17, 1957.

To sum up, I joined the Democratic Party from 1952 to 1975 because, first, I thought that this party consisted of patriots and clean elements (I respected and loved Yutevong and Iv Kaes). Second, was that this party was against the monarchical regime, which had French influence by capitalist-style revolution. (I respected and loved and modeled upon Robest Piya). These two reasons inspired me to join Song Ngoc Thanh from 1952 to 1954. Third, I thought it was a Marxist Leninist group with patriotism and the aim of making our country become a socialist society and claim independence from Vietnam, but in fact it was not. After a long time of my involvement, I observed them breaking up among themselves, intellectuals of the movement and groups of people. They did not fight against the American imperialists, claiming that the Americans would turn back to support Sangkum Reastr Niyum (Popular Socialist Community). Finally, I knew that the group leaders were not qualified enough and lived in debauchery status (such as the contemptible Hang, Thun Hak, and the contemptible Koam Ret).

The influence of these contemptible traitors on me was an individual matter.

In their enticement, they raised the personal matter of leading individuals, especially of contemptible Song Ngoc Thanh and then Siv Chauv arguing the accomplishment was achieved by themselves. They never talked about heroism of the people, but concentrated only on a handful of groups of individuals. This was a fascist idea which looked down on the people and masses.

Reasons for my return to Chamraen Group

I came to see that the Chamraen group had a more open view on analyzing situations. They did not say this and that interchangeably as Song Ngoc Thanh had been doing. In the field of national solidarity, Chamraen group also had open view, strategic line for gathering forces and distinguished between friends and enemies. They did not do whatever they wanted to both in the country and overseas. They found it urgent to gather people in the fight against the American peril. As for the traitors, they cited monarchical or republic administrations as their political targets for propaganda. Still worse, they looked down on our people, specifically poor peasants, asserting that the people had very low comprehension and were enticed by Sihanoukists. Furthermore, they were so fascist. If any
one took a different view from theirs, she or he would be soon labeled as a Vietnamese lackey.

**Stopgap stay in France (October 7, 1957-May 15, 1970)**

On October 17, 1957, I won a scholarship to study in Paris for a degree in Technology of Aircraft Tele-communication under the auspices of my uncle named Ul Chon, who at that time, stayed at the old association with me.

My aim was to assimilate Leninist theory and learn communist revolution in Europe, especially in France. Also, I wanted to know and take part with Marxist students and intellectuals in France.

I relied on Ul Chon for money to buy clothes. Before my departure, Brother Ieng Sary invited all scholarship-students to visit his home, where he gave instructions and advice concerning ways of living over there, as well as the issues of gathering patriotic forces against American imperialists and their lackeys. Then a cordial party was organized. Son Sen was also present and Hou Yun gave me 500 riel.

On the departure day, Brother Ieng Sary handed to me a confidential document and asked me to hand it over to Brother Khieu Samphan staying in Paris. As planed, the letter was handed to Khieu Samphan at Paris International Hospital, where he was hospitalized a day before my arrival. Few days later, Khieu Samphan told me that as requested, I was accepted as member of Marxist Leninist group in France, comprised of Khieu Samphan, Thiounn Mumm, In Tam, Sam Bok, and In Sokan (working in Le Havre). Then I became an active member of the “Khmer Student Association”. My task was to entice Cambodian students and trainees to be aware of the peril of Americans and their lackeys inside and outside the country, namely contemptible Sam Sary, Mao Say, Lon Nol, and Nhiek Tioulong and to take part in or join the “Khmer Student Association”.

In 1958, I became a member of “Linguistic Group” of French Communism. In the same year, I passed baccalaureate 2 in Paris. On that special occasion, I was rewarded by the Marxist Leninist Group.

Late in 1958, Brother Khieu Samphan returned to Cambodia. Then Thiounn Mumm became responsible for the Marxist Leninist Group in France. In 1957-1958 I was really influenced by Khieu Samphan’s education, as he paid so much attention to me. I modeled on him in terms of spiritual devotion to hardship and diseases in order to fulfill the guideline-task for gaining affection from the people and being humble toward the people.

- In the Meantime, I took part in writing and publishing a secret magazine “Reasmei”.
- In 1959, after In Sokan returned to Cambodia, I was chosen to become a management staff member with Thiounn Mumm, Tun, Chote Sirin and contemptible Touch Kham Doeun.

At that time, liberal influence began to spread over the Marxist Leninist Group due to the documentary promulgation by French party of “20th Conference of the Communist Soviet”. The group was in total agreement with the decision by the conference. The spirit of unlimited internationalism intended to gradually elevate Soviet Union as revolutionary leader of the world infiltrated and absolutely extended itself in me as well as the group. Like other liberal parties, I agreed to Zark Duclo’s formula: “To fight against Soviet is to fight against communism”.

In the same year, 1959, I attended a “Universal Conference on Youths and Students” in Vienna, Austria headed by In Sokan. There was also a delegation of Sangkum Reastr Niyum youths led by Yim Dit. The two delegations, “Khmer Student Union” and “Sangkum Reastr Niyum Youth” were led by Yim Dit and In Sokan, advisor.

After this conference, In Sokan and I attended another conference of “International Union” held in Prague, Czechoslovakia. In the conference, conflicts between China and liberal groups gradually arose. For example, the Chinese delegation refused the use of “by peaceful means” in the preamble. We also asked for an audience with the Chinese delegation, with whom we talked a lot about friendship and solidarity between the two countries. Mostly, the Chinese delegation condemned American imperialists and Yugoslav revisionists. However, the trend of revisionism was actually liked with in the Marxist Leninist Group in 1960, after a world conference of 81 communist parties and worker’s parties held in Moscow. The group organized several training courses to place emphasis on statements by the conference, particularly on “national democracy” in third world counties.

Since then standpoint and stance of revisionism infiltrated and made me practice real activities accordingly during that period. The standpoint and
stance against the revolution are: 1) proletarian revolution can win without use of violence. For example in 1958, in Czechoslovakia, a communist party seized power via elections by the world’s socialist forces who prevented intervention by international imperialism. In the meantime, Soviet soldiers were deploying in Czechoslovakia; 2) in the transitional period, especially in Third World countries, proletarian parties might allow national capitalists to lead democratic revolution or share the leading power. And the ways to reach the goal could be followed by peaceful means; 3) the theory of sovereignty is limited to the international unified communist movement led by Soviet Union. Revolution in each country has to serve the general interest of the international communist movement. For example, in 1954, at the Geneva Conference, the international situation and the interests of international communist movements required no fighting. Therefore, the party in each country, which was leading the struggle, had to listen to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Obviously, I spoke out in favor of standpoint and posture of Soviet revisionism, particularly living in peace, with economic competition with capitalists. Moreover, I argued that if another world war occurred, not only capitalists but also all human beings would be annihilated. In the meantime, I spoke out against China vis-à-vis contradictions with Soviet revisionism at the time when the Vietnam War started. Propaganda mechanism of international revisionist federations upheld and used the struggle by Vietnamese people as a pattern for people around the world. The Marxist Leninist Group and I myself strongly believed in the propaganda and modeled upon the struggle of the Vietnamese people. In the light of contradictions between China and the Soviet Union, the Group and I myself considered the neutral attitude and stance of the Vietnamese Party as correct.

After the 1962 “missile crisis” in Cuba conflict between China and the Soviet Union occurred. The Group and I were on the side of the Soviet revisionists. In 1966, due to both the individual conflicts and procedural guidelines among the Group, I decided to resign as a management staff member, which would then consist of only Thiounn Mumm, Tun Chot, Sirin, and contemptible Touch Kham Doeun. The conflict did not stem from standpoint or stance contradictions as the Marxist Leninist Group in France absorbed revisionism a hundred percent. The hot point of conflict was the fact that I did not agree with them on the compromising attitude of Thiounn Mumm, who took no actions against the violation of the Group’s organizational principles. For example, Tun Chot and Sirin got themselves employed in a French “Research Institution” without informing the management team during their hospitalization in the southern part of France in 1965. Acting as chief of the “Khmer Student Union”, contemptible Touch Kham Doeun, without a consensus by the group, integrated the Union into the “International Student Union” at its conference held in Moscow in 1962.

By so doing, what are my standpoint and attitudes towards the struggle of the people under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea? I will make it clear in three phases from 1958 up to 1970. I would like to affirm my Angkar’s “backbone membership” was confirmed in 1956. I was so humble and served the people’s struggle movement under the leadership of the party without any knowledge of the existence of the party, but only its core leaders.
THE TRAGEDY OF KOH PHAL VILLAGE

By Sorya Sim

(Continued)

Mr. Sen Sos, 69, Koh Phal village, 2000

I was born at Koh Phal village. I later moved to live with my wife in Trea village. About July 1975, I as well as other rubber plantation workers were evacuated from Trea village. I reached Ta Pav village.

About two or three months later I heard sounds of shelling sounds from the direction of Koh Phal. I was assigned by the Khmer Rouge cadres to be a fisherman and I was fishing in a lake in Ta Pav village. At the lake the fish were getting scarce, so I was sent to catch fish at Koh Phal early in 1976. My fishing team included six people, three Chams and three Khmer. I remember the name of only one man, my chief, named Nut. Nut at present lives at Poes 1 market.

My team was ordered by a group of soldiers, whose names and faces I do not remember, to stay right at the bank. We were not allowed to come up the island. We were told we would be shot dead if we moved even two or three meters up the island. There were people responsible for picking up the fish we caught. I do not remember their names. We had enough to eat. We had things like rice, sticky rice to prepare desert, meat, and of course, we the fishers picked the big fish to eat.

At about 5 or 6 pm every two or three days, a huge ship with a full load of about 1,000 people unloaded onto Koh Phal. I was about 150 meters from the ship. These people carried with them packages [Bangvech]. Young, old, men, women, they were probably Chams, Chinese, and Khmer. I knew some of them as Chams because they wore caps and long-sleeved shirts. At about 8 pm, I heard people screaming and crying. And I could tell which cries came from the young and which from the old. This voice came from the place where there were 49 graves. I knew there were 49 graves because after 1979 I went and had a look.

I was at Koh Phal for three months. Then I was sent back to Ta Pav village and worked as a bike repairman. There, I realized that those people screaming and crying had to have been killed because at Ta Pav village Ta Hak was also killed [for hardly a reason]. He was accused by the village chief of stealing someone’s duck eggs and of beating a cow when getting angry with Angkar. Ta Hak was also a Cham and was killed in 1976 in a well in Ta Pav village. I knew the story because I saw Ta Hak’s Sarong and shoes hanging over there. I recognized it was Ta Hak’s Sarong and shoes.

I saw three gun storehouses, one of which was not completely built yet. Each storehouse was about 10 meters wide and 20 meters long. I knew about this because I saw the Khmer Rouge cadres unload cases of bullets and guns from their ships onto Koh Phal. In 1979 when I came to Koh Phal and saw empty storehouses. Some of the 49 graves were not buried. I could see skulls and bones. The floods have claimed much of banks of Koh Phal and the some of the graves have accordingly disappeared.
Searching for the truth — History

**Zip, Commune Chief of Poes 1 commune, Koh Phal village, 1999**

There are 49 graves full of Khmer Rouge victims in Koh Phal village. Nobody has ever dug them up. The size of each is about 2 meters wide and 5 meters long. The depth is about 2.5 meters to 3 meters.

**Math El, 62, Koh Phal village, 2000**

A lot of Chams died of malaria, 220 people in Phka Daung, 44 people in Krabei Kriek village, 66 in Chravak Dek village, 67 in Baray village. People were categorized into several types of enemy. The first group included those who were considered most rich and educated in religion and were put into Phka Daung village, the most malaria-prone area; the second group went to Krabei Kriek; the third group went to Chravak Dek; and the fourth to Baray village. The second group was the less educated. The third and the fourth groups were the fishermen and poor Khmer villagers told us that there had been a big party for those Chams [including the slaughter of a cow for food] and that they were put onto truck; they were never seen again.

People from these villages were later were moved to other places, including Rumkel Village, Pon Village, and the so-called Vihear Khpuoh or Vihear Teap Village in Suong district, Kampong Cham Province. I made it to Suong. None of the people of the two villages, Baray and Rumvinch, survived the killing during this evacuation. On the way back to Koh Phal, we met people from this and that village but not from those two villages. The

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Islamic Koran, Chapter 16, Verses 126

**Interpretation:** Therefore, Muslim doesn’t ban its followers from punishing or taking revenge. The word “equal to” means being equivalent to the act committed and suffered. For example, there is a cut, which kills a person. And the equivalent act is to give hit with fist. The magnitude of the knife can be small or big, or causes injury at different places. The man who is about to take revenge can be younger or older than his victim. Also, the strength of the fist can be lighter or stronger. If all mentioned materials used to take revenge are of equal quality, the revenge or punishment may be equivalent. On the other hand, the cycles of revenge will never be brought to an end if there is no equal use of strength against each other. Currently in Cambodian society, only courts are permitted to resolve disputes. In the case that the victims is patient, she or he will suffer no consequences and receive a complete, new good result, meaning that the victim can use his or her patience to compensate the punishment by the perpetrator. Punishment and torture are considered as misdeeds. But if the punishment is made equivalent to the precedent torture there would be a fair result. This means that the victim suffers no loss of his or her good deed gained earlier. **Sorya Sim**
to dig out the graves. These soldiers were of our [government] soldiers, not the Khmer Rouge. They asked permission from the district. They ordered people to move away for one week. The soldiers did not bring bones away with them. They were probably looking for gold. When we had moved for three days, Ta Yan, Chief of Krauch Chhmar District allowed us to come back. Ta Yan now lives in Cha village, in Dambe district, Kampong Cham. His deputy is named Ta Samin, a policeman who is now living in Kampong Cham. Some time later, the district authority dug up two ox-carts of skulls and brought them to the district office for people to see.

Tes El, 66, Koh Phal village, 1999

I lived in many places from 1975 to 1979. Of those places, I remember I lived at Roka Khnao village for six days, one year at Krabei Kriek Village, and Chong A Village for several months. It was the chief of the commune, named Mil, who ordered me to evacuate, “You all move!” I did not want to leave but I dared not say. If you stay, you will be tied [arrested]. After the evacuation, I was ordered to plough land and to farm rice, corn and tobacco. The person who ordered me to work was the village chief named Nut, now dead. I never saw people being killed with my own eyes.

Tes El, 67, Koh Phal village, 2000

I was born at Koh Phal and lived here until the evacuation of 1975. In 1979 I returned to live in Koh Phal. The Khmer Rouge took control of Koh Phal in 1973. In 1975 there were 1700 people. All were Chams. In 1979 there were about 300 left, including children.

In the fasting month of Ramadan in late 1975, all the people of Koh Phal were evacuated because of a revolt against the Khmer Rouge. A few of the people of Koh Phal were evacuated to Stung Treng province, but most to Phka Daung Village, Krabei
Kriek Village, Chravak Dek Village, Baray Village, and Romvinh village. Ten families from each of these villages were later moved to the Krasang and Santuk areas of Kampong Thom province and to Suong District of Kampong Cham. The five villages were deep in the forest, malaria-prone, and under-populated. The Chams built small cottages and lived among the Khmer. Some Chams were also there from Chumnik village. People suffered from overwork and insufficient food. After a while people at Krabei Kriek and Phka Daung villages were moved elsewhere and some of them survived and returned to Koh Phal after 1979. None of those from the other three villages returned. Khmer people who came and visited us here told us that none of these Chams survived.

Sles Tayeb, 35, Koh Phal village, 2000

I was evacuated [from Koh Phal] to Phka Daung in 1975 after the evacuation. I can remember that time. We walked to Roka Knao Village. Then we took boats through Chumnik Village to Phka Daung, Chravak Dek, and Baray Villages. I lived in Phska Daung Village. I lived in small cottages. There were more people in Phka Daung than Krabei Kriek and the rest. Chams from Trea Village who had been evacuated to Dambe District were also evacuated to Phka Daung around 1977.

For one year at Phka Daung Village I looked after cows, and then field dams. I carried soil, back-breaking heavy, I almost died. Phka Daung Villagers died of malaria. No arrest. No torture. Collective meals. Chams worked like the Khmer. Very few Khmer old people died because they had lived there a long time. More new people died. A lot of people at Phka Daung village died, about three every day, so often that women dug the graves. More people died than survived.

After that we were evacuated to Suong district. I moved along with others but stopped at Kbal O because I met my relatives there. Others continued to Suong.

El Math, 46, current Koh Phal Village, Koh Phal, 2000

I was evacuated to Phka Daung Village, Chhouk Commune, Krauch Chhmar District, Kampong Cham Province. There I did farming and had rice soup to eat. No torture. Phka Daung for almost three years. When the Southwest fought the East in 1977, I moved to Po Cheung Khal for eight months. These Southwest cadres killed all Koh Phal Chams who were at Baray village and Chravak Dek Village, but the Khmer were not killed. Those in Phka Daung and Krabei Kriek Villages were left alone. I did not know the reasons. I never saw people being killed. Only two of my sisters and I survived. The rest of my family members died, including my brothers El Sen at Phka Daung, El Tort at Baray, El Tiyae at Baray.

Two years after I returned to live at Koh Phal I heard that my cousin Aminah survived. I went to Chravak Dek Village to look for her. I came into the house asking for water to drink. I knew the house. I used to live there. I asked a lady there for Aminah, the daughter of the woman named Mes and she cried out saying all were gone, the whole family. She was killed somewhere in Chhuok Commune. More people were killed at Baray and Chravak Dek villages than at the others.

Koh Phal family members were separated at Roka Khnao village for ten days on the way to Chhuok Commune and over there they were put in different villages. They could visit each other but not live together. We could only visit sick relatives for a short time, not stay and take care of them. We were told the health worker would take care of them.

At Phka Daung Village in late 1978, I was taking care of my buffaloes when I saw leaflets being dropped, but I could not read them.

At present there are 63 families in Koh Phal and they are farmers and fishermen.
(Continued)

The second Huy at S-21, Nun Huy, was nicknamed “Tall Huy” (Huy k’puh) or “Rice field Huy” (Huy srae). He ran Office 24, the prison farm at Prey So affiliated with S-21. In the hierarchy of the prison, he was an important figure. In 1976, for example, he supervised some study sessions for communist Youth Group members working at the prison. His wife, Prak Khoeun, a “full-rights” member of the CPK, worked as a part-time interrogator at S-21. The two were arrested in November 1978. Nhem En claimed that Huy was arrested for sexual offenses, but his confession does not mention these.

The Interrogators

In November 1976, the interrogation division consisted of at least eleven six-man interrogation groups. These evolved into ten six-person units by mid-1977, which were further divided into three-man teams, led by a unit supervisor. Each team included a chief, an annotator-deputy, and a third member, in the manner of Communist Party cells and other triadic organizations throughout DK. The third member, sometimes referred to as a guard, may have been the person assigned to inflict torture. By 1978, most interrogators worked in a “hot” (kdau) contingent. This was directed by a senior interrogator, Pu, about whom no biographical data have come to light. In 1976 and 1977 there had also been a “gentle” (slout) subunit, whose members were apparently prohibited from using torture. The “hot” subunit was referred to in one confession as the “cruel” (kach) contingent. Its members were allowed to torture prisoners. In 1978, the “gentle” group was no longer mentioned in confessions, although it may have been replaced by a “cool” (trocheak) unit. An eight-person “chewing” (angkiem) unit under Prak Nan, an experienced interrogator, dealt with tough, important cases.

In 1977 and 1978, it seems that at least one interrogator, Prak Khoeun, the wife of “Rice-field” Huy, was a woman. Prak Khoeun came from sector 25 and classified herself as a “lower-middle peasant.” She had joined the revolution in 1972, she wrote, because she was angered by the “way the power-holding classes exploited and looked down on poor peasants.” Having transferred to S-21 in 1977 after marrying “Rice-field” Huy, she admitted torturing “several” prisoners “until they couldn’t function.” There may have been other female interrogators at the prison. Ung Pech remembered one whom he nicknamed “the Monster” (a-yeak), and the archive reveals that Kun, who was the wife of a senior Khmer Rouge cadre and arrested with him at the end of 1978, was interrogated by two women, Li and Kon. On the other hand, Kok Sros, interviewed in 1997, could recall no women regularly employed to question prisoners.

Most of the interrogators and document workers had fought in the 1970-1975 war, often serving as messengers (nir’sa)-a perilous, respected job. In most cases, their education had been limited to a few years in rural primary schools or sojourns in Buddhist wats, where a premium was placed on memorization,
Searching for the truth — History

Number 8, August 2000

obedience, and neat calligraphy, all virtues in demand at S-21. However, the transitions from schooling to warfare to S-21, where political acuity was also prized, were often difficult for these young men, as the ex-interrogator Ma Meng Kheang confessed:

It’s difficult to think so much. You get so tired [at S-21] and you get headaches, and besides, it’s a political place, it’s not easy to work there, it’s different from rice or vegetable farming or working in a factory. You never know when the day is finished. You never know if you are “correct.” With farming, on the other hand, you either have a crop or you don’t, in a factory a machine starts up or it doesn’t.

The hours for interrogators were long, and the work was exhausting. Questioning often extended far into the nights. Interrogators resented the conditions under which they were forced to work and sometimes compared them unfavorably to the relative freedom they had enjoyed as soldiers in the civil war.

The Documentation Workers

The telephone directory lists fourteen men in the documentation unit, but it was undoubtedly larger than that, and those listed were probably in charge of three-man teams. The unit was responsible for transcribing tape-recorded confessions, typing handwritten ones, preparing summaries of confessions, and maintaining the prison’s voluminous files. Unsurprisingly, given what we know of the consequences for “sabotage” in DK, typographical errors are almost nonexistent. Even so, between 1976 and 1978 at least ten documents unit staff were arrested, interrogated, and put to death. They confessed to being “lazy,” preparing “confused” documents, “ruining” machines, and beating prisoners to death when they assisted with interrogations.

The photography subunit at S-21 operated under the supervision of Suos Thi. People in this group took mug shots of prisoners when they arrived, pictures of prisoners after they were killed. According to Nhèm En, who worked in the subunit, photographs in this final category were taken by specially selected cadres (the prisoners’ throats had been cut) and forwarded in single copies to the “upper brothers.” The unit also produced identification photographs of the staff. Over six thousand photographs taken by the unit have survived. Hundreds of the mug shots, selected and enlarged by East German photographers in 1981, have been posted on the walls of the Tuol Sleng Museum since 1980.

The photography subunit used cameras, film, paper, and developing chemicals that they discovered at various locations in the capital. Nhèm En, who defected from the Khmer Rouge in 1996, was interviewed several times. En was a peasant boy from Kompong Cham who joined the Khmer Rouge forces in 1970, when he was ten years old. He was selected to study photography in China in 1975 and 1976 and then came to work at S-21. Five Khmer worked with him in the photograph unit, and one of them was purged. En himself came under suspicion in a December 1977 study session for “playing the radio” and “taking bad photographs”-offenses he recalled spontaneously twenty years later. One of his photographs, developed from a negative processed during Pol Pot’s visit to China in October 1977, appeared to show “Brother Number On” with an unseemly blotch above one eye. Chan accused Em of doctoring the photo to insult Pol Pot, and Em was packed off to the “reeducation office” (munthi kay pray) at Prey So. In early 1978 he was released, he says, after Chan had found the flaw in the original, Chinese negative.

The Guards

The defense unit, not included in the telephone directory, was the largest at the prison. In 1978 it had 169 members: 127 assigned to the main facility and the rest attached to the “special prison” to the south reserved for high-ranking cadres. In 1976 and 1977 guards worked were organized into six four-hour shifts a day, but in 1978 guards worked in ten-men units for eight-hour shifts. They were expected to follow a set of thirty rules designed to keep them alert and to prevent them from fraternizing with prisoners. The rules enjoined them to keep prisoners from escaping, obtaining weapons, attempting suicide, or talking to each other.

Guards were not allowed to talk to prisoners, to learn their names, or to beat them, but as a former guard admitted in his confession, “If you’re on guard at night, you can beat the prisoners without anyone noticing it.” Kok Sros has recalled that while guards were forbidden to beat prisoners, only those who beat them “severely” were punished. Moreover, “If a prisoner didn’t obey our orders, we had authority to beat them.” As for casual chatting, which inevitably took place, Kok Sros went on
“we could talk to them, but we weren’t allowed to pity
them...Some of them asked us to release them, but if we
did then we would take their place. Some of the
prisoners said ‘I didn’t do anything wrong, why did the
Organization bring me here?’ I didn’t know what to do
...I told them I was afraid to help them.”

Guards were also forbidden to observe or
eavesdrop on interrogations, and they were expected to
be constantly alert: “While on duty,” an S-21 regulation
reads, “[guards] must not sneak naps or sit down or lean
against the wall. They should [always] be walking,
guarding, examining things carefully.” Guards seldom
had enough sleep. In their self-critical autobiographies,
they overwhelmingly list “drowsiness” (ngoknguy) as
the greatest flaw affecting their work. Elaborate
routines governed the disposal of weapons and
ammunition and the disposition of prisoners’ chains,
shackles, and locks. There were also complex
procedures for transferring prisoners from their cells to
interrogation sessions and between cells and the trucks
that took them to Choeung Ek.

Rules for guards prohibited humane behavior.
High spirits and levity in the contingent also worried
those in charge. A self-criticism document prepared at
the prison in 1977 accused some guards of “laughing
together in their free time” and “lacking a firm
revolutionary stance.” The same “offenses” crop up in
the self-critical autobiographies that the guards
prepared from time to time and also in guards’
confessions. Nhem En has recalled friendly rough-
housing with his colleagues in the photography group,
and Kok Sros has referred warmly to the friendships he
developed in his three years of working at the prison.
None of this is surprising, when we recall that many of
the workers were rural teenagers unaccustomed to any
kind of institution, much less one where laughter was
viewed as a “shortcoming.”

An Evening at S-21

In the early days of the prison the rules for guards
were apparently more relaxed. A night-watch report
from October 1976, which suggests as much, is the only
surviving document recording conversations between
guards and prisoners. This report provides a rare
glimpse of prisoners and guards in relatively humane
interaction and also records some examples of
prisoners’ courage and resistance, sadly lacking from
most of their torture-induced confessions.

SUMMARY SENT TO THE OLDER BROTHER

Sas Chantha
Sum Chriech
Chou Pehu
Ngoeung
Sok Moch

S-21 prisoner
IN CHARGE OF THE GUARD GROUP

I. Interior Guards

a. Activities of Enemies

- Building K, Room 5, cell 5, the prisoner Pun Suphoal told the guard that mosquitoes were biting excessively.

- Room 4, cell 3, the prisoner Ngai Yet said that he couldn’t sleep, between sunset and 2 A.M.

- In the room under the stair, to west, a sleepless prisoner stole frequent looks at the guard and at the electric wiring.

- Room 5, cell 4, the prisoner Suk Hoeun, alias Hom, managed to shift a table, noisily, without informing a guard.

- Room 3, cell 4, the prisoner Yim Phoeung, at the time when our comrade was distributing rice gruel, said maliciously that he’d not yet eaten and had just come in from work but [in fact] he wasn’t [ever] working, he’s wearing shackles.

- In the cookhouse, Room 6, cell 3, the four prisoners Mau Hung, Yu Nan, Pun Leang, and Di Somat intend to break their locks and escape... One of them said: “This is not the Organization’s place, it’s a place for individuals.” Mau Hung said, “This is the place where the Organization caught me, it’s a place where I won’t survive, because the Organization consists of outlaws” [chao prey, literally “wild robbers”]. That’s what Mau Hung said to one of our fellow guards.

- Building Kh, room 5, cell 10, when the guard asked the prisoner Som Saravuth to stretch, the prisoner claimed to be unable to rise, but when the guard left his room he stood up.

Subunits at the Prison

Three subunits and the prison farm at Prey So operated under the aegis of the defense unit. One of the subunits included eight “captures” (sometimes called “messengers,” or nir’sa) and ten in a “motorized section.” According to Nhem En, the “capturers” accompanied prisoners to S-21 from the countryside and executed them all, including important cadres, who were killed and buried near the prison. Nhem En’s memory is corroborated by Kok Sros. In 1977, Him Huy worked in this unit and earned a fearsome reputation among other members of the staff. A “motorized section” drove batches of prisoners into S-21 and conveyed others to the execution grounds at Choeung Ek.

A twenty-six prison “economic support” subunit, affiliated with the defense unit, provided food and custodial services for guards, interrogators, and prisoners. Two of its members were barbers, five others were responsible for raising chickens, rabbits, pigs, ducks, and vegetables within the compound. Four “excrement bearers” in the unit provided a plumbing and sewage system of sorts. The duty was given to guards as a punishment for minor infractions. Excrement was removed in buckets from the prison and used for fertilizer.

Seven employees in the economic support unit prepared and delivered food for a prison population that averaged a thousand or more for most of 1977 and 1978. Six others performed the same task for less than a hundred interrogators and document workers, and thirteen more took care of perhaps two hundred guards. In Duch’s report on the prison in the first three months of 1977, he takes seven lines to deplore the deaths of ducks and chickens at the prison and only two lines to report fourteen prisoners’ deaths from torture. In the looking-glass world of S-21, ducks were mourned more than people. Rice for S-21 and probably for other units in the capital was the grown at Prey So.
(Continued)

The February 1978 “confessions” of Meat Touch alias Kaem, who at the time of his arrest was the Democratic Kampuchea Ambassador to Laos, implicate Ieng Sary in guilty knowledge of mass killings in the countryside and of arrests. They are marked for sending to “Comrade Van”, with an additional note in the hand of Duch informing the “respected Brother” that Kaem “engaged in two activities in Laos: 1. In the imperialist department, he was in contact with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees organization ...; 2. With the Yuon [Vietnamese], he worked constantly with the Yuon Ambassador”. Duch helpfully adds that Kaem’s description of “his activities in Laos” begins on p.37 of the text.

In these parts of his “confessions”, Kaem says he indoctrinated Cambodians resident in Vientiane, the capital of Laos, such that they would “see the difficulties and suffering of the people” back in Cambodia, including “the suppression of rights and freedoms among the people, and the implementation of a dictatorial regime that was massacring the people.”

Kaem’s appended “List of Names of Persons Involved in My Activities”, includes the names of ten persons identified as having been “arrested already”, and the names of 50 persons implicated in “treason” or other purported crimes, but apparently not yet arrested.

A second set of “confessions” marked for Ieng Sary’s attention are those of San Pau, a combatant at the Phnom Penh “State Market”, which was under the authority of the Foreign Ministry. Although they mention no killings, their conclusion that “on 28 July 1978, the Organization arrested me and sent me straight to this place” (i.e., S-21) is followed by an appendix entitled “On Traitorous Forces Excerpted from the History of the Activities of San Pau, Combatant of the State Market”. This includes 34 names, of whom two are listed as already arrested.

REPORTS TO THE TOP FROM THE GRASSROOTS AND ELSEWHERE

Another category of documents in the DC-Cam files that implicate surviving senior and other CPK cadre in crimes comprise internal situation reports copied to those senior leaders. These materials include in particular telegrams and other messages originating from the CPK’s various Zones, sectors and other locations in the grassroots, but that also include reports from military units formally subordinated to the Central Committee and from DK ambassadors posted abroad. They add considerably to the evidence of direct involvement of cadre outside the capital Phnom Penh in acts which may be part of a pattern of international crimes and of at least “guilty knowledge” on the part of senior leaders in Phnom Penh about these acts. With regard to the latter, Tittemore’s review of the material concluded that “such documents may constitute probative evidence of knowledge of ... atrocities on the part of ... officials” like Nuon Chea and Ieng Sary. The atrocities in question include political killings of...
Cambodians and also killings of Vietnamese prisoners and civilians committed in connection with armed conflict between DK and Viet Nam, which may constitute war crimes. Kae Pok would appear to be implicated more directly.

Like the “confessions” and other CPK-era documents, these communications often use euphemisms like “smash” and “sweep cleanly away” to refer to killings, but they also sometimes employ the DK Constitution’s phrase, “highest level of punitive sanction”, instead. They are on occasion addressed specifically to Pol Pot (including by abbreviation or to his alias 009), but more often they are addressed simply to “Brother” or “the Organization”, or to the Central Committee by its codenumber 870 (or to its administrative Office 870). In any case, they were routinely marked for copying and presentation (châmlâng choun) to a list of some or all of the five members of the Standing Committee who were usually resident in the capital, Phnom Penh: the late Pol Pot himself (referred to merely as “Uncle”), Nuon Chea (referred to as “Uncle Nuon”), Ieng Sary (referred to as “Brother Van”), the late Vorn Vet (referred to as “Brother V on”) and the late Son Sen (referred to as “Brother Khiev”). They do not resolve who among the five had decision-making authority on what issues, or in what forums decisions were made, but they do seem to make clear that both Nuon Chea and Ieng Sary were part of the same routine information loop that also included Pol Pot, Vorn Vet and Son Sen. In some cases, the documents solicit authorization to conduct executions.

One relatively early example is a 21 March 1976 telegram from a cadre who signed himself Chhon (probably an alias for the late East Zone Secretary Sao Pheum) addressed to “Pol”. It has a notation that it be cc’ed to Nuon, Khiev and Van, and reported on arrests of Vietnamese and Cambodians in areas of Sector 24 bordering on Viet Nam. It said that on 13 March, district forces had “captured five Vietnamese who had hidden themselves in the forest”, two of whom had been “shot dead” and three of whom had been “captured .. alive” and were “now detained at Security”. Five more Vietnamese had been captured between 14 and 16 March. The Sector had also arrested a Cambodian who was accused of throwing a grenade on 7 March that had killed one combatant and severely injured four others. The report identified him as a “pacification agent” and explained, “we beat him up during interrogation about his organizational links” and thus identified “more than 20 of them in the grassroots of Preah Sdech district” whom the report said in turn had further “organizational links coming from Viet Nam”.

On 18 July 1976, the Secretary of then autonomous Sector 103, Bu Phat alias Hâng (later purged), sent a telegram to a “Beloved and Missed Brother”, who was apparently Pol Pot, which was similarly copied to Nuon Chea, Son Sen and Ieng Sary. It reported an incident on 12 July, when the Sector military command had despatched three combatants to deliver a report, one of whom had turned on the other two and shot them before fleeing. The report surmised that the combatant in question was part of a group of eleven other combatants who had been contacted by “CIA pacification agents” in Thailand who had persuaded them to “smash cadre and to no longer live with Communists without freedom, ranks or salaries”. The evidence for this was that they had been saying that “even though they were working non-stop, the Organization would still say they weren’t doing things
right.” The report noted that ten of these combatants “were already smashed” in line with “the Sector’s preliminary conclusion”, but promised there would “be a further detailed investigation”.

Other internal documents are less explicit, but either report arrests and purges or reveal discriminatory practices, especially vis-à-vis the Islamic Cham community.

On 30 November 1975, the cadre who signed himself Chhon sent a telegram to Pol Pot, that was copied to Nuon, on the subject of population deportations to the then North Zone. It reported problems that had arisen with regard to the “removal of people from the East [Zone] to go to the North [Zone]” because “the views and the instructions of the Organization” on this matter were “not being respected”. In particular, although the “full number” of people who were supposed to be “rounded up”, “removed” and “transported” from East Zone Sector 21 to the North Zone had been handed over at the reception points, the North Zone had “absolutely refused to accept Islamic people [e.g., ethnic Cham] and would take only pure Khmer.” This was contrary to a decision at an earlier meeting that had “stipulated that ... the Northwest and the North had to accept them in order to split up Islamic people and separate them from the length of the Mekong River”. The telegram to Pol stressed that “in principle their removal was to break them up, in accordance with your views in your discussions with us already”. It wondered whether it might be possible that North Zone Secretary Kae “Pok didn’t know about this problem”. Chhon explained that he had suspended the movement of Islamic people, while waiting for Pol’s “views and those of the North Zone”, and asked him to “please decide what is to be done about this problem”.

No document has yet been found revealing how this problem was sorted out. However, on 2 April 1976 Pok sent a telegram to Pol, copied to Nuon and Son Sen, that revealed his concern about the involvement of Cham, former Khmer Republic soldiers and dismissed and dissident cadre in opposition activities. It also touched on the measures he was taking to deal with them. Pok declared that although, “basically, the enemy” had “yet to conduct any powerful activities anywhere throughout the North Zone that would adversely affect either the people or the production movement”, there were problems.

Thus, some activities are being carried out, such as propaganda that the revolution is dogmatic. There is propaganda to hold back the cooperatives, propaganda to hold back the putting up of new paddy dykes, as well as propaganda about famine and hunger.

Pok was concerned about this political opposition and determined to take measures to suppress it. He explained that in Chamkar Loe district of Sector 42 in particular, “contemptible enemies who are former soldiers in tandem with those who are Cham or ex-chairmen of cooperative groups” had posted photographs of the Khmer Republic President Lon Nol and his 18 March 1970 declaration of the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk on trees. Pok informed Pol that his Zone had “arrested those contemptible elements who are ex-chairman of groups in the old cooperatives” and also instructed the Sector “to pay attention to keeping such activities under surveillance.” He explained that the Zone believed that there were “in addition undercover links on the inside” of the revolutionary ranks, but that they were being subjected to “further surveillance and assessments”. He promised that “when we see what their activities are, we will take additional measures” against them.

Two more examples come from telegrams from Central Committee Divisions that were copied to Nuon Chea. One, dated 24 September 1976, reported that after Division 164, which was based in the seaport town of Kampung Saom, had taken unspecified “measures against the enemy”, five of them had “fled into the forest”, but been “pursued and arrested”. A few days later, another telegram reported that this unit had arrested “a boy, aged 16” on the night of 23 September who had “confessed” to being “an informer conducting reconnaissance for ... dacoits” whom he said were armed with automatic rifles and pistols.

A third is a March 1976 message to Son Sen, cc’d to Ieng Sary, from Central Committee Division 920, which was based in the Northeast Zone. It discussed “problems inside” the unit caused by “no-good elements”. The telegram mentioned that the unit had been “doing a lot of additional interrogation” of such elements, adding that it would “send along the dossier[s] later”.

Number 8, August 2000

Searching for the truth — Legal
Nuon and Van were both among those copied in on a more explicit 15 June 1977 telegram from Um Neng alias Vi, the Secretary of the Northeast Zone (later purged and committed suicide), reporting the recent arrest there of “209 Yun troops”. Vi explained that the prisoners, who included nine women, were “of Jarai nationality”, and upland minority group with members living on both sides of the DK-Viet Nam border, and claimed to want to seek asylum in DK, evidently to escape ill-treatment in Viet Nam resulting from the men’s previous service in anti-Communist armed forces there. After interrogation, however, Vi’s assessment was “that these contemptibles are external enemies who have come to go undercover on our soil”. Vi requested “additional views ... from the Organization” about what to do with the prisoners. Using the Constitutional phrase, he noted that the Zone unit that had originally captured them had made a “request ... for a decision for the highest level” of sanction to be imposed on them “straightaway”, but that he had awaited the prisoners’ “responses [ie, “confessions” made during interrogation] before being agreeable to such as decision.” Vi’s report also used the Constitution’s language in connection with purported members of several networks of “contemptible undercovers [ie, undercover enemies] at the rubber and cotton plantations and in the mobile units who had been removed from the military in 1974”. He revealed it had been decided that they would be secretly taken away from their current locations, and added, “Once responses have been obtained from all of them and clearly tape-recorded, the request is made for a decision for the highest level for all of them.”

Both were also copied in on a telegram dated 25 June 1977 from the West Zone, addressed to the “Respected and Beloved Organization”. It described the arrest by a “defense unit” in Kampung Chhang sector of 24 persons, including one woman, who upon interrogation said they had fled 120 days earlier from Prey Chhor district of Kampung Cham, hoping to join an armed opposition group. This message solicited the advice of the Organization as to “what sort of measures” should be taken against these prisoners.

Another telegram, dated 6 September 1977, from the Secretary of the (new) North Zone, Kâng Chap alias Sæ (purged in August 1978) and addressed to “Committee 870”, reported that the “internal enemy situation” in the North was that the Zone had: discovered one undercover enemy burrowing from within after another in the grassroots, offices, ministries and the military both by keeping track of traitorous counter-revolutionary activities and through responses. On the one hand, we have discovered one after the other enemies who are former civil servants, police and soldiers. On the other hand, compared to before, we now have a gradual decrease in terms of undercover enemies burrowing from within: a very few of their henchmen remain.

Sæ gave assurances that the Zone was carrying out “ongoing” measures to “continue sweeping all these enemies cleanly away one after the other; putting into motion an all-round combat movement that takes the production movement in particular as the key link in order to find the enemy: in other words, they will be found on the combat battlefield of purging and sweeping.” He explained that there remained a very small number who are still deviating from the line on production. There is still opposition to the revolution via legal ways, in accordance with old habits and in accordance with old methods of ploughing, harrowing, transplanting, broadcasting, with regard to which there is stubborn insubordination, refusal to go along with the line on production.

This opposition persisted even though the Zone had done indoctrination about “the line on production many times already”. The Zone was now differentiating “between those who do not yet understand and those who are in opposition”, and would take “measures in accordance with the concrete reality” against the oppositionists.

Similarly, with regard to the Zone military, despite “purging and purging, re-educating and re-educating, and indoctrinating and indoctrinating” the troops “politically, ideologically and organizationally”, a “small minority” of combatants “who were formerly henchmen of undercover enemies” still remained problematic. One had recently fled to Thailand, after which the Zone had “removed a number of other evil and liberal elements from the army ... to go to do production in the rear.” Moreover, “in conjunction with this,” the Zone was “taking one re-education and purge measure after another”. (Continued)
FOUR WAYS TO PROSECUTE TORTURE COMMITTED IN THE DK-ERA

By Jan van der Grinten

There is significant evidence that torture was committed on a large scale in Cambodia during the DK-era. The recent book by David Chandler, “Voices from S-21,” is a comprehensive study of Tuol Sleng’s documents showing that the use of torture was a normal part of daily activities in Pol Pot’s secret prison. Vann Nath’s biography and many other sources teach us that prisoners were tortured in provincial prisons as well. In particular the data collected by DC-Cam during the Mass Grave Mapping Project, bear out that various forms of torture seem to have been common at most of the zone-, region-, and district-level prisons operated by Khmer Rouge security forces throughout Cambodia. DC-Cam’s report last year teaches that “there is a depressing uniformity of findings: witnesses testify to torture and murder on an astonishing scale, and remains of mass graves and former Khmer Rouge prisons provide their own mute testimony, littering the countryside as physical evidence of these crimes. It happened everywhere, and it happened in much the same way across the country. This confirms that Khmer Rouge terror was both massive and systematic, which meets one of the criteria in the definition of crimes against humanity.” (Craig Etcheson, “The Number—Quantifying Crimes Against Humanity in Cambodia” (Phnom Penh, to be published in 2000)

Prosecuting the people responsible for torture in the DK-era is possible on several grounds. In this article I will describes these legal grounds and some of the main problems of evidentiary requirements for prosecution. It’s beyond the scope of this article to discuss this in detail. What is written here contains no more than an outline of the main laws applicable to the Cambodian situation. I will relate this to the competence of the tribunal as set forth in the draft “Law on the establishment of extraordinary chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the prosecution of crimes committed during the period of Democratic Kampuchea” (draft version of January 2000).

Possibilities for the prosecution of torture to be taken into account include:
1. Torture as an element of war crimes under the Geneva Conventions;
2. Torture as an element of crimes against humanity;
3. Torture as a substantive crime under international law (jus cogens);
4. Torture as a substantive crime under Cambodian domestic law.

Each possibility has certain advantages and disadvantages, particularly with regard to issues of evidence, because the underlying rules contain limitations or so-called “thresholds,” in their scope of applicability.

1. Torture as an element of war crimes under the Geneva Conventions

Cambodia was a party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. These conventions apply “to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them”. The scope of the conventions, thus, is restricted to (international) armed conflicts, though the common Article 3 regards internal conflicts as well, but their is no enforcement mechanism for breaches in this respect. The Convention’s applicability is limited to the “protected property or persons” under the respective conventions. These are wounded and sick members of the armed forces, prisoners of war and civilians under the control of a party to the conflict or occupying party of which they are not nationals.

An important provision of the conventions is that state parties have the duty to put on trial individuals suspected of “grave breaches” of the conventions’ provisions, regardless of their nationality. Prohibited under the provisions of the conventions, “in any time and in any place whatsoever”, between other things, is “violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture”. Committing one of these acts is regarded as a grave breach, and the perpetrators are individually accountable.

The question to answer is whether the provisions of the conventions apply to the situation in Cambodia in the DK era. Was torture committed in an armed conflict with another state? The Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 52/135 answers this question in the positive: “The historical record suggests that armed conflict between Viet Nam and Cambodia began by September 1977, and most likely earlier. The border skirmishes in May 1975 and the continuation of incidents make a strong case for the applicabilit” of the conventions in relations between Cambodia and Viet Nam during nearly the entirely of Democratic Kampuchea’s rule. ... In particular, the Cambodian army appears to have committed willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, willful causing of great suffering, unlawful deportation or confinement and extensive destruction of property”.

Those responsible for torture, committed against protected groups under the conventions, in the armed conflict between DK and Viet Nam thus could be prosecuted as perpetrators of “grave breaches” according to the conventions.

(Continued)

(Continued from page 25) In the DK era, men and women were sent there from units, factories, and work sites in Phnom Penh for minor offenses or pending transfer to Tuol Sleng. In the first time ten months of 1977, according to a document prepared by “Rice-field” Huy, over two thousand prisoners passed through Prey So. One hundred ninety-two of them, “mostly under twenty years of age,” a report from the facility asserted, had died of “illness.” Eighty had managed to escape. All but twenty-seven of these were recaptured and sent on to S-21. Some of the remaining prisoners listed in the document were probably also sent along to S-21, whereas others-Nhem En and Him Huy among them—returned to duty at S-21 after serving short sentences at Prey So. Ho’s defense unit also supervised that work of fifteen paramedical personnel who treated sick prisoners undergoing interrogation, patched up those who had been severely beaten, and certified deaths. One of the paramedics, Phoung Damrei (alias Phoeun), complained in his confession that there were only three trained medical personnel at S-21 to deal with thousands of prisoners. It was “impossible” to treat them, he said, and large numbers of them died. The man in charge of the detachment, Pheng Tri, was later arrested himself and made a similar admission at a study session in 1977, whereupon he was reproved by Chan for “not believing revolutionary medicine.” Prison records list prisoners as succumbing to malaria, diarrhea, “emaciation,” “tiredness,” and mistreatment. In a document listing twenty-one deaths in a short period, five are attributed to “wounds” and one to “torture, suffocated inside a plastic bag.” Fifty-two prisoners are said to have died of “illness” between April and September 1976, a period then the prison housed less than 300 people at any one time, and a cadre notebook from 1977 recorded that 30 deaths had occurred at the prison in July, 88 in September, 49 in October, and 67 in November, making a total of 234 deaths over four months. Many those who died had already been worn down by wounds, malnutrition, and torture; several photographs of corpses in the archive show that they were all severely under-nourished.
Perhaps the best-known post-Nuremberg Nazi trial is that of Adolf Eichmann in Israel in 1961-1962. Eichmann, the former head of the Gestapo Department in Berlin in charge of the “Final Solution” (the extermination of Jews in Germany and occupied areas) had escaped capture at the end of the war and had been living since 1950 under an assumed name in Argentina. In May 1960, Eichmann was abducted by Israeli security agents and brought to Israel, where it was announced that he would be put on trial for his role in the “Final Solution.”

Eichmann was tried under Israel’s Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law, 5710/1950, which defined punishments for crimes against the Jewish people, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Section 1 of that law defined the offenses: “Crimes against the Jewish people” means any of the following acts, committed with intent to destroy the Jewish people in whole or in part: (i) killing Jews; (iii) placing Jews in living conditions calculated to bring about their physical destruction; (iv) imposing measures to prevent births among Jews.

“Crime against humanity” means any of the following acts: murder, extermination, enslavement, starvation of a civilian population, and persecution on national, racial, religious, or political grounds.

This law essentially combined the Nuremberg offenses of war crimes and crimes against humanity with the more specific crime of Crime Against the Jewish People. The latter crime borrowed elements of the definition of genocide from the Genocide Convention. As such, this law allowed Israel to bring domestic prosecutions against individuals for acts of genocide against the Jewish people.

The Punishment Law also provided for punishment of those who served in an “enemy organization,” as declared by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (Section 3 (a),(b) and explicitly excluded the defense of “superior orders” (section 19). Eichmann was indicted on four counts of Crimes Against the Jewish People, for his administration of the “Final Solution; “for placing Jews in conditions calculated to bring about their physical destruction, for causing serious harm to Jews by enslavement, starvation, deportation, persecution, and detention, and for preventing childbearing among Jews. Three more counts charged crimes against humanity, alleging the murder, extermination, enslavement, starvation and deportation of Jews; the persecution of Jews; and the plunder of Jewish property. One count charging war crimes alleged the mistreatment, deportation, and murder of Jewish inhabitants of occupied states. Four more counts of crimes against humanity focused on Eichmann’s administration of the “evacuation” and extermination of other civilian groups, including Poles, Slovenes, Gypsies, and the children of the Czechoslovak village of Lidice. The last three counts charged Eichmann with membership in the S.S., S.D., and Gestapo, all criminal organizations as declared by the I.M.T.

These charges were all exhaustively documented. In his defense, Eichmann raised objection to:

1. the court’s jurisdiction, based on principles of international law including prohibitions on ex post facto legislation, territorial sovereignty, and Acts of State;
2. his involuntary abduction from Argentina;
3. the fact that the Argentine period of prescription (statute of limitations) had expired.

He made the following additional defenses:
1. that he was following superior orders;
2. that the Judges, as Jews, were psychologically unable to give Eichmann a fair trial.

All of Eichmann’s objections and defenses were rejected by the District Court of Jerusalem in its judgement, which found the defendant guilty on all fifteen counts and sentenced him to death.

Eichmann appealed to the Israeli Supreme Court, alleging lack of jurisdiction, the Judges’ psychological incapacity to give him a fair trial, and error of the District Court in finding that he played more than a minor role in the alleged acts. The Supreme Court went on to reject each of these claims. The Supreme Court began by refuting the defense’s broad contention that when international and municipal (domestic) law conflict, the former prevails. The court held that statues should be construed to correspond to international law, but in the event of an inevitable conflict, the municipal statute prevails.

Next, the Supreme Court specifically addressed each challenge to its jurisdiction. Answering the defense’s argument that the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Law violated the principle forbidding ex post facto legislation, the Court stated that while this maxim was valid as a general principle, it was neither binding customary international law nor a constitutional requirement. Moreover, as an ethical matter, the law did not punish formerly acceptable acts, but instead dealt with “odious crimes” which the defendant had to have known violated “deeply-rooted universal moral values.” The Court also held that there is no customary international legal principle prohibiting, on grounds of territorial sovereignty, the enactment of criminal law applicable to an act committed by a foreign national in a foreign country.

In an extensive discussion of the conformity of the Punishment Law to principles of international law, the Israeli Supreme Court emphasized that Eichmann’s crimes “must be deemed... as having always borne the stamp of international crimes, banned by the law of nations and entailing individual criminal responsibility” and that “[i]t is the peculiarly universal character of these crimes that vests in every State the authority to try and punish anyone who participated in their commission.

As to Eichmann’s abduction from Argentina, the Court upheld the district Court’s ruling that since the abduction violated only Argentina’s rights as a sovereign State, the settlement between Argentina and Israel ended the dispute and offered no ground for denying jurisdiction. The Court also excluded, consistent with the Nuremberg Charter and Genocide Convention, the Act of State Defense(i.e., that Eichmann’s actions were all official acts of state and thus could not be questioned under international law). Traditionally, international law applied only to relations between states, and not to acts of individuals, and thus individuals were not liable under international law, a doctrine repudiated by the Nuremberg charter.

During the trial, Eichmann strenuously attempted to exculpate himself by claiming he had acted under superior orders, but the Court rejected this defense as well, holding that Eichmann had acted independently in carrying out the “Final Solution,” and that international law allowed that exclusion of the superior orders defense. Finally, the Court briefly upheld the District Court’s rejection of the contention that Jewish judges were psychologically unable to give Eichmann a fair trial.

The Supreme Court then restated the facts, laying out Eichmann’s role in the Nazi hierarchy, his independent carrying-out of genocidal policies, and his active and informed role in the deportation of Jews to extermination camps. Eichmann’s death sentence was affirmed, and he was executed on May 31, 1962.

Searching for the truth — Legal Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam)
Number 8, August 2000

33
The former secretary of State on the war’s end, the controversial strategy he helped make and how the conflict shaped the foreign-policy thinking of three generations of Americans.

Not too long ago, former president Gerald Ford and I were reminiscing about his presidency and our experiences in government service. We agreed that the high points have a way of becoming blurred with the passage of time. But we shared one experience that will never lose its immediacy: the pain and anguish of the day when the last Americans and a pitiful band of refugees were evacuated from the roof of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. Movies and television present great crises as times of frenetic activity, with officious aides ripping telephones off the hook and shouting instructions to scurrying subordinates. In reality, crises are distinguished by a stillness born of the awareness that choices are disappearing. The number of decision makers shrinks to those still in a position to affect events, their solitude magnified because, the more severe the crisis, the fewer the volunteers who are willing to assume responsibility.

On that final day in April 1975, Ford and I were quite alone: he in the Oval Office, I in the security adviser’s suite down the hall, interrupted only by periodic phone calls as the Pentagon reported the departure of each helicopter. For a month we had refereed the interdepartmental debates that marked the end of the tragedy: whether to speed up the withdrawal of the last few Americans to avoid needless risks or to stretch it out to permit the maximum numbers of Vietnamese to escape; whether to give up on requests to the Congress for aid that would never reach Vietnam or maintain the request so that America would not compound defeat with the dishonor of stabbing an ally in extremis in the back. Ford and I had fought for slow extrication and keeping the aid request alive. The president had prevailed, and Ford’s staunch support enabled 130,000 Vietnamese to flee the catastrophe. Now that debate was overwhelmed by events. We had become spectators of a drama we were no longer able to influence, suspended between a pain we could not still and a future we were not yet in a position to shape.

For those who lived through the final day, any account must appear as fragmentary, dominated by the perspective from each protagonist’s vantage point as chaos consumed two decades of sacrifice. For those who were spared the anguish, the passions will seem incomprehensible. And historians are no help,
since their accounts generally replicate bitter schisms of the period. Radical critics conjure up bloodthirsty American leaders pursuing a war to satisfy their twisted psychologies. The right either ignores the war as a liberal aberration or blames the defeat on lack of ideological zeal (the mantra of “neoconservative” converts who, in reality, were on the antiwar side while the war was going on and have their own reasons for avoiding its memory). Reluctant to come to grips with the most traumatic experience of the past half century, Americans find it difficult to draw the real lessons from what was done to this country—and what we did to ourselves—during that sad period.

That will be my subject here. For one of the most important casualties of the Vietnam tragedy was the tradition of American “exceptionalism.” The once near-universal faith in the uniqueness of our values—and their relevance around the world—gave way to intense divisions over the very validity of those values and the lengths we should go to promote and defend them. And those schisms have had a profound impact on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy ever since.

ENTERING INDOCHINA & LEAVING IT

It was the so-called greatest generation that entered Indochina in the heyday of American exceptionalism. It did so in pursuit of the strategy that had already stabilized the post-World War II world, rebuilt Europe, restored Germany and Japan to the community of nations and arrested the Soviet advance into Europe and in Korea. A mixture of the experiences of World War II and a philosophy drawn from the New Deal, this strategy concentrated on stopping Soviet aggression and removing communist opportunities for internal upheavals by promoting economic and social progress in regions under U.S. protection.

Though the American conduct of the cold war is often presented as reflecting a nearly unanimous consensus, there was always significant dissent during this period, especially in the intellectual and academic communities. They argued either that the communist threat was exaggerated or that the United States was associating with too many questionable regimes to sustain its claim as a defender of liberty. But their critique was confined to the wisdom of specific policies, not to the validity of the values on which it was based.

With the advent of the Kennedy administration,
this policy was given its most sweeping formulation in the new president’s Inaugural Address—his promise that the United States would “pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to ensure the survival and success of liberty.” At the time there was virtually no opposition to this open-ended commitment, or to the conventional wisdom that Indochina was an essential outpost in the defense of liberty.

As Kennedy was preparing to take office, President Eisenhower recommended that America give military support to Laos if North Vietnamese intervention there continued. Within two months of his Inauguration, Kennedy sent Marines to Thailand, adjoining Laos. He recoiled from intervening directly (though the CIA undertook covert measures). But by December 1961, when Hanoi opened a supply line to South Vietnam through Laotian territory and intensified the guerrilla war, Kennedy sent U.S. military “advisers” to South Vietnam, whose number rose to 16,000 by the end of 1963. President Lyndon Johnson escalated this commitment until it reached more than 500,000 combat troops by the time he left office. Once again, there was no significant opposition, either within or outside the administration, to that massive deployment. Though the decision was blamed on Johnson later on, it was in fact Kennedy’s closest advisers—McGeorge Bundy, Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk—who urged the escalation.

By the end of the Johnson administration, frustration had set in. The strategy that had worked in every previous American war—of wearing down the adversary by attrition—could not succeed against guerrillas defending no specific territory and who were therefore in a position to choose when and where to fight. Nor did the non-communist countries of Indochina live up to the standards of democracy of our European allies, throwing into question the moral purpose of the war. For those who had made the decision to send American troops, growing self-doubt compounded despair triggered by Kennedy’s assassination.

While America’s leaders were seized by emotional turmoil, their critics challenged the very essence of American foreign involvement. The argument that the war was unwinnable and that its cost exceeded its benefits escalated as rapidly as the U.S. deployment. At first the doubters dwelled on how to find an honorable way out. But within months, American exceptionalism itself was called into question. The protesters increasingly argued that the ultimate cause of the crisis was not errors in judgment but moral rot at the core of American life. The victory of the communists in Indochina, which administrations of both parties had sought to prevent for nearly two decades, became for the radical protesters a desirable national catharsis. Critics moved from questioning the worthiness of America’s allies to challenging the worthiness of America itself, and of its conduct not only in Vietnam but around the world. Vietnam became the first war in which prominent Americans paid highly publicized visits to the enemy capital to oppose their own country.

By the time Richard Nixon became president, the battle lines had been drawn. The demoralized establishment, which had launched us into the quagmire, abdicated from the task of extrication. They left the field to the protesters or joined them in attacks on the alleged shortsightedness and warped mentality of the Nixon administration. The radical protesters, certain of their moral superiority, saw no need for restraint in the methods they used to pursue their ends. Through street demonstrations and deliberate subversion of all authority, from universities to the U.S. government, they sought to wreck any policy designed to vindicate the values on which America’s post-World War II policy had been based.

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There is overwhelming evidence that the Khmer Rouge violated the Nuremberg Principles, the laws of war, and possibly even the Genocide Convention during a four-year reign that left more than one million dead. On the eve of the Cambodian Parliament’s historic vote on the UN’s mixed Khmer Rouge tribunal, Cambodians must ask themselves a simple question: do the architects of one of the most destructive social and political experiments in human history deserve amnesty from prosecution? The case of former Khmer Rouge leader Ieng Sary raises a more troubling question: has amnesty become the price of peace in the twenty-first century?

Ieng Sary first met Pol Pot in Paris in 1949. The two men studied together and married the Ponnary sisters. Sary served as Vice Prime Minister and Foreign Minister during the Khmer Rouge years. His signature atrocity began as a documentary film made with the help of Chinese advisors. The film featured a long idyllic shot of the Cambodian countryside and Tonle Sap Lake: “How beautiful, our liberated home, shining in all your grace: Your beauty, beloved, conquers every heart. Oh Tonle Sap, you greatest of all lakes in the world!” In August 1975, Ieng Sary traveled to Paris where he addressed a group of intellectuals and urged them to return and aid the revolution.

One thousand Cambodians living in France, Eastern Europe, and the United States returned to Cambodia, and when they arrived in Phnom Penh, they were sent to the old Khmer- Soviet friendship Technical Institute. Those with suspect biographies were sent to S-21 Prison and killed. One of the S-21 interrogators recorded this account of his “questioning” one of the returnees: “I questioned this bitch who came back from France; my activity was that I set fire to her ass until it became a burned out mess and then beat her to the point that she was so turned around I couldn’t get any answer out of her; the enemy then croaked, ending her answers.” Of the one thousand intellectuals who returned to Democratic Kampuchea, one hundred and fifty were alive in 1979. After the Vietnamese entered Phnom Penh in 1979, they recovered some of the intellectuals’ confessions from the Foreign Ministry files. According to historian Marie Martin, “Ieng Sary...
Prime Minister Hun Sen has informed leaders at the National Assembly that the government’s work on establishing a tribunal of former Khmer Rouge leaders is done, and responsibility for any more progress lies with lawmakers. The premier implied to National Assembly President Prince Norodom Ranariddh that the ball is in his court in a letter dated Monday and obtained by Kyodo News. “In general, the government has achieved big things already, what remains only are technical problems, which are not normally agreed upon 100 percent,” the letter reads. His statement is in sharp contrast to a comment made by the prince last week, when he said lawmakers still have some “difficult problems” to resolve.

Before Ieng Sary defected to the government in 1996, he made it clear that he would not defect without amnesty: “In view of the historical role I played in leading our cadre, combatants, and people, I request the Cambodian Royal Government to officially and clearly determine my legal status.” When asked whether he sought amnesty from the Phnom Penh government, Sary replied boldly, “I have [made] no mistakes for them to excuse me.” Ieng Sary shifted the blame for Khmer Rouge atrocities to Pol Pot and a “secret security committee” run by Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Son Sen, Yun Yat, and Tamok. According to the former leader, these were “the mass murderers of Cambodia.” While he expressed pity for the intellectuals he lured back to Cambodia, he claimed that he had no remorse: “I have no remorse because I never killed anyone, nor did I ever make a decision or suggestion to Angkar to do so—never at all. Neither did I suggest the arrest for execution.”

(Continued)
Bamboo and thatch huts are perched over the water all along the tranquil shore. Children frolic on the beach, shrieking in delight. Their parents relax on the water after a stroll through the ancient Ankorian ruins that lie nearby. Local vendors bring delicious broiled fish and cool drinks. Other vendors glide by in longboats, offering snails, shellfish and other delicacies. Merrymakers down for the day from Phnom Penh while away the afternoon, laughing and chatting with their friends and families. It is another day at the popular resort of Tonle Bati in Takeo province.

Occasionally, their eyes might be down to the far shore of the lake, shimmering in the distance less than a kilometer away across the water. But few are aware of the horror that unfolded there during the Pol Pot time, or of the very different kind of shrieks that came from the children at that time.

Samrith Phum knows what happened there. It happened to her, and cost her husband his life. It happened to tens of thousands of other people as well. At this site on the border of Kandal Stung District, Kandal province, and Bati District, Takeo Province, a security center of the Khmer Rouge Santebal organization snuffed out the lives of countless thousands of innocent Cambodians. Today, this site is the location of a modern set of ruins which stand in stark counter point to the Ankorian ruins across the lake at the resort.

In 1963, during the era of Prince Sihanouk’s Sangkum Reastr Niyum, the U.S. Agency for International Development built a teacher training college near the village of Trapeang Sva in Trea Commune on the edge of Boeng tonle Bati. It was a marvel of modern convenience and efficiency, designed to train Cambodians to teach a new generation of leaders for the future. In 1977, under the direction of Khmer Rouge southwest Zone Secretary Chhit Chhoeun -a man better know to the world as the notorious Ta Mok-the Khmer Rouge transformed this citadel of learning into a chamber of mass extermination. The school that was intended to help build a generation of new leaders for Cambodia was
instead used by the Khmer Rouge to exterminate a generation of Khmer leaders. The local people called it Sang prison.

Samrith Phum and her children were imprisoned there for six months, but managed to survive until the arrival of the Vietnamese troops in January 1979. Her “crime” was simple: she was married to someone who had been declared an “enemy” of the revolution. Her husband’s crime was also mundane. He had shared firewood with a neighboring village that lacked enough fuel to cook their meager factions of rice. for this crime, the village chief, Pech Chhochm sentenced him to torture and death at San Prison. It is a typical story of the Khmer Rouge regime, where life was capricious in the extreme, and death walked behind every man, woman and child. Today the former Khmer Rouge village chief Chhoch still lives in nearly Boeng Khyang village. When Phum sees him or his former deputy driving by her house, she says, “they make me sick with memories.”

The story of Mok’s Sang Prison is enough to make anyone sick. Even more sickening is the fact that this facility was typical of the network of network of at least one hundred and twenty five execution centers operated by the Khmer Rouge all across the country. By grasping what happened at Sang Prison, we can clearly perceive the crimes of the Khmer Rouge regime, where life was capricious in the extreme, and death walked behind every man, woman and child. Today the former Khmer Rouge village chief Chhoch still lives in nearly Boeng Khyang village. When Phum sees him or his former deputy driving by her house, she says, “they make me sick with memories.”

According to local villagers, the Khmer Rouge began killing people in Trea Commune in late 1975. At first, the victims were mostly New people, such as former soldiers, civil servants and teachers. They were taken to security centers located around the region, and they were never seen again. Early in 1977, the Khmer Rouge began sending more and more of the victims to a place called Sala Damnak, soon to be renamed Sang Prison. According to local villagers, the Khmer Rouge began killing people in Trea Commune in late 1975. At first, the victims were mostly New people, such as former soldiers, civil servants and teachers. They were taken to security centers located around the region, and they were never seen again. Early in 1977, the Khmer Rouge began sending more and more of the victims to a place called Sala Damnak, soon to be renamed Sang Prison.

In March of 1977, Khmer Rouge Region 25 Secretary Som Chea was arrested, and Southwest Zone Secretary Mok replaced him with a member of the region committee named Prak. At about this same time, the security chief in the area, Kaseh, realized that he was about to be purged and committed suicide with his wife. Mok replaced Kaseh with a man named Mong, who then made his base at Sang Prison.

According to a Base Person who lived in Trea Commune at the time, the Khmer Rouge then renovated and expanded the prison at Sang. From this time forward, the rate of killing in the region increased, and the list of victims began to include Base people as well as New people. Now Sang Prison was in full operation. What was once a center of learning was now a full-fledged execution center.

One surviving victim who was imprisoned there estimated that there were twenty-two staff members controlling life and death at Sang. We believe we have identified most of the former workers and bosses at Sang Prison, at least several of whom are still alive and living in the vicinity of Trapeang Sva village.

Some of these perpetrators have been found and interviewed by the Documentation center. One is a man named Sak Tam. Sak Tam insists that he never killed anyone at Sang Prison, despite the fact that local villagers say he was a brutal prison guard. Tam complains that these accusations are unfair and that he was just the cook for Sang Prison. He says he prepared food for a prison population that fluctuated at around five hundred people. To make their meals, he would throw one handful of rice into a large kettle to make a thin rice gruel. Each ladle of gruel included only a few grains of rice, and had to be shared by two prisoner. It was not enough to survive. Every day, Tam recalls, ten to fifteen prisoners died of starvation. But the cook of Sang Prison does not feel like he was responsible for the deaths of hundreds of inmates by starvation.

The executioners at Sang Prison certainly were responsible for the deaths of inmates. One survivor from the prison remembers that the executioners seemed to be proud of their work for the revolution, and they certainly had a lot of work to do, One of the killers at Sang Prison, a man named Pan, bragged to an inmate of the prison that “5,000 people died and my arms are still not tired.” The size of the killing field near Sang Prison suggests that at least their many people were killed there. (Continued)
THEME I: Peace. Peace is extremely important to Cambodians, particularly to the average citizen who works long hours to scrape out a meager living. Most Cambodians are tired of conflict and bloodshed, of losing loved ones, and of living in a state of lawlessness and fear. Interviewees repeatedly stated that development, economic and otherwise, would be impossible without stability and security. The Cambodia interviewed expressed a desire to live in a stable democracy so that Cambodia can develop as other counties in Southeast Asia have. Although a trial may be necessary for long-term stability, some interviewees believed that short-term stability and a state of peace outweighed future concerns. They feared that a trial, with its adversarial nature and zero-sum results, would result in political upheaval and could return the country to a state of war. Given that many current politicians and government officials colluded with or were themselves members of the Khmer Rouge, concerns of political instability resulting from a trial are very real. Thus, a trial or truth commission will have to take into account Cambodians’ concerns of stability and security.

THEME 2: Full Truth. Some interviewees simply wanted to know the truth about what had happened in the Khmer Rouge era. The Khmer Rouge were highly adept at disguising chains of command and keeping Cambodians in the dark about who was orchestrating the genocidal regime. In Buddhist cultures, truth-telling is the most important of the moral virtues, and the revelation of truth can effect crucial changes. Further, the ultimate goal of punishment has traditionally been correction and not revenge. Common punishments have included confession and asking for forgiveness, rather than corporal or capital punishment. Thus the act of truth-telling on the part of the perpetrators could have great intrinsic value to many Cambodians.

THEME 3: Determining Responsibility. Interviewees themselves brought up command
responsibility in many interviews. Who exactly should be held responsible for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge? The question of command responsibility is particularly interesting in view of the monarchical, absolutist tradition of Cambodia. From the reign of kings through French colonization, through King Sihanouk and Lon Nol, Cambodia has always been ruled by a dictator. This led, it seems, to the lack of formal education discussed below and consequent susceptibility to indoctrination.

Cambodian tradition promotes reverence for leaders far more strongly than Western political systems, by whom and for whom international criminal law has been created. Even in the wake of genocide and war, many interviewees were still willing to trust the new Cambodian government and to let it decide which remedy would best address the crimes of the Khmer Rouge. This raised a question posed by Carlos Nino: “whether we are justified in imposing through the criminal law our own values on people who not only do not share them but even lack the conceptual scheme which would make them capacity of recognizing and understanding our values.” Precedential definitions of command responsibility may need to be reassessed in the Cambodian context, shifting the burden of proof further towards the superior. Cambodian values often differ from the Western values that underlie international criminal law. For example, international criminal law emphasizes individualism, and the ability of the individual to choose whether or not to obey an unlawful command given by a military leader. This assumption may not hold in the Cambodian context.

A closely related question raised by the Khmer Rouge atrocities is how to legally address circumstances of individual or mass killing under duress. Under the rule of the Khmer Rouge, Cambodians were starved and forced into slave labor, conditions that certainly do not lend themselves to independent thought or deep theoretical or moral freedom of choice. When the choice was to kill others or be killed should this relieve or mitigate responsibility for murder? For crimes against humanity? For genocide? The international military tribunals in the wake of World War II found that duress was a complete defense. However, a recent case by the International
Searching for the truth — Public Debate

Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia held that duress can mitigate a criminal sentence but is not a defense against grave crimes such as crimes against humanity. In the case of Cambodia, it may be more accurate to focus on the “top leaders” of the Khmer Rouge for individual criminal culpability, as the living conditions of most other Cambodians may make it difficult to establish that they met the mens rea requirements of such crimes.

THEME 4: International Actors. Interviewees expressed concerns about foreign involvement in and support of the Khmer Rouge regime. Some interviewees held the racist view of disbelief that Khmer would kill Khmer and asserted that there had to be someone or some external force behind the Khmer Rouge. Others simply wanted to find out which countries supported the Khmer Rouge.

While there is no easy answer to the question who supported the Khmer Rouge, and there is a fine line between culpability for complicity and a non-interventionist stance, this area demands further research. The United States, Thailand, and the People’s Republic of China all arguably supported the Khmer Rouge either financially, politically, or both. Some Cambodians assert that the Khmer Rouge could never have remained in power had other countries not supported them. This question of outside support must be closely examined in order to establish a shared historical memory and perhaps forgiveness in Cambodia; independently, a tribunal would be incapable of such a task.

THEME 5: Amnesty. The fourth recurring issue was that of amnesty. This is a particularly interesting question in Cambodia—a country with a strong Buddhist tradition. Both Buddhism and the goal of national reconciliation seem to point towards amnesty, and approximately half of the subject interviewed felt that amnesty would be acceptable given an in-court confession and apology. However, the other half, including a Buddhist monk, felt just as strongly that the crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge were so heinous that amnesty is not tenable. This raises important philosophical and psychological questions on the limitations of human forgiveness—there may exist crimes so horrifying that to forgive them officially (rather than personally) would be to diminish their severity.

It is important to reiterate that even those interviewees who ultimately agreed to amnesty accepted it on the condition that those found guilty would admit in court (or in a truth commission) to what they had done, confess their guilt, and apologize publicly to all Cambodians. Some scholars, including M. Cherif Bassiouni, would say even that this is the only possible method for legitimate amnesty. As a Royal Government of Cambodia official stated, amnesty cannot be given or guaranteed before trial. A person must be assumed innocent until proven guilty, and therefore does not have any guilt to be pardoned of before a judicial body has examined her individual circumstances. One of the main benefits of amnesty is that it encourages guilty parties to explain what exactly happened and to incriminate other culpable persons. If voluntary confession in court is not a part of amnesty process, then amnesty loses one of its central goals. Finally, for amnesty to adequately address the needs of the victims’ families and loved ones, public apologies are imperative. Amnesty is not to be used as a method for the truly culpable to escape punishment-instead, it should be a form of catharsis for both the perpetrator and the victim. The perpetrator confesses to his crime, which relieves him, legitimates the victims’ loss and pain, and potentially inflicts an internalized punishment on the guilty party. Both the public shame and the personal consciousness of the crimes that he has committed serve to punish the perpetrator. Thus admission, confession in court, and public or personal apology are three vital components of amnesty, and the Cambodians interviewed believed that amnesty should not be offered without them.

Those interviewees who, under these conditions, supported amnesty usually explained their forgiveness from a Buddhist perspective. The belief that “Hatred cannot be conquered by hatred” was repeated several times in the interviews. It is important to note that this belief in amnesty often did not extend to the top leaders. One interviewee recounted the story of Angkoly Mala, who committed a horrific and gruesome crime that his teacher had masterminded and ordered. The young student was forgiven, but his teacher was not. The interviewee analogized this story to the situation of the Khmer Rouge, insisting that there should be no amnesty...
for top leaders of the regime. Thus, even for people operating under an explicitly Buddhist interpretation and worldview, amnesty is not always prescribed.

Of the subjects who insisted on amnesty, one stated that tolerance and forgiveness were “the primary Khmer nature.” Perhaps there could be a sociological assumption or argument underlying these claims, but from the interview and other statements it seems that this assertion was based on views about race and biological determinism. Such a reductionist view may lead one to question the validity of this viewpoint. It could be reasoned that interviewees agreed to amnesty because Cambodian domestic law allows the King to grant amnesty or perhaps because the interviewers introduced the idea of amnesty to them. Interviewees said that amnesty was acceptable according to the law, or agreed to amnesty at one point in the interview but later stated to agree with the idea of amnesty, it is important to note these concerns and reservations.

Another justification for amnesty, used to secure amnesty for Ieng Sary (Brother Number Two), is that of national reconciliation. Interestingly, national reconciliation was not directly raised in the context of amnesty in any of the interviews. It is debatable whether amnesty is preferable to punishment for purposes of stability and security. An amnesty provision similar to the one used by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission provides an incentive for perpetrators to confess their deeds and establish a complete picture of the truth, and this form of forgiveness can also help to put an end cycles of retribution and violence. However, stable democracies must be based on a state of law in which citizens are held legally accountable for their actions. Any amnesty policy should strive toward assessing accountability and addressing guilt through social punishment rather than adopting blanker impunity.

Interviewees who disagreed with amnesty were most often nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers, women, and politicians. The NGO workers interviewed were concerned about human dignity and the value of human life. They also spoke about the legitimacy of international laws of genocide and other crimes against humanity. While politicians may have had ulterior motives for opposing amnesty (i.e., punishing members of opposition parties) NGO workers expressed valid and convincing concerns about the ramifications of amnesty on international criminal law. Thus it may be wiser to try top leaders and establish a truth commission for the rank and file violators.

One powerful statement by an interviewee justifying his refusal of amnesty was: “For whom should one have pity? Pol Pot or two million Cambodians?” Many Cambodians have suffered for twenty years with little or no redress, and are eager for justice. This sentiment highlights the ability of many interviewees to transfer the blame for what happened during the Khmer Rouge rule to the regime’s top leaders. A denial of amnesty to the top leaders would allow Cambodians to relieve the anger, loss and pain that has been stored for years, and perhaps to forgive the lower-level members of the Khmer Rouge who were following the coercive orders of top leaders.

(Continued)
TONLE SAP LAKE MASSACRE:
VOICE FROM THE GRAVE

By Ronnie Yimsut

The chilled-north wind from the Himalayas no longer a threat to my warmth nor my sanity. I was contended. I was happy even though I only have a few
hours of rest and an emptied stomach. I have got my
family again, at long last, to comfort my soul and spirit.
I was happy, for the moment in time that I finally
reunited with my long lost family once more. Nothing
would matter now? even under Angkar terrible regime.

At the crack of dawn, our escorts started kicking
people to get up and moving on again. They were the
“slave driver,” the master of their domain and ours. I
slowly got up and was pleased to know that everything
was not a dream last night. At 15, I was too big and too
old for my mother to hold on to me, but she did. She
still clung to me and refused to let me go. I do not want
to lose them again, but I had to join my group.
Reluctantly I returned to my camp to help Sedum’s
elderly father. Everyone moved closer to join Serey
family. We were a clan again, now numbering 16 people
of all ages and abilities.

After less than two days of hard traveling, we
reached a place called “Ta Source Hill,” a place about a
mile south of Keo Pour. It is a familiar, area for me as I
have lived in Keo Pour after the fall of Cambodia. It is
a place where I used to live in 1975-1976, before the big
march to Tapang town. I was so surprised to see so
many changes, physically speaking, happening to the
area. It was almost indistinguishable. A few landmarks,
the twin dikes were still there, but just about everything
else has drastically changed. There were so many
people being forced to work on this gigantic water
reservoir. There must have been at least 15,000 people
at this site alone. Our group was told to set up camp in
any dry site we can find, but we must remain together
as a group. Within an hour of our arrival in Ta Source
Hill, Angkar Leu cadres soon came around to collect
workers. All except Sa Oum, who was due to deliver a
child at any moment, and her father were off to the work
site right away. Serey got permission to find wood in
preparation for Sedum’s baby delivery.

Everyone was so hungry and exhausted after this
long journey. Angkar Leu did not allow us to rest before
we were off to work again. I was very tired and so
hungry. I am sure the rest of my family felt the same.
My parents and siblings were close by, but they didn’t
say much. All of them were working just like everyone
else. More digging and hauling of dirt and gravel from
a very deep and scary looking reservoir. I watched the
soldiers beat people up with baton, not because they
didn’t want to work, but because they didn’t have any
more energy to give. It was bad, very bad. Angkar Leu
had brought slavery to a high level.

It was at Ta Source Hill that I finally realized our
fate. We were forced to work all day and almost all
night for five agonizing days by a new batch of soldiers.
Those who brought us over had long since departed.
The new guards were cruel and had no mercy. Many
died before my eyes from heat stroke, sickness,
exhaustion and starvation. Most people died from
beating they received from the soldiers. And many were
quietly taken away in the cover of the night to almost a
certain destination: death. All that time I wondered
when our turn would come. I wished it would arrive
sooner so that we didn’t have to suffer like those before us.

People from my group began to drop like flies in
the muddy bottom of the canal. Very few even bother to
take them to get a proper burial. The dead and near dead
were scattered all over as far as my eyes could see. We
were all too exhausted and too weak to move. Every
now and then a group of people, our fellow laborers,
came by to collect the dead bodies under watchful eyes of armed guards. Very few mourned for the dead. Even the relatives showed very little emotion because they knew that the dead would suffer no more. We were all like a bunch of living dead. I honestly thought that it would be much easier if they just came and took us away. When were they going to end our misery? I waited and waited. It never came.

A pointed object poked at me very hard and woke me up from the muddy bottom of the canal where I fell asleep. I slowly opened my eyes to look at the teenage soldier who continued to jab me with his seemingly over-sized AK-47 rifle. He was no older than 12, just three years younger than I was, but much, much fatter.

“Move it, Mith! Now! Let’s go!” He was barking angrily for me to get up from the mud.”Go ahead and shoot me,” I said to myself.

I was ready to die. The situation was hopeless. I finally pushed my weak, skinny body up from the mud and wearily walked into a direction where my group, including my family, was being congregated. It was our time to go, at last.

I began to have mixed feelings about the sudden relocation plan. Normally, we would stay in one place for weeks or even months at a time before they shipped us out again. I had wished for them to take us away and now that the time had come, I was having second thought. Nonetheless, after five long and miserable days and nights without substantial food or rest, I was more than ready to go—where I was going was irrelevant. I just wanted to get out of this place even if it meant sudden death. By the look of others, including my family members, they were all ready to go as well.

After all that they had put us through, especially the last five days, nothing could be worse. Nothing would matter anymore.

They ordered us to file in a row of four. My little brothers hung on to me tightly. They were all hungry and tired. They did not cry, just exhausted. A small group of soldiers who were to escort us were made up of all ages, some as young as 10. There were only five of them to escort what was left of my original group of family. By then there were only 79 of us altogether. During those five awful days at Ta Source Hill, eight had died, including six children and two elderly men. I wondered why there were so few of them if they were going to kill all 79 of us? I am always the curious one, even now.

The oldest soldier, a man name Phum, came over in front us and spoke loudly so that everyone could hear him.

“Angkar Leu is moving all of you to the Tonle Sap - the Great Lake - to catch fish. There will be plenty of food to eat,” he said simply and clearly.

Suddenly, people came to life and began talking among each other about the news. We were all very skeptical about this seemingly miraculous news. However, it made sense, as most of us in this group were at one time commercial fishermen on the Tonle Sap Lake. They told us just what we wanted to hear: the food, the chance to catch and eat fresh fish from the lake, the chance to get away from the misery of Ta Source Hill. It all sounded too good to be true. I was completely fooled by the news. Well, perhaps I had a little doubt, but so did the rest of the people in my group. We would have to wait and see what the future would hold for us.

Our escorts took us south through a familiar muddy road toward the lake, which was about six or seven miles away. The last time I walked on this very same road was just last year, when I was on another Mobile Brigade project. The longer we were on that road, the more relaxed we were. Perhaps they were
telling us the truth? We seemed to be heading in the right direction. There were only five of them. They couldn’t possibly kill all 79 of us - Could they?

After about three miles of walking, the armed men asked us to stop and wait for the rest of the group to catch up. My family sat holding each other’s hands without speaking a word. Worry look was on everyone face. One of Sa Oum’s older sister handed me the last bit of cooked-dried rice. I threw a handful into my mouth and passed it on to my eager little brothers.

People were very weak and the three-mile hike took its toll. Another child died on the way. After some hesitation the soldiers allowed the mother to bury her child. It was another 20 or 30 minutes before they caught up.

Our escorts wanted us to move on quickly before the setting of the sun. They asked all the able men, both young and old, to come and gather in front of the group. The men were then told to bring their tools, especially any knives and axes they had with them. They said that the men needed to go ahead of the group to build a camp for the rest of us.

The men were soon lined up in a single file with their tools in hand. I watched Serey and my two older brothers, as they walked reluctantly to join the line. Dad was too old and too cripples to join in with the men and was left behind.

“This one is too skinny and too weak to be any use,” one of the escorts said about me to his comrades, laughing I may add.

Serey briefly said goodbye to his pregnant wife, Sa Oum. I was there close by. Sa Oum was quiet and her worried face gave away her concerns.

“Don’t you worry, I’ll take good care of her,” I assured Serey. The group disappeared shortly in the darken sky. That was the last time I ever saw my brothers and the rest of the men again. The sky was getting darker and a chillier. The notorious Tonle Sap Lake mosquitoes began to rule the night sky. After about 30 minutes or so, the two escorts that led the men away returned. They quickly conferred with their fellow comrades. One or two of the people from my group overheard something quite unbelievable. The shocking news quickly spread among the people within the group. I later learned that they said something like, “a few got way!” It only meant one thing: the men were all dead except a few who managed to escape.

It was about 7 or 8 o’clock in the evening before we were ordered to move on again. By this time the children who still had enough energy to cry were crying and screaming as loud as they could. It was mainly from hunger and exhaustion, but also from the attack by the swamping mosquitoes. Amidst the crying of the children I could hear the sobbing and weeping of the people who lost their loved ones. Sa Oum and my mom were amongst those who were quietly grieving. I still had my doubts about the whole situation, although the odds were stacked against us. If we didn’t die of starvation, exhaustion, or mosquito bites, there was a good chance that the hands of Angkar Leu’s soldiers might murder us.

(Continued)
May 20 is an unforgettable day. A new millenium has come, while the childhood is materializing with a great speed. However, the past always makes me preoccupied with the suffering of a number of Khmer women and orphans at Sang prison’s forum organized in Kandal Stung District, Kandal Province on May 20, 1985. It’s true that 15 years have passed, but in reality misery of thousands of widows and children who were recalling their memories of suffering always appears with a phantom to me. At that time (1985), I was just thirteen. But, I remember having seen the commemoration being held annually on May 20 to pray for the dead inflicted by the Khmer Rouge violence.

Day of Anger was held at Sang prison with the participation of people from all walks of life, Buddhist monks, soldiers, students and other hundreds of orphans from Hungary-Sponsored Orphanage. Sang prison was one of prisons located in Southwestern Zone. It was once used for execution and torture against their alleged enemies accused of treason. For this reason, local authorities chose this location for commemoration of Day of Anger to enliven painful memories of people who endured during the regime of three years, eight months and twenty days.

Before delivering statement of suffering, the committee in charge of organizing the commemoration invited Buddhist monks to practice religious offerings to the dead so that their souls might rest in peace. Then ‘victim representatives’ were asked to come forward to reveal and condemn the heinous crimes of Pol Pot clique, which could not be forgotten. The period of more than three years plunged Cambodia into a stream of blood and tears. The destruction happened throughout the country, where people in cities were relocated in jungles and exposed to forced labor. People were not provided with enough food to eat. Young people became old beyond their age. All national infrastructures, including schools and hospitals were ruined and transferred into prisons or pigsties. Khmer Rouge barbarously tortured Cambodian people by various ways. They used pincers to take off victims’ nails and then used alcohol to inflame more pain. Some time victims were hanged up and plunged into a water containing jar. Pieces of steels were burnt to the point that they could make victims hurt. Some victims were tied up with their armed stretched. They the Khmer Rouge slashed victims for food. Moreover, the Khmer Rouge used palm stem to cut open people throat, buried them alive and bayonet them to death. As for women, they were raped before being killed.

After the speeches of victim representatives, an orphan was asked to come forward to read a poem, emphasizing the pain of victimized women during that regime. Then people and children came up and retold their misery and separation. I remember seeing an elderly woman recounting with tears the Khmer Rouge violence against her family. Her daughter was killed without sympathy. She witnessed the killing, which was the most heinous and inhumane act the world has ever met. Khmer Rouge act was in parallel with Hitler’s. Hitler never killed his own people, but Jews. On the
other hand, Khmer Rouge killed their own people without condolence. She went on to say that her daughter was raped by four village militiamen. Before raping, they tied up her hands and feet and then undressed her. In the end, they bayoneted her at her vulva to dead. Her memories brought tears to everyone present at the meeting, including monks. I was so moved by the way the orphans recalled their sad stories. They said their parents were forced to work too hard without sufficient food. After their narration, the committee burnt down artificial figures of Pol Pot, Ieng Sary and Khieu Samphan as a symbol of the collapse of their administration to coincide with the voice of victory made by the participants “Long live the glorious party of Kampuchea”. This is the end of the meeting. People made their ways to different direction toward their homesteads with the feeling of unforgettable suffering inflicted by Pol Pot clique.

Twenty-five years have passed, yet Khmer people have been preoccupied with sadness and pain by a handful of Khmer Rouge. We had never expected the occurrence of such barbarous act. It is very logical that anomalous event can occur at any time. We had never expected that Pol Pot became a notorious criminal of the mass killing in Cambodia. Albeit the stories are out of sight, they are not out of mind. The sound imbed in our sentiment always persistently asks us “Why the Khmer Rouge committed such barbarous acts?” Every Khmer individual suffers mental illness due to a handful of criminals who slaughtered hundreds of thousands of people. Youth life was very dark. Day of misery was never absent. The souls of hundreds of thousands of orphans have been calling for warmer shelter. All these causes have converted the Khmer gentleness into barbarous, inhumane acts in the present-day Cambodia. The past memories were completely buried in the period of killing fields within three years, eight months and twenty days. A number of excellent heroes died. No word could describe the magnitude of suffering of every Khmer individual.

LETTER FROM PURSAT PROVINCE

Dated June 27, 2000

To respected Excellency Mr. Youk Chhang,
Director of the Documentation Center of Cambodia:
My name is Sao Daroeun, district governor of Kandieng, Pursat Province. I have received “Searching For the Truth” of issues number 1 up to number 5 one after another. I would like to express my gratitude for your excellent magazine sent to our local authorities. After reading, I can’t help appreciating all texts and articles of the magazine. In addition to these points of satisfaction, I would like to list down my points of view in the light of your publication: 1) The magazine is a reflection of truth and make me moved and support it. I am very moved by the description of obvious, unexpected tragedy cause by the genocidal regime within three years, eight months and twenty days. I feel surprised at the thought of a situation where I survived the regime in 1979 with fearful, paying off status. I am very exited to see your Excellency create such accurate magazine, emphasizing real characteristics of the documentation, which reveals the history of bitter endured by Khmer people during 1975-1979 to the national and international publics.

I support the publication of the magazine with broad distribution. By this way, the younger generations would be able to learn about the past. Therefore, I would suggest the magazine be reached by local villagers: 2) “Searching For the Truth” is priceless by the fact that it is not a holder of fictions, but experiences of criminals who massacred their own people under the guidelines of Pol Pol clique. Cambodian younger generations have to mobilize the Khmer spirit and conscience for the sake of national unity and preventing the return of the regime riddled with killing pits. I highly appreciate you and your colleagues for impartial stance in seeking a real justice for our unfortunate people. I will see my enclosed poem retelling the bitter memories for the Documentation Center of Cambodia.

Yours sincerely,

Sao Daroeun
Governor of Kandieng District, Pursat Province
KHMER ROUGE SONG:

NEW SCENERY OF CAMBODIAN REMOTE AREAS IN RAINY SEASON

Compiled by Sayana Ser

Thunder goes on consecutively along with rain showering crops, which are, both old and young seedlings, growing rapidly.

The scenery changes its shape with glittering beauty, while the rice fields bear a number of dikes and canals where the water is running tremendously.

Main reservoirs high and firm contain a large coverage of water with water-gates for distributing water to crops.

Even rice fields which are several kilometers away also have enough source of water running constantly. The rice fields are very close to small rivers, which can be used to water thousands of hectares of farmland.

Our farmers throughout the country are having a wise management to do rainy season farming intensively directed by Angkar.

They are so happy. Both old and young are storming attacks on plowing and transplanting rice seedlings earlier.

In the nursery, the rice seedlings become green and growing with different capacity—some long some short. Brothers and sisters are in a hurry to pull rice seedlings.

Some are carried by ox-cart, while some other are carried with shoulder for farmers to transplant in the vast rice fields.

Brothers and sisters in the transplanting groups work very fast. They transplant rice seedlings nicely in row with a great speed.

Several hectares of rice seedlings were transplanted. Some are fruity under the care taken by our brothers and sisters, who spend some time extending their plantation work.

No piece of land surrounding their homesteads are left uncultivated. Farms are full of crops and trees for fruits. Crops in every farm site are growing.

In all sections of handicrafts–both carpentry and iron section, craft practitioners are producing a great number of instruments and other materials.

Brothers and sisters are working intensively just the same way as the soldiers are attacking enemies during the war.

All villages, districts, regions and zones, brothers and sisters do not take free time, but work very hard to be in self-mastery in all fields.

The scenery in rainy season overshadows the intensive work, self-reliance in all fields of rebuilding the country with the speed of great leap forwards.