Table of Contents

Letter: Memory..............................................................1

DOCUMENTATION
An ambassador of Democratic Kampuchea ..........3
“Kampuchea Krom” Khmer Prisoners ..............11
The People of Kampuchea.................................14
Security Guards at Tuol Sleng prison...............16
KR Telegrams .........................................................19
The Documentation Process.............................28

HISTORY
The Rights of KR to Depose of Cambodians.....29
Voices From S-21 ....................................................35
The Perils of Neutrality..................................36

LEGAL
Categorizing Crimes of the CPK .................37
Crimes Against Humanity ...............................39
A Sampling of Documentary Evidence ..........41

PUBLIC DEBATE
Points of Views on the KR Trial .......................44
Khieu Samphan’s Theories .............................45

FAMILY TRACING
Searching for Family Member .........................46
I met my Uncle ..................................................48

KHMER ROUGE ARTS
Cooperative farmers are happy ..................Back Cover

Searching for the truth.
Number 2, February 2000

Mother and Son

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Youk Chhang and Raymund Johansen; Proofread by Julio A. Jeldres and Rich Arant.
My mother was a gem seller and head of a household of nine children - two of them died before I was even born, and one more died before I reached the age of maturity. I am the youngest. When I was nine (1970), soon after my father died, my mother started to employ me as her messenger. I was responsible not only to collect messages but also money for her. She did not have a car. She did not know how to ride a bicycle. She believed it would be a waste of time and money to travel to her clients’ houses by cyclo. Thus, almost everyday after school, she would instruct me to go to collect messages or money from her clients. My mother cannot read or write. Therefore, she could only give me verbal instructions, as to the whereabouts of her clients. I had to take notes or memorize her instructions. Usually, I would have to ask people on the street before reaching the location of her clients. I would also have to make many stops to chat with people, and would sometimes even ask the monks-the most reliable source for such information-in order to reach certain addresses. It was fun for me to do this, and every time I would collect messages or money for my mother, she would reward me with a small sum for ice cream or soft drink. I even saved enough money to buy helicopter toys. I was “well off” by working for my mother, compared to other kids in my neighborhood. I sometimes used my reward money to treat my friends.

I worked on locating my mother’s clients up until the Khmer Rouge came to power in April 1975, when I was fourteen. I lived in Tuol Kauk-the Phnom Penh suburb. I was home alone when the Khmer Rouge cadres came to chase me out of the house on the morning of April 18th, 1975. My mother and everyone else had already moved to my uncle’s house for better safety. She was hoping to collect me later, but it was too late for her to do so. The Khmer Rouge cadres had already pushed me at gunpoint to join the crowd on the streets. I was too young, I guess, to understand what was going on. Perhaps, I was too innocent to be afraid of anything. I seemed to know my direction. After realizing that the Khmer Rouge were conducting an evacuation and “wanted” all the people in Phnom Penh to go to their home villages, I started to ask people along the road for my mother’s home village where I used to visit when I was six (1967). I used exactly the same approach as when my mother instructed me to collect messages or money from her clients. At each stop, I would collect additional information from the people on the streets, including the Khmer Rouge cadres, about my mother’s home village. After 17 days on the road with my bicycle, I found my mother’s home village. It was Phum Chous, also known as Phum Thmei, located in Prey Lvea Sub-district, Kabass District, Takeo province. It is about 85 kilometers from my house in Tuol Kauk where I was born and grew up as my mother’s messenger.

Asking people for directions is an effective way to reach a location in Cambodia. It is also very common, since most farmers—who make up to almost 80% of the Cambodian population—cannot read or write. Using written address is not the typical way to locate places in Cambodia. You may even get lost instead! Cambodians do not mind at all telling you,
even though this can take hours explaining what is next or how many houses far from a pond or tree it is to reach your destination.

In the provinces, the way to locate a place through “word of mouth” has not changed a bit today. As the head of the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), I often have to travel with the mapping team to remote areas in the provinces to collect data on mass graves, prisons, or execution sites dating from the Khmer Rouge regime. It is no different from 30 years ago when I worked for my mother. Now I must ask people again for directions, this time to the genocide sites and the home villages of witnesses who have survived the Khmer Rouge regime so that the memory of their experiences can be recorded. The memories are hard to take, but too precious to remain untold. The genocide truth is too valuable to leave unrecorded at the killing fields under the rain and storms. It must be preserved for the benefit of the younger generations to come. It is the flesh of the un-buried bones you would have seen everywhere in Cambodia. There are millions and millions of bones. Those of my sister and other relatives are among them. My mother survived the Khmer Rouge regime. The Khmer Rouge killed all her brothers and sisters. She lost almost all of her relatives. She has been through all kinds of sufferings under the Khmer Rouge regime. She is 74 now. She is still strong, physically and emotionally. I am now 37 (1998) and am still her messenger. My job for her this time is not to collect messages or money from her clients, but the truth of genocide history for her surviving friends. She spends most of her time at the temple. She does not have the money to reward me for ice cream or soft drink any more, but instead gives me her pride of love, support and encouragement for my search for the truth of genocide history. She urges me to share this compilation of important history with every mother in the world.

Each time when I reach a location in the killing fields of Cambodia, it reminds me of my mother who has taught me to be strong. She believes that love from your heart will guide your instincts in the right direction. Your heart is your soul, which can never be destroyed by others.

The mapping report presented here is an important contribution to Cambodia’s genocide history. It includes the horrible, previously unrecorded experiences of survivors of the Khmer Rouge regime, as related by them to our mapping team. The majority of the survivors are “mothers”. Even though they have gone through such a horrible historic epoch, they have managed to take good care of their children and live strongly again. They share a history with us that they do not want to see repeated. The messages are purely from their hearts, tears, and sufferings. They want nothing from any of us, but to listen to their stories and wishes for genocide justice. As a messenger on this important mission, I am very honored to share them with you, and I am sure that my mother will be very proud of me.

Youk Chhang

Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam)
AN AMBASSADOR OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA TO LAOS BECOMES A PRISONER OF TUOL SLENG

By Kalyan Sann

As with all “confessions” extracted under torture at Tuol Sleng, readers are warned that the truth of factual assertions cannot be assumed.

Meak Touch, alias “Kem”, became a prisoner of Tuol Sleng on 20 November 1977, after serving for nearly one year as Democratic Kampuchea’s Ambassador to Laos (from March 1976 to January 28, 1977). Meak Touch became a member of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) in 1961, in Kampong Cham, through the introduction of Koy Thuon. According to his “confession”, in 1964 Koy Thuon enticed Touch to join CIA. Touch’s job was to “burrow within the revolution with the aim of destroying the revolution and provoking chaos among the people for the purpose of recruiting CIA agents. After the liberation in 1975, Touch served first as an ambassador-at-large in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to his “confession”, Meak Touch had encouraged Khmer immigrants in Laos to hate the revolution, and cooperated with Vietnam and Laos with a view to recruiting Khmer military forces in Laos and sending them to the Thai border with the objective of toppling the government of Democratic Kampuchea.

The confession document of Meak Touch bears a annotation by Duch, the Chief of Tuol Sleng Prison. Located on the cover page, this reads: “Dear Respected Brother, his activity can be divided into two aspects. 1) His activity with CH.P (imperialists). He had contacted UNHCR and then met In Tam in Thailand, with whom he had recruited Khmer immigrants in Laos for an absolute force against the revolution. UNHCR is an organ of the United Nations. It stands for United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2) His activity with Yuon. He had worked with a Yuon ambassador, Ninh You Liem, and a Laotian foreign minister, Phoun Siphaseut, in strategic framework of Indochina Federation. Yuon had also used the Khmer immigrants in Laos. With respect, 9 February 1978, Duch: 21 February 1978.” On the left page margin, there is an annotation of Duch reading: “He described his activities on page 37.”

The following is the confession document’s description of Meak Touch’s personal background and activities before 1975.

1. Activities of Meak Touch Before 1975

Meak Touch alias Kem, 42, was born in Koh Andet Village, Koh Andet Sub-district, Srei Santhor District, Kampong Cham Province. He used to serve as an Ambassador of Democratic Kampuchea to Laos. His father’s name is Peang, his mother’s name is Sum. In 1946, Touch left his hometown and lived in Wat Botum, Phnom Penh with his elder brother, named Meak Sem, chief of buildings for Buddhist monks in the temple compound.

In 1953, Touch graduated from Franjio Bodvin and was transferred to a private school known as Kumpuch Botr until 1965. In 1957 he was a third grader of Sihanouk High School in Kampong Cham. He held a diploma in 1958 and became a State Secretary for the Ministry of Work in 1959, in which he was involved in the revolutionary movement through the enticement of Vorn and Yem.

In 1961 Meak Touch became a “backbone member”. On April 16, 1962, Touch became a member of the Communist Party of Kampuchea with the nomination of Ep On and the recognition of Vorn. In October 1963, Meak Touch was transferred to work in Kampong Cham. Vorn introduced him to Koy Thuon, who was responsible for the Kampong Cham region. In early November 1963, Koy Thuon assigned Meak Touch to work as an office curator and messenger from Kampong Cham to Phnom Penh. After such a long association with Koy Thuon, Meak Touch realized that Koy Thuon was a polite and intelligent person, caring for others. Koy Thuon gave money and other assistance to Touch whenever Meas Touch was in need. The characteristics and attitudes of Koy Thuon created more and more mutual intimacy and understanding.

One day in March 1964, Meak Touch brought letters and documents from Phnom Penh to Koy Thuon,
who was then eating lunch. Koy Thuon invited Touch to join him for lunch, and they chatted. Koy Thuon took the opportunity to practice his ideological propagandizing, telling Touch, “To live in the revolutionary guidelines of Angkar is to live in the spirit of economy, non-negligence, and care for the hardship and poverty of the revolutionary people. Obviously, we have to have some kind of tolerance. Don’t be so strict all the time. We make the revolution, while showing tolerance so that we will be able to keep the working strength. We care for ourselves to avoid bleakness. The matter of caring for our personal health is also important. Your comrades should care for your health, because you are always sick.” Koy Thuon always raised similar issues with Meak Touch, placing emphasis on the advantages of living a private life, in which family happiness can be obtained. Meak Touch thought that some of Koy Thuon’s arguments were convincing.

Some time later, the revolution began to face more intricate issues. Koy Thuon suggested that the enemy was accelerating its rampant slaughter and arrest of revolutionists, and decried the fact the revolution had only bear hands with which to fight against the enemy, adhering as it did to the standpoint of independence and self-reliance, while the enemy had sufficient means for cracking the revolution. Koy Tuon was also frightened by the situation in the rural areas, where many revolutionists had been arrested, while some had been killed. Koy Thuon suggested that the enemy was accelerating its rampant slaughter and arrest of revolutionists, and decried the fact the revolution had only bear hands with which to fight against the enemy, adhering as it did to the standpoint of independence and self-reliance, while the enemy had sufficient means for cracking the revolution.

In October 1965, Meak Touch managed to recruit two persons named Nhaom San and Phou, because the two had views of life opposed to the revolution. Touch argued: “The ‘revolution’ is a strict regime for both life and expression, which contrasts with our current regime (Sangkum Reastr Niyum—Popular Socialist Community). Our regime is better suited to our requirements.” Later, Touch spread a rumor in work places, teachers’ circulars, technical schools, and bowling places, about the scattering of the revolutionary forces, and the discouragement of people to believe in the revolution.

In 1966, Koy Thuon introduced Meak Touch to “Doeun” and “Chhoeun”, who became his advisors, as Koy Thuon was leaving soon for business in faraway workplaces. Later, Touch succeeded in recruiting four more people named Kong, You Thann, Suos Seam, and Chum Noeu. Kong and You Thann joined the CIA in February 1966, and Suo Seam and Chum Noeu in May 1966. These four persons were teachers at the Technical School of Kampong Cham.

In July 1966, Doeun called a meeting with six participants, planing to accelerate all traitorous activities to stymie and destroy the revolution. In August, Douen called Touch, Nhaom, San and Phou for a meeting, exhorting them to encourage people in all sections to carry out activities in order to ensure their force’s extension. Meak Touch managed to recruit another person named Say, formerly a teacher in the Technical School, and organized a CIA induction ceremony for him in February 1967 with the authorization of Doeun.

Near the end of 1967, Doeun called a meeting in which the following nine people participated: Doeun, Meak Touch, Kong, You Than, Suos Seam, Chum Noeu, Say, Nhaom San, and Phou. At this meeting they discussed means of accelerating activities to meet the evolving situation. In 1968, the situation became intense, and a fight to obtain weapons took place shortly before the war broke out. At that time, Touch increased efforts to gain recruits in order to weaken the momentum of the revolution. At the end of 1968, Koy Thuon stayed at Meak Touch’s house for nearly one month and worked with people he had recruited, such as Pauk, who was injured, and Chhean, an ambassador to Hanoi. At that time Touch was assigned to guard the
In March 1969, Doeun called a meeting with the previously mentioned nine people. At the meeting, Doeun said: “The situation is evolving. To keep the pace with such evolution, there is a need for our comrades to overcome obstacles and speed up our work. Nothing else will do. So far, there is no momentum for our work. It has remained at the same speed.” In 1970, Doeun again called the nine people for a meeting. Doeun said: “Now we have reached our goal of a coup. However, the revolutionary side will not accept such a situation. Therefore, we all have to try our best to grasp the situation, and speed up the activities in all sections for a satisfactory result.”

In mid-June, 1970, Nan asked Touch to infiltrate liberated areas. Meak Touch arrived at Stung Treng, where he was received by Pauk, who accompanied him and another person to Office K-21 (Northern Zone Office). In October 1970, Meak Touch recruited three people for the CIA movement. After the assignment, some recruits committed activities against the revolution, such as imposing restrictions on ordinary vendors by seizing their goods or detaining people without valid reasons. Some others carried out activities against the Revolutionary Movement by convincing people that the Revolutionary Movement had the same characteristics as the previous regimes.

In January, 1971, the Regional Organization required Meak Touch to attend his first political training session, which would last for over one month, and be held at the Party School of K-21, Bangky Tan Ren, Region 130, with Brother Number one and Brother Number Two acting as the Educational Committee leaders. In June 1971, Meak Touch became a member of the Zone’s Educational Committee, headed by Saom (Tiv Ol). In November 1971, Angkar dismantled the Zone’s Educational Committee and Saom was transferred to another place.

In February 1972, the Zone Organization appointed Meak Touch as a member of Cham Ka Leu District. In his new position, Touch began to work against Angkar’s trade limitation directive. He encouraged the cadres to drink so that they would pay less attention to the movement and have no self-control. In July, the Zone Organization required Meak Touch to attend a training session in the Zone’s Conference School, located in a jungle in the Tuol Sambo Sub-district’s compound, Stung Treng District. Touch spent one-and-a-half months there attending the lectures of Brother Number One. After the course ended, Touch was transferred to the Ministry of Economy. The Chief of the Economy Committee was Hun. His deputy was Sath. Having this opportunity, Khuon introduced Kun and Hakk to all comrades working there saying: “We are all in the CIA network, comrades, and we have to know each other so that we can cooperate to create favorable conditions for activities in the new Economy Committee.”

In July 1973, Khuon moved Meak Touch from the Commercial Section. He was unemployed for a short period of time. Then Touch was appointed as a member of Department of Economy of the Northern Zone. There, Meak Touch encouraged medical staff to work in a careless manner and not to care for patients. As a result of the lack of hygiene in medical procedures, patients’ wounds began to fester, leaving the whole hospital in a compromised state. This ruined the morale of male and female combatants, and it affected the patients’ feelings, causing them to doubt the competence of the medical staff. Meanwhile, [he] destroyed Angkar’s belongings, including enough cloth to make 40 shirts, five hammocks, and a box of medicine (by exposing it to rain).

By the end of August 1974, the Zone Organization assigned a committee to take responsibility for building memorials to hold the remains of cadres killed at the frontlines. The committee consisted of eight members, including Meak Touch, who was responsible for decorations. Doeun explained to Touch about ways to hinder the memorial construction. He said it was a plan of the CIA, which had three main purposes: 1) to prevent the advancement of cultivation in the bases; 2) to destroy the property of Angkar and the public; and 3) to provoke conflicts among the people about the revolution. Doeun continued, “The construction work necessary for the memorial is extensive, requiring a great amount of labor, equipment, and time. So the construction project is a complicated affair and has the potential to engender great conflict. Thus, we have to take advantage of this opportunity.” Meak Touch followed Douen’s advice. He destroyed things in both
the Decoration and Construction Sections. At the decoration section, he spoiled hundreds of pineapple plants and dozens of coconut trees, which were to be planted at the memorial compound, by storing them in the open. At the construction section, Meak Touch would occasionally remove some parts of the building and asked the construction workers to rebuild them. Sometimes he asked the workers to move things from here to there without reason. Meak Touch also destroyed hundreds of Mai Sak and Korki trees. Under the pretext that Mai Sak were needed for the construction, Touch ordered workers to cut hundreds of Mai Sak siblings.

In November 1974, Sreng called Touch to join a meeting at Sath’s Office in Stung Treng. There were four other CIA participants from the Committee of Construction. The topic of the meeting was a plan to bomb the memorial. The aims of bombing were: 1) to intimidate people and foment dissatisfaction with the revolution; 2) to cause civilian casualties; and 3) to destroy the building and construction materials at the construction site.

The bombing would be ordered via telegram to Brother Khuon’s side working at the frontline near Phnom Penh. The time of bombardment would be December 1974. By the end of December 1974, two fighter plans dropped five or six bombs in the morning, and two or three bombs in the evening, destroying a few newly built houses, but causing no casualties. After the bombardment, construction of the memorial ceased and the buildings and materials were removed back to the bases.

2. Meak Touch’s activities after 1975

In February 1975, Meak Touch returned to work at the Economy Department of the Northern Zone. The unit had the duty of making garments for male and female youths, both “new” and “base” people, at the Ministry of Economy. However, the workers did not work hard, and failed to meet the needs of the youths. Most people worked at the usual speed, while some ignored their duties entirely. As a result, the assigned production was not achieved. Meak Touch destroyed the unit’s equipment, including thirty suits of clothes (by plunging them into water) and five sewing machines (by removing their bolts).

After the liberation, Meak Touch was moved to Phnom Penh. By the end of May 1975, Khuon appointed him as a deputy chief of the Phnom Penh state-run market, headed by a person named Chhoeun. In mid-June, Chhoeun was transferred to another job. Meak Touch was promoted to chief of the market, upon which he provoked troubles within the military unit based at the market. The situation became so complicated that it could not be resolved. In addition, Touch caused moral offense between males and females, leaving the whole military unit in a tumultuous situation. Touch encouraged people to love modern things, to be preoccupied with personal happiness and material things, and to do things on their own initiative, and in a disorderly manner. During his management of the market, Touch succeeded in recruiting three more people: Chheng, Oeun, and Ren.

In September 1975, Chhoeun called Touch and seven other people in for a meeting at the Commercial Department adjacent to the riverside. At the meeting, Chhoeun said: “Our plan is to destroy the main economic sectors. In the city, there are big and important factories, power plants, and warehouses. It is necessary that each unit be well-prepared for self-sufficiency. Food supplies must be thoroughly prepared for use in April and May. If this task is accomplished, our efforts to smash the machinery of the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea in the upcoming year will succeed”. Meak Touch and his partisans carried out Chhoeun’s plan by first collecting and hiding food (such as rice, salt, dried fish, fish paste, milk, and sugar), medicine, and other equipment with great care.

In October 1975, the Commercial Committee assigned Meak Touch to attend the first political training session of the Party School. The course was conducted by Brother Number Two at Phnom Penh’s stadium. Touch spent one-and-a-half months at the session. In November, after the course ended, Touch was transferred to work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. By the end of December, Doeun called ten agents, including Meak Touch, to attend a meeting held at the Commercial Department adjacent to the riverside for more advice on the traitorous plan, to be carried out during the upcoming national holiday ceremony in April 1976. Doeun said: “Each unit is responsible for its role in the plan to take over the government during the
upcoming national ceremony to be held in April 1976. This plan has already been well-prepared. It only has to be implemented in a timely manner. Divisional soldier Oeun will be responsible for maintaining security. Guards will be holding AK rifles to fire at Angkar on the stage.”

In early 1976, Angkar appointed Meak Touch as Ambassador for Democratic Kampuchea to Laos. In February 1976, before his departure to Laos, Meak Touch met Chhoeun at the Commercial Department. Chhoeun entreated Touch, “You must continue our activity in Laos. In Laos, there are Khmer immigrants who used to live under previous regimes. Thus, their politics and viewpoints are mature, which creates favorable conditions for our work. Comrade has the duty to gather Khmer immigrants in Laos and convert them into forces against the revolution and communism. All converted forces have to be sent to Kampuchea subsequently by legal means. My side will take care for the receiving procedures. We will use these forces to conduct sabotage in bases and cooperatives. These forces burrowing inside units will have to recruit more secret elements for the long-term strategy of toppling the authority of the Communist Party of Kampuchea at the appropriate time. In addition, you must examine the possibility of sending Khmer immigrants in Laos to the refugee camps in Thailand for our future plan, which is to convert those forces into an overwhelming strength against the Communist Party of Kampuchea.” (At this point in the confession document, there is a handwritten notation in Duch’s script that reads: “The duty to fight against the revolution and the Communist Party of Kampuchea assigned by Chhoeun is to grasp the Khmer immigrants in Laos, and educate them to become an absolute organ against the B.K.K [Communist Party of Kampuchea]).

On February 22, 1976, Meak Touch departed for Laos, where he received his credentials as Ambassador of Democratic Kampuchea. He commenced his mission on March 1976.

3. Meak Touch’s Purported Traitorous Activities in Laos

In Laos, as an initial step, Meak Touch recruited a person named Proeung after great effort. Touch convinced Proeung by saying that “in Kampuchea, after the liberation, people endured great hardship. Food and shelter issues have yet to be solved, resulting in even greater hardships for the people of Kampuchea.” Touch often raised these matters with Proueng, and asked him to bring Khmer immigrants to visit him, using
Proeung’s house to welcome them. There, Proeung and Meak Touch met two new people named Yen and Koy.

In June 1976, Meak Touch asked Proeung to work with him at the embassy as a translator and perform various office work. However, his purpose was to use Proeung as a messenger for communicating with foreigners. At the same time, Touch also asked Yen to work with him. Yen’s duty was to clean the embassy premises at noon and guard the embassy at night. In fact, Yen was used to guard Touch’s traitorous work.

To accelerate the recruitment of forces, Meak Touch educated Proeung, Yen and Koy as core elements so that they would be able to convince more Khmer immigrants to join the movement against the Communist Party of Kampuchea and the people of Kampuchea. To facilitate this work, Meak Touch used Proeung’s house as a meeting place for recruiting Khmer immigrants. (At this point in the confession document a note appears in Duch’s script stating: “He grasped contemptible Proeung as well as all Khmer immigrants in Laos”.

In June 1976, Meak Touch met with the Vietnamese ambassador, Dinh Nho Liem, in response to the Vietnamese ambassador’s courtesy visit when Touch first arrived. During the meeting, Dinh Nho Liem said: “Our countries once joined together hand in hand with Laos to struggle against French colonialism and American imperialism, until the day of independence. Therefore, from now on our three countries have to stick together in order to grow and develop. Dinh Nho Liem continued: “The Vietnamese party and government regard solidarity between our three countries as crucial. The relationships among the three countries will be improved, and we will enhance the solidarity among them.” (At this point in the document there is a margin note reading: “The Yuon ambassador has tried to understand contemptible Touch.”)

The Vietnamese ambassador requested three or four more meetings with Touch following the first one. As a result of these successive meetings, Dinh Nho Liem better understood Meak Touch’s position, and the relationship between the two was strengthened. (At this point there is another underlined annotation reading: “Yuoan has grasped the standpoint of contemptible Touch.”)

After the meeting with the Vietnamese ambassador, Meak Touch requested a courtesy meeting with Phoun Siphaseut, Foreign Minister of Laos. After exchanging greetings, Mr Phoun Siphaseut said: “I am very concerned about the tension between Kampuchea and Vietnam. I personally want to see the two countries have a good relationship.” Then Phoun raised the same matters mentioned by Dinh Nho Liem. (At this point there is a note in Duch’s handwriting that states: “Phoun Siphaseut has tried to understand the contemptible Touch.”)

In June 1976, Mr Phoun sent a letter of invitation to Meak Touch for a lunch meeting, to which Dinh Liem was also invited. After lunch, they discussed issues relating to the relations among the three countries. Mr Phoun said, “We have to have an agreement on achieving the goal of Indochinese Federation. Laos has absolutely agreed with this point. Therefore, we have to convince Kampuchea to join the Federation. Your comrade, who is working in Vientiane, has great potential for recruiting Khmer immigrants. They will be converted into a force against the communism and revolution of Kampuchea so that they can be infiltrated into Kampuchea for sabotage, and as a force for future use. At the same time, we have to
propagandize and motivate people to attack the Kampuchean revolution and let the world know that Democratic Kampuchea is not a just, clean society, but is a practicing dictatorship who’s people are enslaved and live in misery.”

The meeting reached an agreement on certain points, including: 1) assign Meak Touch to propagandize Khmer immigrants in Laos, and 2) Dinh Liem will help gather forces by organizing a sports team in name only, to be utilized for making contact with people via the Vietnamese embassy in Phnom Penh.

The discussion ended with a hope that the three countries would better cooperate for maximum achievement of the plan. (At this point in the document, there is a note in Duch’s handwriting: “Phoun Siphasseut and Yuon ambassador begin their cooperation with contemptible Touch in the principle of Indochina Federation.”)

Shortly after the discussion, Dinh Nho Liem and Meak Touch conversed in an aside sidelines of the meeting. Dinh Nho Liem said: “Vietnamese party and government define the matter of Indochina Federation as a crucial strategy. Now we can not achieve, but in the future, maybe ten, twenty or thirty years later, the Vietnamese younger generations would bear in mind and consider the idea of Indochina Federation as important. The Vietnam party and government shall not forgive the idea of including Kampuchea into the Federation. In all circumstances and generations, [we] will carry out activities for the achievement of such goal.” Dinh Nho Liem continued: “After the achievement, the Vietnamese party and government will do everything and have ability and means to archive this goal. This time we cannot, but later we will. Vietnam has been strongly supported by socialist countries, such as the Soviet Union. So, everything can be done.”

In July 1976, Meak Touch met with the director of the UNHCR on the matter of moving people to Thailand and certain regulations concerning the refugee camps and UNHCR itself, in Thailand. (At this point in the document there is a note in Duch’s handwriting: “It’s a part of American imperialists via UNHCR.” Concerning the abbreviation “UNHCR”, there is an explanation: “UNHCR is a high commissioner for refugees, which is part of the United Nations.” Concerning the issues raised by Meak Touch, the Director of UNHCR stated that he would sponsor everything for Khmer immigrants, including paper work.

In July 1976, Angkar called Meak Touch to attend a training course and work with it in Phnom Penh. Meak Touch arrived in Phnom Penh in early August, where he met with Chhoeun, who informed him of the failure of the plan to disrupt the national ceremony in April 1976. “The traitorous plan launched in April 1976 is aborted because Angkar changed its plans by not allowing security guards to hold any weapons. Our combatants responsible for launching the attack were gathered at one place.” At the same time, Meak Touch reported on what he had accomplished, including his discussion with the Vietnamese and Laotian ambassadors about the Khmer immigrants in Laos and Thailand and the matters concerning the UNHCR. Three days later, Chhoeun met with Meak Touch again. Chhoeun said that he agreed and assured that contacts with Khmer camps in Aranh District situated along Kampuchean-Thai border would be established so that the camp side could contact Khmer immigrants sent in by Laos via UNHCR.

The refugee camps were supervised by In Tam. Chhoeun stated: “The plan of evacuation is to attack the political influence of Democratic Kampuchea on the world stage with the aim of letting the world know that Democratic Kampuchea is not just and is establishing a dictatorship. This will make the people afraid to return to their own country. The plan is also to isolate the government of Democratic Kampuchea from the people of the world. The educated combating forces with strong politics are used for sabotage, and provoking troubles in villages adjacent to the border. Some other forces will be ready to counter-attack with the help of traitorous elements burrowing within the country.”

In September 1976, Meak Touch returned to Vientiane to motivate Khmer immigrants to flee to the refugee camps along Khmer-Thai border. In October 1976, In Tam arrived at Vientiane sponsored by the UNHCR. In Tam met with Meak Touch for almost an hour, discussing his work in the refugee camps. (At this point there is a note reading: “He has met In Tam via UNHCR.”) During the meeting, In Tam said: “Currently, great efforts are being made in the camps to
recruit more anti-Communist forces. These forces will be available in all circumstances for destroying the revolution. They will be used in the future to take power in Democratic Kampuchea with the assistance of those forces burrowing inside the country. It will be an easy task to evacuate Khmer immigrants from Thailand, because UNHCR will sponsor everything, including paper work.” After In Tam left Vientiane, Meak Touch transferred the task of evacuating Khmer immigrants from Thailand to Proeung.

Between November 1976 and January 1977, Meak Touch succeeded in recruiting several people, including Yen, Koy, Chea Lim, Cheang Un, Koy’s father and an aged car driver, who had worked for the Khmer embassy in Laos a long time ago. These persons were recruited based upon what they had heard of the hardships, lack of freedom, dictatorship, and killing that the people were enduring.

In early January 1977, Phoun Siphaseut, Dinh Nho Liem and Meak Touch called a meeting to discuss plans to be implemented in Kampuchea. Dinh Nho Liem said: “The Khmer immigrants recruited must be sent into Kampuchea. Some of them have to carry out activities such as breaking up internal solidarity, destroying light and heavy equipment, and provoking chaos in cooperatives, factories, and other units. The rest must burrow within the public for secretly recruiting forces so that in the future they will hold leading positions in cooperatives, factories and other units. We are trying either to redirect the guidelines and change the complexion of the leadership of the revolutionary authority, or to capture power directly. As to the other Khmer immigrants abroad, they must provoke conflicts along the border. Parti-cularly, along the Kampuchea-Laos border, we have to cause tension and intricate issues, which will lead to an unsolvable border conflict.” (At this point, there is a note reading: “Yuon is planing to send Khmer immi-grants and its agents to Kampuchea.”)


On July 24, 1977, Angkar took Meak Touch to a house in Comrade Meas’s unit, where he stayed alone. On August 2, 1977 Angkar sent Meak Touch’s family to live with him. On November 20, 1977 Meak Touch was arrested and sent to the Ministry of Security.

According to the 58-page confession document, Meak Touch was interrogated in Tuol Sleng prison for eighteen days by a person named Ly, an interrogator in Group A. The document is a handwritten text, bearing the signature and thumbprints of Meak Touch, as well as dates on all pages from start to finish. According to a cover-page note in Duch’s script, the confession document was sent to Comrade Vann (Ieng Sary).

On pages 55 to 57 appear the names of 60 persons implicated by Meak Touch’s confession. Of the 60 names, eleven are followed with the words “already arrested” in brackets, and five with the word “dead” in brackets. The list concludes with the signature and thumbprint of Meak Touch.

The above text is a summary converted from file number J00412bbkh, held at the Documentation Center of Cambodia: the confession of a Tuol Sleng prisoner named Meak Touch, alias Kem.
“KAMPUCHEA KROM” KHMER PRISONERS

By Sopheak Vichea Tieng

When the Khmer Republic, led by Field Marshal Lon Nol, was toppled on April 17, 1975, the Khmer Rouge regime took power, later changing the name of Cambodia to “Democratic Kampuchea.” During their reign, the Khmer Rouge employed all available means to locate, detain and eliminate those who were opposed to their policies, or who were suspected by the regime (“Angkar”) of being its “enemy”, including Kampuchea Krom Khmer. Cambodian Khmer and Kampuchea Krom Khmer are both “Khmer” peoples and share a culture that dates back to the era of Norkor Kok Thlork (Kork Thlork empire). Many of the Kampuchea Krom people were accused by the Khmer Rouge of being enemies, and detained at Tuol Sleng Prison. The Kampuchea Krom prisoners were divided into three separate groups: 1) those accused of being soldiers and spying for Vietnam; 2) those accused of being supporters of the recently defeated Lon Nol regime; and 3) ordinary people who had resided in Kampuchea Krom.

Group One

Members of the first group—those Kampuchea Krom Khmer accused of being Vietnamese soldiers spying for Vietnam—were referred to by the Khmer Rouge as “Y uon Spy”—those who had joined Ho Chi Minh’s Labor Party, established in 1930.

For example, according to Tuol Sleng confession file Y-27, dated 16 January 1978, Yoeung Keo, 27, and his wife Kim Lorn were arrested by the Khmer Rouge of being enemies, and detained at Tuol Sleng Prison. The Kampuchea Krom prisoners were divided into three separate groups: 1) those accused of being soldiers and spying for Vietnam; 2) those accused of being supporters of the recently defeated Lon Nol regime; and 3) ordinary people who had resided in Kampuchea Krom.

Yoeung Keo and two other monks, Yoeung Chay, and Yoeung Pov, to join a Vietnamese communist movement, assigning them to motivate other monks and the general populace to fight against the South Vietnamese military. Yoeung Keo served in the movement until the liberation of South Vietnam in 1975. Thereafter, Ong Meuy Cha assigned Yoeung Keo to work in Commercial Section in Youeng Va Sub-district.

On November 16, 1978 Ong Meuy Cha summoned Yoeung Keo for a meeting, at which a plan to spy in Kampuchea was devised. Yoeung Keo confessed that Vietnam designated him to spy on the revolutionary army in both artillery, tank and battleship units from Kamppong Som to Kep. After his arrest, Yoeung Keo was sent to Kampong Som and held there for three days. On January 8, 1978, Angkar sent him to the S-21 detention center now known as Tuol Sleng, where he was interrogated by Oeun, Khan and Chen, interrogators in Office S-21. The interrogation was conducted on January 16, 1978.

Another case is that of Seung Seap, a Kampuchea Krom Khmer arrested by the Khmer Rouge on May 19, 1978 while entering O Raing Village, Sen Monorom District, Mondul Kiri Province for the purpose of spying. On May 20, 1978, Seung Seap wrote his confession at O Raing, and was then sent by Angkar to Tuol Sleng Prison. According to the Tuol Sleng “Blackboard of Honor”, on May 28, 1978, Seung Seap was taken to be killed by Tuol Sleng security guards. According to Seung Seap’s confession, on May 14, 1978 General Phan Nga of the Army of Vietnam designated Seung Seap, who was then a Three Star Corporal, and five other Vietnamese soldiers to spy in Kampuchea. At dawn of May 15, 1978, Seung Seap and his partisans reached O Raing, Sen Monorum District, Modul Kiri Province, where they are were arrested by Khmer Rouge soldiers on May 19, 1978. Based on the confession file entitled “Biography and Activities of Aggression on Kampuchea” (held at the Documentation Center of Cambodia), Seung Seap, 28,
was a Kampuchea Krom Khmer, who was born in Por Pus Toek, Poumy Sub-district, Bassac District, Khleang Province, Kampuchea Krom. In childhood, he went to primary and junior high school at Khleang Province. He later spent five years as a monk. In August 1975, he was appointed by the Vietnamese authorities as secretary of the Poumy Subdistrict office. In August 1977, Seung Seap joined the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Movement. In October 1977, Va Thanh, the district chief, sent him to a military school for a four-month military techniques and investigation training course.

Another case is that of Chao Kim. Chao Kim was a Kampuchea Krom Khmer who was arrested and held at Tuol Sleng. Before his arrest, Chao Kim had been a member of the Ho Chi Min Youth Labor Party, and was honored for his outstanding contributions by a letter of appreciation from Kong Thanh, an undersecretary of Try Torn District on October 17, 1976.

**Group Two**

The second major group of Kampuchea Krom prisoners held at Tuol Sleng were those accused of membership in the “Indochina Liberal Great Solidarity Movement”, led by Chao Dora (Field Marshal Lon Nol) who held power from October 6, 1970 to April 17, 1975, and had been the leader of the chief of the “Kampuchea Krom Struggle Front” established on March 18, 1960 in Svay Torng District, Moat Chrouk Province (died November 17, 1985, in the U.S.A.). This organization was opposed to the Khmer Rouge, and many of its members were arrested and executed under Democratic Kampuchea. According to a document found at Tuol Sleng before his departure to the U.S.A, Lon Nol, as “Chao Dora”, the chief of Indochina’s Liberal Great Solidarity Movement, appointed Chao My commander-in-chief of the movement (November 30, 1976), Chao Pros as a deputy chief; and Majors Yanh Yaom and Chao Sokh Samnang as a Battalion Commanders, (December 8, 1976) (Tuol Sleng Document). "The appointment shall be in effect from the date of issue until the day of my return from abroad". On this document, there is a note written by the Khmer Rouge security personnel reading: “Note: What does the seal say? Is it the name of Lon Nol under the word president? “. The Khmer Rouge security apparatus’ interest in this particular group of Kampuchea Krom Khmer is clearly evidenced by this document.

Another example of former Khmer Krom supporters of the Lon Nol regime being targeted by the Khmer Rouge is the case of Chao Son. According to his biography document preserved at Tuol Sleng (box 21), Chao Son, 36, Kampuchea Krom Khmer, was born in Kampong Spean Village, Kov Ke Sub-district, Kov Ke District, Ba Svieng Province, Kampuchea Krom. He had been a second lieutenant in the Khmer Republic army, based in Kampong Som. He fled into jungle in June 1975 and was later arrested by Khmer Rouge soldiers. He was sent to Tuol Sleng and forced to write his “autobiography”.

A further sample of the documentary evidence demonstrating the Khmer Rouge targeting of Khmer Kampuchea Krom for extermination is a report dated December 11, 1976, that was sent to the Ta Keo Regional Chief, stating that on December 10, 1976, in Ream Andaek Sub-district, the Khmer Rouge arrested 67 Khmer soldiers, equipped with 37 weapons who were fleeing Vietnam. Among them were Khmer from both Cambodia and Kampuchea Krom. They fled from Vietnam on December 8, 1976 and stayed one night in Phnom Saom. They were accused by the Khmer Rouge of being members of the Indochina Great Solidarity Movement, who were fighting against the Vietnamese Communists and asking for assistance from the United States. At dawn of December 11, 1976, these prisoners were sent to the District Security Office. On the way, eight of the prisoners who attempted to flee were shot dead.

**Group Three**

The third category into which the Khmer Kampuchea Krom held at Tuol Sleng were divided included those civilians who had either fled Vietnam or had been arrested when the Khmer Rouge entered Vietnamese territory between 1977 and 1978. For example, we have the cases of Thach Yav (65) and his two sons, Thach Cham Raen (23) and Thach Saroeun (21) who lived...
in Prasna Village, Prasna Sub-district, Ky Yinh District, Moat Chruok Province, Kampuchea Krom. They were sent to Tuol Sleng Prison on September 3, 1978, and kept in House number 32, “Big Room” number 4, “Small Room” number 16 for interrogation (box 2). A further example is Kong Sorn, whose nickname was Bun Thoeun (35). He had been a barber in Veal Peus, Kampuchea Krom, and later resided in Russei Srok Village, Kampong Trach Sub-district, Kampong Trach District, Kampot. He was arrested by the Khmer Rouge on January 9, 1978 in Kampuchea Krom and sent to Tuol Sleng to relate his history.

According to Sam (37), who worked as a youth with the Khmer Rouge security guards in S-21, and currently resides in Kampong Chhnang Province, in 1977, there were both male and female prisoners of Kampuchea Krom and Vietnamese ethnicity at Tuol Sleng. Sam recalled a Kampuchea Krom woman who had asked him for a sarong. For giving her one, Sam was accused of flirting with the woman, and was punished by seven days without food. After 1979, only seven out of the nearly 20,000 prisoners who had entered Tuol Sleng remained alive.

Articles on this magazine, specifically in Document Section, e.g. “Cham minority at Tuol Sleng” published in the first issue, and “Security Guards” in the second issue, will be bound into a historical monograph of KR regime. Currently, the DC-Cam is conducting research on 19 topics relative to human rights violation against Cham minority, children, highlanders, women, Buddhist monks, memorials, etc. The Documentation Center of Cambodia would like to appeal for both voluntary spirit and cooperation for information and documents relevant to the KR which are considered significant for the history of the regime. There are a wide range of materials, including newspapers, notebooks, handwritten letters, telegrams, meeting minutes, reports, biographies, audio-tapes, films, photos, and so on. Please contact: Sorya Sim @ tel: 023 211 875 or by e-mail: dccam@bigpond.com.kh. Thank you.

Please send letters or articles to
Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam)
P.O. Box 1110, Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Tel: (855) 23-211-875
Fax: (855) 23-210-358
Email: dccam@bigpond.com.kh
Homepage: http://welcome.to/dccam
(A Khmer Rouge text describing the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) administrative and political geography, first published by the DK Ministry of Education for Elementary Class 2, 1977, pp.10-11)

The people of Kampuchea, including the majority Khmer and ethnic minorities living in bases and regions throughout the country, have lived and practiced their cultivation in Democratic Kampuchea since long time ago. Kampuchean people have lived in Kampuchean territory since the birth of Kampuchea. As of 1977, Democratic Kampuchea had a population of 7,700,000. All of them are genuine collective farmers and workers. Eighty percent of the total population are cooperative farmers, while the remainder are syndicate workers and male and female combatants of the revolutionary army, who are the sons and daughters of the farmers and workers, and have an obligation to protect and build the country in close cooperation with their parents who are workers and farmers. Our workers and farmers are living in harmony with a view toward great national solidarity, and are protecting Kampuchean society with a spirit of equality, genuine democracy, and non-discrimination. Joblessness is never a problem. People no longer flee their home towns, nor do densely populated areas any longer exist.

After the great triumph of April 17, 1975, the yearly population growth of Democratic Kampuchea has increased compared to that of previous regimes. This is a result of the gradual enhancement of people’s living conditions.

Capital City and State Organization

To provide an appropriate forum for our state in both domestic and overseas affairs, our revolutionary organization has maintained Phnom Penh as the capital city of Democratic Kampuchea. Thus, Phnom Penh is the place for meetings of all state organizations. These state organizations are:

1. The People’s Representative Assembly

The People’s Representative Assembly is composed of 250 members, elected once a year by the people of Kampuchea and the revolutionary army via a direct and secret vote. Of these 250, there shall be 150 representing the peasants; 50 representing the labourers and other working people; and 50 representing the revolutionary army. All parliamentarians are those who used to share happiness and grief and struggled together with workers, farmers, and the male and female combatants for the country’s defense and development, both in the previous era, and in the present day. The parliamentarians have a duty to make law, render legal decisions, carry out the implementation of the law, and define the political guidelines for Democratic Kampuchea. The parliament has a Standing Committee and other committees such as the Economic Committee, the National Defense Committee, the Committee of Foreign Affairs, the Cultural Committee, the Committee of Social Action, and the Committee of Health Care.

2. Judicial Committee

The Judicial Committee has been established with the supportive vote of the parliamentarians. It is a judicial organ of the people, which represents justice, defense the people’s rights, and the democratic freedom of the people. It condemns any acts against the people’s state, or against the rule of law of the workers, farmers, and our revolutionary army of Kampuchea.

3. The State’s Presidium

The State’s Presidium represents the state of Democratic Kampuchea in internal and external affairs, within the framework of the constitution, and in accordance with the rule of law and the political guidelines of the people’s representatives. The committee is headed by a president and a first and second deputy, elected by the parliamentarians.

4. The Government

The government is the executive organ for implementing the rules of law and political guidelines of the parliamentarians. Our Democratic Kampuchea’s government is elected by the parliamentarians. It consists of a first minister and his deputies, as well as the presidents of the several committees accredited to ministries and other state committees, including the Ministry of Economy, Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Social Action, Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of
Searching for the truth — Documentation

Culture and Education, Committee of Agriculture, Committee of Industry, Committee of Commerce, Committee of Communication, Committee of Electricity, and Committee of Rubber Plantations.

Cooperative and Syndicate

Democratic Kampuchea divides the state into a capital city, provinces, zones, regions, districts, sub-districts, and cooperatives. The capital city of Phnom Penh is home for all political organizations of our Democratic Kampuchea. Some provinces also have their own provincial towns. However, they are not serving the same purposes as they did in the previous regimes, that is, they are used only as workplaces of our syndicates’ workers. In addition, all places throughout the country serve as residences and work sites for our cooperatives’ farmers. Therefore, cooperatives and syndicates are the vital bases of Democratic Kampuchea, because our country is an agrarian country, where 80 percent of the people are farmers.

I. Cooperatives

Our cooperatives were established on May 20, 1973 in the sparkling revolutionary war. They have subsequently developed with the speed of many great leaps forward. At the outset, each cooperative had only 10 to 15, or perhaps 30 families. After the great triumph of April 17, 1975, our cooperatives gradually developed to a stage where they were converted into village-based cooperatives. At the beginning of 1977, the cooperatives became multi-village bases with less than 1,000 families, and sub-district bases with more than 1,000 families.

The cooperative is an organ of our peasant farmers. Collectively, farmers live, eat, study, entertain, work, and receive equal interest in the organization. Its nature is revolutionary, and is absolutely against and in favor of abolishing the oppressive, privatization regimes of feudalists and capitalists, and in favor of protecting, strengthening and extending a regime of equality of workers and farmers under the leadership of Kampuchea’s revolutionary Angkar. For example, the cooperatives centralize farming land, cattle, rakes, ploughs and seeds as its own for collective cultivation. Thus, no farmer lacks land, cattle or seeds, nor rents from nor works for other people who possess the agricultural factors mentioned above, as was done before. And no one can possess land, cattle, plough or rake for rent, to exploit the needs of, or impose hardship upon, poor farmers. Another example is that the cooperatives collectively share equal benefits and solidarity, regardless of differences in circumstances among people from different cooperatives. In addition, our cooperatives have abolished the consciousness of any kind of oppressed classes, and established the collectivity of revolutionary workers and farmers for the benefit of their members.

2. The cooperatives have a major role in the field of national defense. Obviously, just in a short period of time, the cooperatives have transformed the country into a place where irrigation systems, including lakes, canals, dams and dikes have been created. Many dikes have been built, and this has transformed Kampuchea into a fresh rice field in both rainy and dry seasons.

3. The cooperatives are a steel fortress for protecting the authority of the revolution as well as that of Democratic Kampuchea, because the cooperatives have smashed all kinds of enemies and their class oppression.

II. Syndicate

The syndicate is an organization of workers. Workers are those who work in factories, repair shops, transportation, ports, railroads, fisheries, and animal husbandry, to support industrial production and serve the people. These sections include salt farms, rubber plantations, etc....

The organizational criteria and role of workers and farmers are the same. However, worker syndicates play a more crucial role in building our industry. At the same time, the worker syndicates also have a duty to make cultivation for self-sufficiency and to alleviate the state’s burden in this area.

In the new revolutionary phase of building and defending, our worker syndicates in all sections are, with great haste, repairing old factories for which raw materials were formerly imported from foreign countries, in order to establish new agriculture-oriented factories for the people. Together, the cooperatives and syndicates are an alliance between workers and farmers under the leadership of the revolutionary organization of Kampuchea. Based upon this alliance, our Kampuchean revolution has strengthened and extended the collective regime, and abolished the standpoints of capitalism, feudalism and oppressed classes. Moreover, it has made great efforts to build and protect the country step-by-step with the great speed of many great leaps forward for the independence and self-reliance of the revolutionary organization.
My task in Kampong Chhnang Province at the end of December 1999 coincided with the time when the rainy season rice of Cambodian farmers is ripening in the fields, taking on the color of a golden carpet. This showed the proud work of the farmers. I met many people, who in the Khmer Rouge time were children in Kampong Chhnang Province, Region 31 and had been sent to work at S-21 (Tuol Sleng). They were divided into separate groups as follows: Arresting Group, Interrogation Group, Security Group, and Evidence Collecting Group. I would like to present an extract of my interview with Peou, 38, who is currently a farmer. Peou is one of the former young security guards, who worked at Tuol Sleng prison. He revealed his way of life as a security guard, which was similar to that of the prisoners at Tuol Sleng prison.

Before joining the revolution, Peou was a boy, who liked playing marbles, Kup Vong, and hide-and-seek games, in the way rural children do. In 1973, at the age of 13, Poeu served as a militiaman at sub-district, district, and regional levels under the command of an officer named Thoeun. In the end, Poeu and many children in Kampong Chhnang were collected and sent by jeep to Tuol Sleng prison, Phnom Penh.

Before serving as a security guard at Tuol Sleng prison, Peou was sent by the Khmer Rouge to Ta Khmao for military training, including techniques for using artillery, grenades, bayonets, and Karate conducted by Chinese instructors. Poeu still remembered a top instructor named Hou Vann Hoeng. Among hundreds of trainees, Peou was an outstanding candidate. As a result, he became a security guard at Tuol Sleng prison under the authority of comrades Hor and Duch.

Peou described what he could remember, especially the general aspect of Tuol Sleng prison. Tuol Sleng was a place with strict regulations and full of danger. The prison was enclosed by two sheets of corrugated iron, all covered with dense, electrified barb wire. There were five buildings. One was in the north, two in the middle and two on either side. Each building consisted of three floors, each full of prisoners. The top floor was used to hold prisoners who had committed
small offenses. There they were shackled to a long iron bar. The rooms on the ground floor were used for prisoners charged with serious offenses. In those rooms, there was nothing other than an excrement container that the prisoners could just reach. These prisoners were cuffed at the ankles and chained to the steel beds. Many categories of prisoners were held at Tuol Sleng, generally accused of espionage or other disloyalty to the Khmer Rouge revolution and doctrine. The prisoners were sent in from various places throughout the country, including from the staff of Tuol Sleng itself.

Peou worked as a security guard for three years, and related that in 1977, thousands of Eastern Zone people were sent to Tuol Sleng because Sao Phim, had been accused of being against the political guidelines of the revolutionary party of Democratic Kampuchea. All prisoners were interrogated by the interrogation group and the chief of the prison, known as Duch. Finally, every individual prisoner’s fate would be determined by the killer, Duch. Peou described the methods that the Khmer Rouge employed at Tuol Sleng to torment prisoners, including thrusting knives into the prisoners’ eyes, cutting and placing salt on the wound, thrusting knives into the prisoners’ chest and ripping them from one side to the other, with detergent poured into the wound to cause the prisoners to suffer yet more pain, and the use of electric shocks, among others. The Khmer Rouge inflicted these torments until they got confessions, after which they brought the victims to be killed, either by slitting their throats in the Tuol Sleng compound, or at the killing fields of Boeng Cheung Ek and Prey Sar. Peou said that anyone who was sent to Tuol Sleng would neither escape nor survive.

At Tuol Sleng, Peou’s duties were to guard prisoners, clean the victims’ cells, and prevent the prisoners from loosening their shackles. Peou looked upon the guards as warehouse keepers, because when the goods held in the warehouse were taken away, no one would know to where they were brought. Peou insisted that the guards had a duty to send out any prisoner (for example “Number 10”) pursuant to an acquisition form. They had no right to know where the prisoner they had delivered would be taken or to do anything about it.

Life in the prison was sheer agony. The surroundings were horrific, filled with tortures and executions. As previously noted, prisoners came not only from distant places, but also from among the workers at the prison itself, including security guards, interrogation groups, and others. Militiamen lived in fear of execution because the regulations in Office S-21 were very strict. Moreover, those deemed guilty of misconduct stood little chance of being pardoned. Those suspected of being involved in political trends, or with any target people, would be executed.

Hong and Moeun, Peou’s friends who left their village to work as guards with Peou, were arrested by Angkar and sent to Tuol Sleng and killed in 1978. Hong, who served as Unit Chief of Security Guards, was suspected of being an enemy “burrowing within the revolutionary rank,” because one prisoner in a cell guarded by Hong had committed suicide by hanging, and another by thrusting a plume into his blood vessel.

As for Moeun, while transporting vegetables to Ta Khmao, he flipped the delivery truck on a slippery road while crossing Boeng Tum Pun. As a result, Moeun met the same fate as Hong, and was killed. However, before being taken away for execution, Moeun sent a verbal message to Peou saying: “If you have a chance to go home, would you mind telling my mother that I will not survive.”

Peou believed that he would survive, because he had already been interrogated and imprisoned for one-and-a-half months, this for having been in the same network of Hong and Moeun, due to the fact that the three were from the same village. Peou said he had refused to despair and confess to the charge. Fortunately, he was released by a person named Phal, Chief of Interrogation Section, and sent to work in Division 502 until 1979.

Peou related that during his work at Tuol Sleng, he met Duch almost every day, because Duch always interrogated, and ordered security guards to kill any prisoners that were scheduled to be executed. Duch also ordered the guards to replace those prisoners taken away for execution. This meant that Duch had the right to decide who would be killed and which prisoners would replace those who had been taken away for execution. Peou described this situation with the phrase “the old ones would be thrown away, and the new ones would be picked up.”
Searching for the truth — Documentation

Kim Trang (Ieng Sary)

Comrade Van (Ieng Sary)

Brother Nº 3

Vorn Vet

KHMER

Ieng Sary
Khmer Rouge Telegrams
“Sent and Copied to Uncle Van”
By Youk Chhang

During the Khmer Rouge regime, telegrams were an effective and frequently used method of communication between the leadership and their subordinates. Hundreds of telegrams were sent daily from the bases and frontlines to the highest levels of the Democratic Kampuchea regime. A number of these telegrams were discovered in 1997. They include reports on rice farming, people’s “consciousness”, the arrest of suspected “enemies” of the regime, military and diplomatic affairs, border issues, incursions into Vietnam (and vice versa), border clashes with Thailand, the “sweeping” of “internal enemies”, and many other matters.

Most of the telegrams had been sent to “Office 870”, which was the office of Pol Pot, as well as other high-ranking cadres of the “Central Committee” of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, and its “Standing Committee”, and certain military commanders. In addition, these telegrams were frequently copied and sent to other sections for information and/or implementation. I would like to quote from certain of these telegrams on the following pages. These translations are provisional, pending final versions to be published at a future date.
Telegram 81
Dear Brother with respect, We would like to report on a number of things: 1. For situation of M.10 Kh at Spearhead 2 at Mountainous Point 1120, Operative Unit caught 6 people on 23 January at O Sa-ko close to O Ta Mou. They are Tompuon Roeng villagers who escaped in 1968. O Ta Mou is situated near O Kham Pha in our territory. People said [there are escapees] in the nearby Phav Village. Our Brothers are looking for the rest of them, though having not found any as yet. 2. For situation of evacuees from Lao, [we] have arranged for them to be sent through four villages of Sub-district. 3. Brother Tha Vorn has already gone back to D6. A total of 111 families comprise 636 people [evacuees from Lao]. When [we] checked [each of them], [we] took three grenades, ten Karabin bullets, five Laos learning books, and seven sets of radios. For the weapons and radios, Assignment Committee took them provisionally.[We] have provided them with clothes, plates, cooking pots and production tools, though more is needed. The people have not faced any problems as yet. They eat and live collectively with our base people. 4. Situation of people in Saop Village: as Comrade Kanin reported, D 5 have received all of them [Saop people]. The past political consciousness is as follows:

a. Good Points:
   ◆ Following Angkar’s organized work without having any problems.
   ◆ Enjoying Angkar’s plan to address [people’s] livelihood.

b. Bad Points:
   ◆ Not wanting Angkar to split one’s own force, and just wanting one’s own sole group to remain.
   ◆ Demanding to have meals three times a day.
   ◆ Eating privately.
   ◆ Wanting and asking to live near the border again.
   ◆ Demanding property be provided individually, and wanting not to live collectively.
   ◆ These are external complaints.
   ◆ For biographies of Saop villagers, important people’s names have already been extracted.

Wishing you happiness and success with most revolutionary respect,
But 29 December
Copied and sent to: Brother Pol, Brother Nuon, Brother Vann, Brother Vy, Brother Khieu, Brother Doeun, Documentation

Telegram 31
265 [Radio Band]
Dear beloved and missed Mo. 870 [Office 870]: On March 7, at Ang Seila, a place where a dispute occurred previously, Thai military police crossed into our territory and stepped on mines. Four got killed. Then, they had their planes flying over the border, strafing for half an hour on our territory. They fired over 20 heavy rounds into our territory. In the morning of March 6, a 130C aircraft flew in from O Chrao, about one kilometer north of the road. As it approached Nimith Village, it turned back. Our comrade brothers opened fire, though missed it. After the aircraft had gone, the Thai side telephoned us immediately, but our brothers did not answer the phone because we would not allow them to talk with [the Thais]. Thai enemies came in through southern Malai Mountain and three got killed stepping on landmines. We seized from them two guns—one AK rifle and one A79. [We] request that Comrade Khieu, if there are any cadres who would be able to help recommend on how to shoot planes, please send [us] one or two because our brothers always miss shooting at a plane, even if it comes quite far [into our territory].

With highest solidarity,
Nhim
9 March
Received on 10 March at 06:30
Copied and sent to: Uncle, Uncle Nuon, Brother Vann, Brother Vorn, Brother Khieu, Office, Documentation

Telegram 50
948 [Radio Band]
Searching for the truth — Documentation  
Number 2, February 2000

Dear beloved and missed Brother(s): 1. The situation on July 11 at 14:00 o’clock, the Region’s soldiers who were guarding Preah Vihear Temple took eight AKs and two B-40s with them and deserted to Thailand. On July 12, three commanders were ordered to report this to the region. When they arrived at the turning road to Choam Ksan, the person named Yoeun, one of the three who were delivering the report, shot the other two. One got killed and the other was injured. He [Yoeun] took the gun(s) and ran away. [We] assume that Yoeun is a partisan of the other ten who were mentioned above. And the people are the partisans of Yot and Yoeun who were reportedly crushed [killed] last month. CIA Santi Sampoan came from Thailand through that passage at Preah Vihear to recruit these people. This was the initial assumption of the Region’s chief. [We] will do research for more details. Among those eleven people, one is a party member. He took six copies of the Revolutionary Flag’s documents with him. He inserted two leaflets into a tree trunk. The essence of the leaflets was about criticizing the Communists for wiping out the culture, having people work nonstop, and giving them rice rations measured with a can. He called on our soldiers to crush the cadres and not to live with the communists that have no freedom, no rank and no salary any more. Regarding the enemy’s trick three days before they deserted, Yoeun, the betraying party member, created a movement in the Unit. He ordered [the people] to transport rice to the Temple [Preah Vihear Temple] incessantly. He encouraged the criticism. It looked like [they] worked very hard. After it burned, he turned back and said that, “we’re working nonstop and Angkar is still not recognizing that.” 2. The story of Phoeun: In the night of 14 July, when the Region Chief had gone to Phnom Penh and the people of the Commerce Unit were at the Tumnup Khvaing work site, Phoeun was at home threatening to rape five pregnant women, wives of the commerce unit’s soldiers. One of the soldiers arrived and saw Phoeun assaulting his wife. Then he ran to report it to our comrades in the commerce unit’s committee. They arrested and tied Phoeun. After he was tied, he pulled out a two or three-page letter from his pocket that he had written before the event. Our brothers took some of the remaining bits of the letter from the fire where it was burning to inspect it. [He] had written to say goodbye to his wife, “I am in the class that is oppressed. Even after I joined the revolution, there have been classes that are oppressing me. [I] have no freedom. Farewell my dear.” Since 17 April 1975, Phoeun has been overwhelmed with joys, doing things for no good reason, enjoying much freedom, and having no responsibility for his work. The collectivity in the branch of the Ministry Committee and I have constantly been correcting him. He did not eat with anyone. He told everyone to bring food to his home for him. He refused to ride a bicycle or motorcycle. He drove car only. He didn’t organize meetings that relate to work for his branch. And recently I have been to Phnom Penh to join a commercial meeting, again everybody there strongly criticized everything that relates to the above issues. Besides, in April 1976, when his family got injured from a car accident in Phnom Penh, he got angrier. When the people under him came to talk to him, he didn’t listen. According to the analysis of the Region’s Chief and the [people of] the commercial branch, Phoeun is incapable of observing the Socialist line—he is against it instead. He considered the party line, collectivity and Angkar as the oppressing classes that made him lose his freedom. Comments of Comrade Pha and the workers of the commerce unit indicate that if the soldiers hadn’t arrived on time when Phoeun was raping Pha’s wife, this story would be unknown. And when we returned from Phnom Penh, he would have done like Kou and the dead Brother Man, especially, he would have killed me. I met with him and questioned him for a while. [I] asked about the event. He said that because of his wife’s being so sick he could not have enough sex, and that he had also been drunk. [I] asked about his letter. He said he didn’t remember because he had gone mad already. [He] didn’t know what he had written. He said that at first, he had wanted to commit suicide. And then he thought he should rape somebody’s wife so that her husband would somehow kill him. We asked the women he raped and they said Phoeun threatened them that, “if they scream he will shoot them to death. If they tell anyone, he will shoot them. He also said he will give them a good future.” Everybody’s comments are the same as the region Chiefs, agreeing that Phoeun has no more revolutionary element [potential]. There is no way to change him back. He can only betray [us] further. Beside the personal point of view of betrayal of the socialist line mentioned above, the only issue is to search for traitors’ connections and their origin. At the same time [we] must organize a political conscience [indoctrinating] plan for people; his friends, minority peoples, and more importantly, Comrade Chhan, who has the freedom element and is narrow-minded toward the collectivity. [We] request some advice from the Party. 3. Roveang District has had a fair amount of rain. With warmest revolutionary respect,
July 18, 1976
Hang
Copied and sent to: Brother Nuon, Brother Khieu, Brother Vann, Office, Documentation

Telegram 78
Received on 26-1-76 at 13:00
To Brother Mo. 870 [Office 870] and Brother Vi with respect,
We would like to report about the result of the 24 January meeting with the Vietnamese [delegation]: 1. There were six in the delegation headed by Leu Yang, Deputy Chief of the Zone’s military [Vietnamese side]. He told us that his colleague named Phu was sick and could not come. But we noticed that they were supposed to have the chief of their Zone’s military head the delegation to meet us but changed from the head of the delegation to Deputy Chief of the Zone’s military because we changed from Cadre of the Regiment to Chief of Zone’s military. He [Leu Yang] is old and has very deep thoughts. 2. At the meeting, they let us introduce ourselves first. I gave a speech according to what Angkar had advised by emphasizing the situation in 010b. After I finished my speech, they strongly accused us, stressing that we violated their sovereignty moving many kilometers into their territory in 010a, 010b and 010c. They said they gave us a lot of concession by conceding to withdraw completely from 010a and instead gathering their forces to base in 010b. They said that in 010b, we moved very far into their territory, but in fact only 2 to 3 km from O’Sedthei. They said their forces could not tolerate any more. We suggested that we should take the map as the base for the discussion. But they strongly refused. They said the map is imperialistic. The imperialists drew it just for us to have conflicts. And the only matter they raised was for us to move out of 010b immediately. After a long, persevering argument, they agreed to look at the map. We showed our territory and their territory of 010b on the map. After they saw it, they cooled down their behavior by saying that there is a possibility of confusing the demarcation of the territory. They suggested that we should review our territory. They said that there is only a small possibility of a mistake because their heavy artillery division’s estimation is rarely mistaken. I also argued that our side is not mistaken because that place has been our support base since the time of political struggle. In the end [we] decided to send comrade Deng and one of their cadres to meet at the 010b in order to negotiate and closely examine the real situation. It was noted clearly in the agreement that either side camping at the wrong site had to withdraw immediately to its own territory. We suggested measuring from O Sedthei to the conflict borderline by taking the map as a base. They were quiet and agreed to this point. So, the representatives who were appointed from both sides went over to 010b this past January 25th. Their [representative] went their way and ours went our way. Meanwhile, a cease-fire was ordered at every front line. 3. The problems about the people: They acknowledged that our people escaped to their side. Those people are gathered in the old place Yalay and Dakkeu. We tried to ask them to return those people back, but we do not know whether they will return them or give us permission to bring them back. They disagreed and stated that our cadres should go to educate those people. They will give us permission to educate them. If the people agree to return, they will let them return. If the people refuse to return, they will let them stay. They said that they would report it to the Committee to make a final decision. We agreed at this point (illegible) about the problem of the people in Saob Village. They protested that those are Vietnamese people, and asked us to return those people back to them. If the people refuse to return, they asked our permission to go and educate those people by themselves. They said that after those people are given back and if Cambodia does not let them return to Saob Village, they will agree on that. They will find a place that does not have any involvement with Cambodia for those people to live. And if [we] give those people back, we have to be responsible for their damaged property. We decided to wait until we report it to the Chief of the Zone’s military. 4. The problem of Route 19: They protested that we are six kilometers inside their territory. They refused to do that. We argued back and forth, then we decided to stop the argument at that point and we will discuss that matter when we meet next time. 5. They disagreed upon the arrangement for people to go and look at the border marks on both sides. But we agreed to cooperate with each other to build guard paths along the border, and each side is not allowed to cross the other’s path. Also we decided to create a temporary border path according to the
guard stations along the border, and wait for the Center’s plans in order to avoid conflict with each other. 6. The argument was very difficult. They put a lot of pressure on us. But we managed to maintain our standpoint and we have much confidence because our reasons are superior to theirs, especially after we showed them our map. We were able to keep the atmosphere of solidarity. We believe that we achieved good success in this first step. We will send the final agreement of the meeting to Angkar. This final agreement does not satisfy us; but we think it is important to let it be as a first step, that is why we agreed on it. [We’d] like to ask for more advice from Angkar for clarification.

Notice:

♦ 010a is the target in Saob Village
♦ 010b is the target in O Vay
♦ 010c is the target in Route 19

Wishing brother happiness and success,

With respect,

But [reporter’s name]

Date: 26-1-76

Copied and sent to: Brother Pol, Brother Nuon, Brother Vann, Brother Vi, Brother Khieu, Brother Doeun,

Documentation

Received on 26 January 76 at 13:00

_________________________________

Telegram 79

Dear respected Brother: We would like to report on the decision by the meeting between the Vietnamese delegation from Military Zone 5 and Cambodian Northeast Military Zone on 24 January 1976. Please Angkar give correcting advice. The Vietnamese delegation from Military Zone 5 is composed of: 1. Li Yang, Deputy Commander of Headquarter of Military Zone 5, is Chairman of the delegation. 2. Hauk Vang Dap, Political Commissioner of Yalay Provincial Army and Kang Toum are Deputy Chairmen of the delegation. 3. Bin Van Dich, Deputy Commissioner of Yalay Border Defense Unity, is member. 4. Vann Dinh Yi, Deputy Commissioner of Yalay Border Defense Unity, is member. 5. Bou Thvy, Cadre of Military Zone 5, is member. 6. Nguyen Choeung Khang, Cadre of Military Zone 5, is member. 7. Nguyen Van Pha, Cadre of Military Zone 5, is member. 7. Nguyen Van Pha, Cadre of Military Zone 5, is member. 7. Nguyen Van Pha, Cadre of Military Zone 5, is member.

The Cambodian Northeast Military Zone is composed of: 1. Saom Yun, Deputy Commander of the Headquarter of Cambodian Northeast Military Zone, is Chairman of the delegation. 2. Heng Pheng, Deputy Chief of Logistics of Northeast Zone, is Deputy Chairman. 3. Chann Pum, Zone Logistics Member, is member. 4. Chea Sokg, Zone Logistics Member, is member. 5. Ouch Mam, Zone Logistics Cadre, is member. 6. Daot Som, Zone Logistics Member, is member. 7. Kao Em, Zone Military Cadre, is member. 8. Doeur Khean, Cadre of Zone Military Office, is member, liaison cadre and secretary.

After working for a long day in a spirit of solidarity, fraternity and sincerity, both delegations have come to an agreement on the following:

A. With regard to the spearheads west of O Sedthei, both delegations have agreed in principle and standpoint that they have no intention to invade each other, and that the confrontation was due to confusion about specific locations. The delegations on both sides have decided as follows: 1. Advise both sides to definitely avoid having actual armed clashes or to patrol outside one’s own positioned perimeter area. Also advise for repositioning of our respective forces immediately in their own places. If one side finds that its forces are on another’s territory, it must withdraw immediately. 2. Both delegations have agreed that each side will assign its cadres to go to have a real look at the location west of O Sedthei, the place mentioned above where the clashes occurred. The Cambodian side assigns Comrade Heng Pheng, while the Vietnamese side assigns Comrade Yi Khatt. Both assigned comrades are responsible to monitor their respective locations and consult with each other, and then reach a mutual agreement. If an agreement is reached, each of them must recommend it to their own Angkar so that it will abide by the agreement and make report to its zone army. If a compromise and agreement cannot be made, they must report it to their respective zone armies for resolution. These two cadres are guaranteed safety by [authoritative] forces of both sides residing there during period of their mission.
Place to contact is at the Rice Grange, and working period is from 27 to 30 January 1976. The above places, on which both sides have made an agreement, are temporary, and the agreement is valid when both sides’ Central Parties declare it in full force.

B. Both delegations agreed on the issue relating to their respective peoples that: 1. For the Cambodian people who escaped into Vietnamese territory, Vietnam’s side agrees to this to its Headquarters of Military Zone 5, and provides facilitation for Cambodian cadres to educate the people and take them back to Cambodia. If the people refuse to return, just leave them there temporarily. 2. For the Vietnamese people residing in Saop Village from which our border patrol forces evacuated them in order to solve the border problem, the Cambodian delegation has agreed in return that it will report the matter to its Zone Military Commander. As for the returning of the people, Cambodia’s side will reasonably take care of the people and their property.

C. As for the spearhead on the newly built stretch of Route 19: Both delegations see that even though both sides’ border guards have come up with different views, a clash has yet to occur. Therefore, leave the matter as it is temporarily, and solve it in later meetings.

D. A decision on the compromised and agreed area between and stretch alongside the border for both sides to patrol, and on the locations for both sides to defend their border, is temporarily made as follows: If a stream or a river is the space between both sides’ guarding bases, then take the stream or the river as a dividing space. If it is a hillock or a mountain, then take [the middle part that cuts it into two] as a dividing space. If it is a plain land, which is very difficult for us to identify, then both sides’ border defending offices must negotiate and make a compromise so as to allow for a fair space. Each defending office must take the stretch of route along the border on its side as its patrolling path. According to the above decision, both sides must not cross each other’s patrolling path. In case crossing is necessary, prior compromise and agreement is required between both defending offices. To prevent enemies from taking action when both sides are careless, the offices on both sides of the border must often be in touch, inform each other, help each other investigate, and cope with enemies that carry out destructive activities and cause insecurity at the border. A decision on the compromised and agreed patrolling path and location of border defending offices remains temporary until both sides’ Central Parties declare it full right when the armies from both zones request further discussion.

E. Contact between the Vietnamese Zone 5 Military and the Cambodian Northeast Zone Military: Take the newly built stretch of Route 19 as a place to contact. Cambodian side assigns Comrade Pum, and Vietnamese side assigns Comrade Yi. Both sides, when making contacts, must assign a messenger [of one’s own] with written permit approved by zone level. Signals to be used in making contacts by the two persons are specified according to each period of time. This decision is made in two languages, Vietnamese and Khmer, both of equal value. Each side keeps a copy of the version both in Vietnamese and Khmer languages. Made in Office 23, on the newly built stretch of Route 19, in Vietnamese territory, on January 24, 1976:

✦ [On behalf of] Chief of the Cambodian Delegation of Northeast Zone, Zone Military Deputy Chief Saom-Son.

Wishing you happiness and success,
With respect
But [reporter’s name]
7 January 1976
Copied and sent to: Pol, Nuon, Vann, Vy, Khieu, Doeun

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**Telegram 58**

141 [Radio Bands]

To respected and beloved Office 870: This telegram has been sent to Chinese Embassy in Phnom Penh. It reads: “To Chinese Embassy, Department of Economy: Via this urgent message, we would like to ask Comrade Choeng Khieang, who is attending a meeting in Phnom Penh to send us one more rake.”

With high solidarity.

May 7
Agricultural Section received on May 8, 1977 at 9:00 o’clock
Note: This telegram is from Brother Nhim.
Copied and sent to: Uncle, Uncle Nuon, Brother Vann, Brother Vorn, Brother Khieu, Documentation

**Telegram 44**
160 [Radio Band]
Dear beloved Brother(s), Our discussion with the Chinese who brought in four fishing boats: 1. Upon arriving in Cambodia, they will control the machinery [of the boats] again. Then, they will arrange their netting devices and make a test start. 2. They will hand them over to us the boats go well, though no exact date is set. 3. The Chinese team of port technicians who are supposed to control [the functioning of the boats] will allow their team members to return [to China]; they will leave their members to help us solve problems of which we are not sure. The four boats are all the same, but are different from the previous two [because each of them fishes separately]. Their usage is a major problem, machinery or other devices are, however, the same or similar, or only slightly different.

Good health
8 May
Launh
Received on 8 May 1977 at 18:10’
Copied and sent to: Uncle, Uncle Nuon, Brother Vann, Brother Vorn, Brother Khieu, Office, Documentation

**Telegram 36**
210 [Radio Band]
Dear beloved Brother(s) with respect, We would like to inform you in the following: Recently, in Vientiane, students from schools of higher education of the People’s Democratic Republic of Lao got together and went to ask Mr. Phoum Vong Vichit, Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Culture and Education with a number of questions as follows: 1. How will the government solve the problem of Russians wanting to control and reform our Laos culture? 2. How will the government settle the problem of students [Laos] who have finished their studies in Russia and are to return to Lao, but they not only are incompetent but also have become debauched? And what about us receiving no technical assistance from Russia, which promised to give us it for the development of our country? 3. They further asked when the Democratic Republic of Germany will provide us with more assistance for the rehabilitation of our country because it has been now more than one year since the date of the aid agreement [between the two countries]? 4. The Laos Armed Forces request that the government increase their salaries. Recently, enemies threw a grenade near Prek market, leaving two injured.

With warmest revolutionary friendship
8 May 1977
Dean
Received on 9 May 1977 at 10:00
Copied and sent to: Uncle, Uncle Nuon, Brother Vann, Brother Vorn, Brother Khieu, Office, Documentation

**Telegram 324**
1230 [Radio Band]
Respected and beloved Committee 870: We would like to report about certain situations as follows: The situation of the enemy along Thai-and-Laos borders: 1. Regarding the Thai border, the Thai enemy has shrunk smaller little by little due to the hit-and-run attack of “8”. Nowadays, the Thai enemy encouraged the In Tam troops to launch activities to disturb us along the border by organizing their troops into small groups to intrude into our territory in order to launch hit-and-run attacks and to spy on us as well. The contemptible traitors clashed with our troops patrolling the border, resulting in a weakening of the traitorous force because we have self-mastery and have an advantage over them due to our experience in making ambushes. They could not get into our territory as they did before. These traitors are based
along the Dangrek Mountains and we have plans to find their bases to crush them. Earlier, the In Tam group had took
traitors in Region 103, including Contemptible Hang, Chief, as their support. But later we arrested Contemptible Hang.
After we arrested Contemptible Hang and their other henchmen in Choam Khsan district and in the military force in
Region 103, the In Tam group lost their support. Therefore, they cannot enter into our territory as they did before. 2.
The [situation of] enemy on Lao side: It was quiet. There was nothing interesting along the La-poew River. However,
we forbade them to go off shore. Those people were very happy and had promised to us that they would report to us about
Youn [Vietnamese] in Laos, when Youn launched activities on our territory. Concerning the information in Laos, our
bodyguards have heard sound of shots from heavy and small weapons landing in the Lao territory. We asked Lao
fisherman on the La-Poeu river, who said that there were liberation troops named Kang Toap Kum Youn (Youn-Spiting
Troops) attacking Youn; that is why there were sounds of firing like this. And the Lao told us that the troops called Yuen-
Spiting Troops are Lao nationals that escaped from the Youn troops. 3. The situation of the enemy inside: There has
been no big change, just normal situation. We are continuing to wipe out the remaining elements. They were against our
revolutionary both openly and secretly. Because we have increasingly firm support from people, especially base people,
they are getting better at seeing clearly who are enemies and who are friends. In Region 103, we have commenced the
process of wiping out enemies burrowing inside our bodies; to do this, we have also depended on our people. We have
done so well that the enemy cannot raise their heads. This is because the people’s force is strong and this force has
constantly pressed them and wiped them out cleanly. We have gained victory over the enemies from the very beginning
up to now. Concerning clean wiping-out of the enemy in Region 103, people have been maximally happy with that. I
would like to confirm and report on a woman named Son, Comrade Man’s wife. The enemy has answered implicating
her very much. I have decided to remove her from staying in the Office of Zone 801 in order to prevent this woman
from continuing more traitorous activities. Regarding enemy bandits that Contemptible Hang had assigned to positions
in the Sa-ak forest linked to Varin district; we arrested and destroyed them gradually and we were in the process of
looking for them further. But up to now, it has been quiet. I do not know where they have fled. Those we had arrested
were purely high-ranking officials and they had run out of food. Regarding weapons that Contemptible Hang said he
hid by burying them in the ground, he lied. According to what Hang’s henchmen have confessed, there were 160
weapons. He gave 100 weapons to the bandits and he distributed 60 weapons to the work site B-31. We have confiscated
these 60 weapons, but we still lost 100 weapons, including 4 B-40 rocket launchers. 4. The situation of the people: The
level of political awareness, consciousness, and organization has been raised. We have trained and educated people. At
the same time, we have opened wide centralized democracy and criticism among the people and between people and
leading cadres. People have become increasingly clear and they have better seen the right path of the party, which has
prompted them to more vigorously farm than they did before. Therefore, the people’s force in 1978 has increasingly
ascertained and ensured the defense and construction of the nation; that is to say that they can fight the enemy and at
the same time they can do farming. And they will be our warm hope in the future. About the living conditions of the
people in all sectors, by basing on the people’s force, we have gradually solved problems. There have been no
unsolvable obstacles. The clothes that Angkar has supplied to people are appropriate enough. But the problem is that
we cannot sew clothes in a timely manner because many sewing machines lack thread winders, this because the enemy
has destroyed the thread winders. As for illness, illness has occurred in many cases at grass roots, and dam construction
sites because it has been very hot in this dry season. We have had less illness as it gets cool. We keep the dry season for
rest. 5. The situation of farming: Every district in the zone has determined and achieved plans to build dams completely
by April or May at the latest. This year the level of production is an even greater leap forward than last year. According
to our observations, the people’s stimulus to vigorously build dams is also at a greater leap forward level than two years
ago. If comparing the human force and the dams, we have seen that the speed is twice or three times as fast as in 1977.
This has shown that the force of people’s awareness has doubled and people are getting more and more convinced in
communal and party leadership. Besides, we have also wiped out cleanly the opposing gangs. As regards dry season
farming: Continue to harvest, rake, sow and transplant rice. The rice product in the upper regions is from 2 to 3 tons per
hectare, and in the lower regions, 3 or 4 to 5 tons, but in some places from 7 to 10 tons. Regarding the blue beans: We
are harvesting the product and also starting to transport the product for the state step by step and according to our
estimation, we have given to the state 3,000 sacks of rice.
Wish you happiness and victory.
April 10, 1978
Se
Received on April 11, 1978 at 13:00
Copied and sent to: Grand Uncle, Grand Uncle Nuon, Grand Uncle Vann, Grand Uncle, Vorn, Office, Documentation

Telegram 08
371 [Radio Band]
Respected Brother: 1. Regarding the situation of defending both the border and internal grassroots, there has been nothing serious at all. On the border, we are still driving the enemy out. When their spies came into these places again, we smashed some of them while some were able to escape. The internal traitors have been swept out cleanly and interrogated. 2. Heavy construction of water dams, expanding rice field and farming land but less production of various equipment such as silk weaver, boats, ox-carts, water mill, wind mill, fertilizer producing machines, and rice threshing machines. On the evenings of 12 through 19 of April, there was such a succession of rain that water holds in the dams, streams, canals, and wet the soil, and mountains in all places. We are vigorously cultivating. In terms of people’s living standards, the people have a given food ration as previously reported. Generally speaking, people’s living this year is not so hard as it was last year (1977) because we have potatoes and bananas and for immediate needs, people are cultivating based on the year-end rain and they have step by step harvested the rice from the fields. The illness rate has been low and shelters are in place as normal. 4. The building of forces has progressed and arrangements have been made in terms of the party leadership of the masses and core organizations. The masses have progressed and all military units and offices have been firm and happy. The difficulty is to constantly stay with them and advise them about making certain elements quiet. Some contemptible elements could express but have been isolated and cleaned. Pheak’s report was in the meeting on the 10th but because my own health was not well, I could not finish it till the 19th. I can now visit hospitals and receive medicine. I would like you to accept and be informed of this report in writing and I will report as you have advised. May Brother have happiness and victory?
April 21, 1978
[A handwritten note saying:] Received on April 21, 1978 at 15:15
Copied and sent to: Grand Uncle, Grand Uncle Nuon, Grand Uncle Vann, Grand Uncle, Vorn, Office, Documentation.

Ieng Sary, remarks at a reception in New York, September 6, 1975
February/March 1976

We would like to tell you about the Mayaguez. This problem actually should not have brought on a big bloodbath. I handled this affair with my own hands. With the spirit of revolutionary vigilance, our armed forces saw the ship Mayaguez come very close to an island, so our fighters had to capture it. From our information, the ship had come within six kilometers of the island. When the armed forces captured the Mayaguez we in Phnom Penh did not know about it until we heard about it on the American broadcasters, since American technology enables them to bring information faster than our armed forces. After learning about the Mayaguez, we got in touch with the armed forces at the island and we called upon their leaders to come to Phnom Penh and inform us about this affair. Around 2 p.m., they arrived in Phnom Penh. At 5 p.m. we sent them back with the order to release the Mayaguez immediately because we did not want to have any difficulties with the U.S. government. While we were ordering the release of the ship, the Americans bombed Koh Tang. They bombed Koh Tang so hard that they thought everyone there had been killed. But our armed forces remained there waiting for the American troops to come; when they did we attacked them. We regret this affair, this problem. The deaths were unnecessary. We gave orders at Sihanoukville to release all Americans and American crew, yet the Americans came and bombed us, and Sihanoukville and Ream harbor, causing a lot of casualties to innocent peasants.
THE DOCUMENTATION PROCESS AT THE DOCUMENTATION CENTER OF CAMBODIA

By Sokhym Em

Hundreds of thousands of documents regarding the Khmer Rouge history are being recorded by the Documentation Center of Cambodia, using the highest standards of archival documentation techniques. These records are being examined by the staff of the Documentation Center of Cambodia—an institution organized by Cambodians in co-operation with the Tuol Sleng Museum, the Ministry of Interior, the National Archives, and Cambodian provincial authorities throughout Cambodia, as well as foreign experts. The documentation process is elaborate and time-consuming. A brief description of the process follows:

Preparation of Documents

The staff first makes copies of the original documents received from various sources. We proceed with great care to avoid damaging the documents, most of which are between twenty and thirty years old. Following copying, the documents are sorted and categorized. For example, biography files, records relating to political and social issues, and confessions, are sorted by date and source from which they were obtained.

Enumeration

After categorization, every single document is given a six-character serial number. For example, D00001 represents the first document preserved at the Documentation Center. The number is written in red and placed at the top margin of the first page of each document.

Listing

After enumeration, we register documents by formatting a table with seven columns: 1) Serial Number; 2) Original Serial or Identification Number; 3) Date of Document Processing; 4) Sources (the place where the document was originally kept and the name of individual who provided it to the Center); 5) Title of the Document (In some cases the documents have no title, and we have to create one.); 6) Date of Receipt by DC-Cam; and, 7) Type of Document (book, monograph, audio tape, film...)

Cataloging

After the completion of categorization and registration, all information from the documents is extracted in full and copied into a worksheet ready for computer-based data entry process (WINISIS). We convert the information on worksheets into data entry formats holding a wide range of fields and sub-fields.

Information on the worksheet is then entered into various databases. For example, the bibliographic database includes mixed documents, except individual biographies or CBIO.

CBIO database includes biographies of those who were once Khmer Rouge members, ranging from the district committee level on up. Information on other individuals is also included in the data base, for example inmates, military chiefs, murderers, sexual abusers, or torturers. The database contains detailed accounts of these individuals, including their names, acts alleged to have been committed, and dates. The 45 sub-fields of data entry include names, sources, aliases, sex, "social status" in the Pol Pot time, date of birth, age, place of birth, place of death, parents, education, position or rank after 1979, supervisors, and known associates.

The Bibliographic Database contains a wide range of materials, consisting of such items as notebooks, or documents relating to political activities carried out in the Democratic Kampuchea, telegrams from Khmer Rouge cadre, prisoners’ confessions, meeting minutes of Khmer Rouge committees, Renakse records, as well as documents from other sources. The Bibliographic Database contains fifty fields covering all important information. The fields are as follows: Record ID, Country and Time Period of publication, Title, Edition, Bilingual Summary (Khmer and English), Physical Description, Note Content, Original Document Number, Area of Publication, Note Source and Note-ED.& Bibliographical History, Note-Copy in hand, Note Summary,n Translation, etc.

Data Entry

After cataloging, we input this information into WINISIS program. These database records are in two languages—Khmer and English. All of the aforementioned procedures are based on the database system used by UNESCO. Using this method, it becomes a simple matter to locate information on any particular individual.
THE RIGHT OF THE KHMER ROUGE TO DISPOSE OF CAMBODIANS

By Raoul Jennar
Translated from French into English by John D. Ciorciari

1. The International Protection of Dictatorships

In response to Kotsky, Lenin writes in 1916: "The peculiarity of imperialism is its...tendency to annex not only agrarian nations, but all sorts of nations."

Upon this claim, the communist leader will found the struggle against imperialism for the revindication of the people’s right to self-determination. Twenty-nine years later, that right will constitute one of the foundations of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Leninist conception of self-determination profoundly influenced its interpretation in the United Nations Charter. According to paragraph 2 of its first article, the U.N. has the goal "to develop friendly relations among nations, based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace." Paragraph 7 of article two reinforces the principle of non-intervention: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter."

In effect, across the crises that occurred—and decolonization clearly favored this perception—it appeared that the right of people to self-determination was really more a proclamation of the right of sovereign States to exist than a recognition of people’s right to self-determination as to the organization of their country and choices of their governments.

Certainly, the U.N. General Assembly has adopted, in the course of the past thirty years, a certain number of resolutions which tend to strengthen the principle of people’s right to self-determination. But while, on December 14, 1960, the General Assembly proclaimed that "All peoples shall have the right to self-determination, and pursuant to this right, shall..."
determine their legal status and freely pursue economic, social and cultural development,” on December 21, 1965, it adopted a “Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Internal Affairs of States and of the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty,” which tied self-determination to non-intervention. Thus, it is in States that the right to choose a political system is recognized. It is for States that the prohibition on intervention is made. Nothing has fundamentally changed. Non-intervention remains the basis for relations between States. Pierre Mertens, Professor of international law at the Free University of Brussels, underscores this point with realism: “The right of peoples to self-determination has never been anything but the privilege of princes to determine things for the people.” The Charter of the United Nations organizes an international protection of tyrants. According to the disciples of Lenin, Antonio Cassese notes that “in a sovereign nation, self-determination meant the right of the people to choose a socialist regime, the consequence being that self-determination is completely realized only in socialist countries.” That realization of rights was keeping all people “privileged” with such a regime from changing it. Witness Berlin in 1953, Budapest in 1956, Prague in 1968, Warsaw in 1981.

In Western democracies, one could observe an analogous perception of the concept of self-determination: changes in a country’s internal order in reaction to a particularly unjust system were always observed with mistrust, indeed with hostility. (Cuba, Nicaragua...) By contrast, for several decades, the overthrows by militaries of vested democratic governments were either frankly applauded or relegated to the rank of internal affairs exacting non-intervention (Spain in 1936, Greece in 1967, Chile in 1972, Thailand in 1991...)

Rare thus far have been peoples able to decide their own destiny freely. In the name of Marx or in the name of Wall Street, more seem condemned to servitude. The welcome and unexpected upheavals in central Europe and the U.S.S.R.-an incomplete process—cannot make us forget that over a quarter of humanity must still endure the rule of dictatorship over the proletariat and that over two other quarters are trapped in misery and extreme violence to which Westerners, and particularly the United States of America, are not unacquainted.

In order to fight against imperialism, the modern empires declared that intervention, reaching into sovereignty and interference in internal affairs were crimes of international law. That was necessary to prevent the real possibility of an international democratic order which neither settled nor came to the aid of those who, taking exception to imperialism from the right or from the left, had decided to enfranchise themselves.

One of the foundations of democracy—the primacy of law—has been perverted in order to justify the exclusion of millions of human beings from its
advantages. And this continues: isn’t it in the name of international law that regimes between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean are restored or supported, regimes that each day flout the most fundamental human rights?

2. International Non-Assistance to People in Danger

After the Jewish holocaust, though the United Nations exists, and has, by overwhelming majorities, adopted remarkable texts protecting human beings against the abuses of their fellow men, and though no one was unaware of the massacres in progress, it took a majority of governments to refuse to use the means by which pressure could be applied on a country and, of course, to refuse ultimately to intervene to stop the massacres and to stop a new genocide: the extermination of millions of Cambodians by the Khmer Rouge.

On December 11, 1946, the U.N. General Assembly declared that “repression of the crime of genocide is an affair of international interest.” On the same day, it confirmed the principles of international law recognized by the Statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal and by the holding of that Tribunal. Two years later, on December 9, 1948, this same Assembly adopted the text of the Convention for the Prevention and Repression of the Crime of Genocide.

One would think that so many solemn proclamations, ratified by such a large number of parliaments and governments, would protect humans against a repetition of the massacres which had provoked in 1945 the cry, however sincere: NEVER AGAIN!

It was nothing of the sort. In the name of the people’s right to self-determination, the international community permitted a new holocaust to repeat itself. In the same year as the men of Pol Pot seized power, the world knew. When a country has completely collapsed and has been transformed into a gigantic concentration camp, people will succeed in escaping and, in the course of weeks, witnesses will make themselves all the more numerous.

For example, on October 24 and 25, six months after the seizure of Phnom Penh by the Khmer Rouge, François Ponchaud, in the journal La Croix, already furnishes a complete description of what characterized the Cambodian holocaust: forced evacuation of villages, massacres of soldiers and civil servants from the previous regime, systematic executions, separation of children from their parents, complete collectivism, forced labor, famine.... He will confirm and complete this testimony again three months later. Nayan Chanda and William Shawcross, two of the foremost experts on Cambodia, do likewise in the months that follow. On November 30, 1976, the first book goes to press announcing to the world that in Cambodia “they do not reeducate, they do not demand self-criticism, they execute by firing squads.” One month later, Bernard Hamel furnishes dozens of witness accounts on the transformation of Cambodia into an immense extermination camp. Beginning in January of 1977, the book of Francois Ponchaud appears, “Cambodia Year Zero,” which, translated into several languages, will travel around the world. In the United States, Barron and Paul publish “Murder of a Gentle Land” in the same year. In the course of the two years that follow, one can no longer count the dozens of articles revealing the magnitude of the tragedy which struck the Cambodians. Finally, in April of 1978, in Oslo, an international audition of experts and witnesses furnishes overwhelming data. In June of 1978, one of the most attentive observers of Cambodian life, Jean Lacoutre, casts a pathetic appeal: “Survive, Cambodian people!” he writes in a small book.

Unfortunately, that appeal will not be heard. The worldwide public is informed, but it scarcely mobilizes. The large organizations that fight for human rights remain astonishingly mute and manifestly fear to question a communist regime born from a war of “national liberation.” Denunciation of the gulag is no longer in vogue. Governments know this as well. Nothing is astonishing about that, in view of the means of information at their disposal. Not only do they know, but some express themselves. In light of the quasi-negation of genocide that has been their dominant attitude since 1979, it is very interesting to recount the declarations of certain Western leaders and the
initiatives taken by certain governments concerning the violations of human rights in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979.

One must wait until 1978 before political authorities make themselves heard. In the course of its thirty-fourth session, between February 6 and March 10, 1978, the U.N. Commission for Human Rights, meeting in Geneva, discussed at length the violations of human rights in Democratic Kampuchea.

Lord Boston, in the name of Great Britain, declares “...The violations of human rights... certainly constitute the most flagrant and most shocking violations of human rights since the Second World War... To ignore these facts would progressively discredit the Commission, and perhaps even the United Nations in general, in the eyes of global public opinion. It was for that reason that the government of the United Kingdom had decided to bring the problems of the horrific data from Democratic Kampuchea before the Commission. They speak of systematic brutalities inflicted on the population at the whim of authorities. The top members of the Khmer Rouge decided upon the pursuit, by officials and military personnel, of a deliberate policy to track and assassinate, often in a brutal manner, a very large number of Cambodians, including the officials of the former regime, soldiers, policemen, government members, teachers, prostitutes, students and monks. In fact, religious leaders from all denominations were among the victims, and in many cases, it was pronounced that their family should die with them. According to the reported facts, the surviving population was reduced to conditions of servitude and slavery....”

In response, the representative from Democratic Kampuchea, Tim Hok, after very violently criticizing Great Britain, “known around the world for its tradition of imperialism, of colonialism, of neo-colonialism and of perfidy,” condemns “this shameful maneuver, which constitutes an intolerable interference in the internal affairs of my country, an independent, sovereign, neutral and non-aligned State.”

The magic formula, which washes governments from all responsibility, is thus brandished: intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign State. In the name of prevention of all forms of imperialism and neo-colonialism, the Khmer Rouge can massacre with impunity. Those who killed off the intellectuals were protected by the Charter of the United Nations.

On March 8, 1978, the Commission, at the initiative of Great Britain, supported by Austria and Sweden, decides to ask the U.N. Secretary-General to consult the authorities of Democratic Kampuchea and to charge the Subcommission with resuming its examination of the problem during the August session. A Special Rapporteur is designated and charged with conducting a thorough study of the matter of human rights violations in Democratic Kampuchea.

On April 21, 1976, the President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, casts an appeal to all nations to rise up publicly against the systematic violations of
human rights in Cambodia. “The United States cannot fail to condemn the Cambodian government, the worst present violator of human rights in the world” affirms the declaration of the American chief executive.

Four months later, the previous candidate for the presidency of the United States, the senator George McGovern, addresses a senate commission. Estimating that the regime in Phnom Penh was responsible for the deaths of two and a half million persons, he asks that “an international military intervention” be organized to “overthrow the Cambodian government” guilty of “genocide.”

These appeals will not bring about any concrete consequence. In August of 1978, the U.N. Subcommission for Human Rights will record witness accounts more and more numerous on the genocide in progress. Testimony so much stronger that it received the support of governments.

In fact, when it commenced its work, the Subcommission received nearly 995 pages of reports, testimony, declarations and motions from the American, Australian, British, Canadian and Norwegian governments, as well as Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists. The drama appeared in all of its magnitude: the violations of human rights in Cambodia have a massive and systematic character. The victims of the government of Democratic Kampuchea would exceed the two million presented by several governments. The report presented after this work by Mr. A. Boudhiba, President of the Subcommission, concludes at genocide.

3. Genocide Committed with Total Impunity

But what were these rare governments, worried about the dramatic fate of Cambodians, asking: requests to the Security Council whereby to stop unending massacres? Requests to the U.N. General Assembly, which had to convene a little bit afterward? The sending of an investigative commission? Concrete and immediate actions of a nature that would change the methods of the Phnom Penh government?

Obliged to respect of national sovereignty and the duty of non-intervention, on September 15, 1978, they simply ask that “the President, or member of the Subcommission that the President would decide to appoint, analyze this documentation in the name of the Subcommission, as well as the commentaries and observations of the Subcommission and the other pertinent documents...”

Here, therefore, is an assembly of experts vested with an international mandate to concern themselves with the protection of populations against all violations of human rights. The experts are thus very fully enlightened on massive violations with all of the characteristics of a genocide. Although nothing indicates that such practices have stopped, all that it takes to satisfy these experts is...an analysis.

What is a human life worth in the eyes of a U.N. procedure? What is a human life worth in comparison with the respect of States, even if such States ridicule the most fundamental rules of democracy and of the respect for human rights?

All of the testimony, all of the adoptions of relative positions toward the violations of human rights in Cambodia will be refuted by a telegram sent on September 16, 1978 from Phnom Penh and signed by Ieng Sary, the Minister of Foreign Affairs under Pol Pot:

“WE REJECT THE SUBCOMMISSION’S DECISION, WHICH CONSTITUTES IMPUDENT INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (...).”

There is interference. Thus, the rest matters little. A concept is stronger than facts. It erases millions of crimes. It annuls hundreds of witness accounts. It refuses to give an opinion on any indictment. Every condemnation is null and void. The debate is closed. One knows today that the testimonial accounts gathered between 1975 and 1979 on the atrocities of the Pol Pot followers were on this side of reality.

However, they were already sufficient in 1978, in addition to people seeing the events, to establish a justified parallel with the Nazi period. They were not, however, sufficient to push democracies to act. In Cambodia, where people knew that some had managed
to flee and tell of the horror, many awaited an international action. It didn’t come. It was necessary for the Cambodians to be delivered from barbarism from liberators who would soon become occupants. What choice did Western democracies leave to the Cambodians, who wished to liberate their country from Khmer Nazism?

4. For the International Organization of Liberty

The case of Cambodia is exemplary. International law constructed since 1945 around the United Nations has served to protect States and the regimes that hold power in them. It has not protected persons, human groups or peoples. Approximately seventy international covenants relating to human rights have been adopted to this day. When the Khmer Rouge took hold of Cambodia, about fifty of these legal instruments had already entered into force. Those remarkable texts proved to be perfectly useless for two to three million Cambodians, victims of a regime recognized by international law as the legitimate proprietor of the country and its inhabitants. That brutal affidavit poses a question that remains, in Cambodia as in other parts of the world, a cruel reality: what international protection to accord to populations? The system established by the United Nations ignores three obvious things: democratic principles are only applied in a minority of countries; the respect of the person as an individual and as a social group member is most often ignored; and even democracies can, in the international order, serve as the vehicles for barbarism. To those who would delude themselves of the recent progress of democracy, reading all of the last Amnesty International report will furnish a brutal return to reality.

Protecting States comes back to protecting an institutional framework inside of which everything is permissible. It is the consolidation of a fraction of the world and its populations without taking into consideration their free choice.

How to reconcile national sovereignty and free determination of populations since the guardians of that sovereignty do not arise or arise no more from the freely expressed popular will?

How to ensure the equality of States and to protect them against all forms of foreign intervention while keeping this protection from legitimizing crimes against humanity? The organization of the great global village is the victim of a Cesarean conception of communal life. The structure has the upper hand over the people. It is urgent—and the millions of victims of the Cambodian holocaust clamor for it with many others—to overthrow this hierarchy of values. Before the law of States must come the law of humanity. It is urgent to make human rights leave the field of jurisdiction of States. The fate of humanity is not an internal affair—it is not a matter of national jurisdiction. It is, in essence, an international matter—isn’t the Declaration of Human Rights “Universal”?—that cannot suffer multiple interpretations. Fundamental liberties are indivisible.

It is therefore urgent to organize international solidarity among free men and women.
Voices from S-21
Chapter One: Discovering S-21
By David Chandler

(Continued)

The effect of the desolation on the newcomers was phantasmagoric. Chey Saphon, for example, was a forty-seven-year-old Cambodian Communist who had fought against the French in the 1950s. He had lived in Vietnam since 1955 and had been trained as a journalist. On 7 January he was thrilled to be returning home with the Vietnamese troops. He was so unnerved by what he saw, however, that years later he recalled that he “spent the whole afternoon in tears.”

Over the next few days Vietnamese troops fanned out across Phnom Penh. On 8 January, in the southern sector of Tuol Svay Prey, two Vietnamese photo journalists who had accompanied the invasion were drawn toward a particular compound by the smell of decomposing bodies. The silent, malodorous site was surrounded by a corrugated tin fence topped with coils of barbed wire. Over the gate was a red placard inscribed in yellow with a Khmer slogan: “Fortify the spirit of the revolution! Be on your guard against the strategy and tactics of the enemy so as to defend the country, the people and the Party.” The place carried no other identification.

Pushing inside, the two photographs found themselves on the grounds of what appeared once to have been a high school. The spacious, dilapidated compound measured roughly four hundred meters from east to west and six hundred meters from north to south (see illustrations). It consisted of four whitewashed concrete buildings, each three stories high, with balcony corridors running along each upper story. A fifth, single-story wooden building, facing west, split the compound into identical grassy spaces. To the rear of each of these, one of the taller buildings faced east, toward the entrance. Similar buildings marked off the northern and southern boundaries of the compound. The purpose of the compound was unclear to the two men, although the single-story building, littered with papers and office equipment, had obviously been used for some sort of administration.

In rooms on the ground floor of the southernmost building, the two Vietnamese came across the corpses of several recently murdered men. Some of the bodies were chained to iron beds. The prisoners’ throats had been cut. The blood on the floors was still wet. Altogether the bodies of fourteen people were discovered in the compound, apparently killed only a couple of days before.

In large classrooms on the upper floors of the western buildings, the patrol found heaps of shackles, handcuffs, whips, and lengths of chain. Other rooms on the upper floors had been divided by clumsily bricked partitions into small cells where each prisoner’s foot had been manacled, as William Shawcross later wrote, “to a shackle large enough to take a ship’s anchor.” Ammunition boxes in some of the cells contained human feces. On the third floor were slightly larger, more elaborately constructed cells with wooden walls and doors.

The two intruders took photographs of all the rooms in the facility, adding photos of the corpses. They then “informed the Vietnamese authorities” of what they had found. That evening the corpses were burnt “as a sanitary measure.” Some of the photographs taken at that time now hang in the rooms where the bodies were found.

(Continued on page 49)
The Cambodian-American relationship was never an easy one. It always required delicate and astute diplomacy to keep it on a more or less friendly footing. Ever since the nation acquired independence from France in 1953-54, Sihanouk had pursued a determinedly neutral international course. At the height of the Cold War, the United States looked askance at those countries that were unwilling to align themselves with the West. Still, as historian H.W. Brands has demonstrated, American policy toward neutral countries could be remarkably nonideological - despite the overheated rhetoric emanating from high officials in Washington. Although Cambodia was not among the countries included in Brands’s study, the American approach to Cambodia during the 1950s and early 1960s was, in some respects, unusually flexible. Cambodian neutrality was, after all, preferable to Cambodia allied with North Vietnam or “Red” China. Some Americans considered maintaining Cambodia’s independence - even a neutral independence - absolutely vital to saving all of Southeast Asia. The country was the “hub of the wheel in Southeast Asia,” wrote one military official. And so through-out the 1950s the United States provided Cambodia with economic aid. The shining example was the Khmer-American Friendship Highway, which connected Phnom Penh with the newly built port of Kampong Som. Completed in 1959, this road allowed Cambodia to import goods without having to rely on the Mekong River route through Vietnam. Even today Cambodians remember the highway as an example of constructive American assistance.

The United States also muscled its way past the French and began to provide arms and other military supplies to Cambodia. By the early 1960s the United States was paying for 30 percent of the country’s military budget and providing most of its arms and supplies. Even more remarkable, the United States stationed a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Cambodia – the only professedly neutral country in the world where this was done.

But even as the United States provided economic and military aid, it increasing disliked-and challenged-Sihanouk’s foreign policy. A Central concern for Sihanouk (and most Cambodians) was a deep dislike of more powerful and populous neighbors- Thailand and Vietnam. Although these animosities were long standing and had little directly to do with the Cold War, the fact that Thailand and South Vietnam were Cold War allies of the United States made good relations between the United States and Cambodia difficult to maintain. Sihanouk was both suspicious of American intentions - believing that the United States supported and even encouraged Thai and Vietnamese incursions into his country – and jealous that the aid provided to his neighbors was considerably more than was provided to Cambodia. Particularly harmful to the relationship was Sihanouk’s belief – amounting to virtual certainty – that the United States (and in particular the Central Intelligence Agency) was supporting dissident Cambodians, the Khmer Sereii, led by a Cambodian patriot and former official San Ngoc Thanh, who operated from bases in Vietnam and Thailand. The prince’s perception was not entirely fanciful. Particularly after Sihanouk recognize the Peoples Republic of China and sought aid from Soviet bloc countries, the United States covertly supported South Vietnamese and Thai efforts to undermine his government. In 1959 the United States was implicated directly in the abortive Dap Chhuon plot against him. “The importance of this development in shaking Cambodian confidence in US motives cannot be overemphasized,” wrote one State Department official a few months after the event. Relations were so tense in 1959 that American officials in Phnom Penh dubbed it “a Year of Troubles.”

Thereafter the State Department determined that because Sihanouk was widely popular in Cambodia, that the army was loyal to him, and that he was suppressing Communists and other leftists at home, anti-Sihanouk actions were counter productive.
Between 1975 and 1979, the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) implemented what is frequently referred to as a “genocidal” regime. As a result, many observers may be unsatisfied if a criminal court or tribunal finds former CPK officials guilty of anything less than “genocide.” However, the legal definition of genocide, as it applies to events which occurred during the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) period, is somewhat narrower than the common meaning of the term. This article briefly explores the law of genocide and the principle of nullem crimen sine lege, attempting to elucidate some of the legal issues relevant to the prospective Khmer Rouge trials.

1. The Nullem Crimen Principle

Any legal discussion of genocide, as it relates to former leaders of the DK regime, requires an understanding of the doctrine known in international law as nullem crimen sine lege. Literally translated from Latin, the term means “no crime without law.” The nullem crimen principle holds that an individual may only be convicted of a crime that existed at the time of the act’s commission and thus prohibits the application of so-called ex post facto criminal laws. All of the world’s major legal systems adhere to the nullem crimen principle, which is universally accepted by legal scholars as an imperative safeguard for individual rights.

The nullem crimen principle is important for the Khmer Rouge prosecutions, because it means former CPK officials can only be found guilty of criminal offenses that existed during the DK period, when their atrocities were perpetrated. Therefore, the relevant legal scope and definition of genocide, and any other alleged crimes, must be drawn from the law which prevailed between the spring of 1975 and the winter of 1979.

2. The Definition of Genocide

Genocide emerged as a crime in the wake of the Second World War, introduced in the Charter for the Nuremberg Trials and crystallized in the Genocide Convention, which entered into force in 1951. The Convention has been ratified by well over 100 countries and obligates each signatory to prohibit, punish and prevent genocide within its jurisdiction. Cambodia has been a signatory to the Genocide Convention without reservation since its inception and was thus legally bound by its provisions as of 1975.

Although it is quite clear that international law bound Cambodia to punish perpetrators of genocide by 1975, the precise legal contours of the crime during the DK period remains subject to intense debate. Article II of the Genocide Convention set forth the narrow, “traditional” definition of the offense:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

The definition of genocide in Article II describes
its two major elements, which are the basic elements of every crime: actus reus (the required criminal act) and mens rea (the required criminal intent or mental state). To hold an individual criminally liable for genocide, both of these elements must be satisfied; the defendant must have committed one of the acts in (a) through (e) above, and he must have done so with the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” This latter element, the intent requirement, is the principal subject of the debate on how to define “genocide” in the prospective Khmer Rouge trials.

A. The Issue of Protected Groups

The definition of genocide in Article II of the Convention has generated intense debate in the context of the DK regime, because it arguably fails to protect the vast number of ethnic Khmer nationals who were slaughtered by the CPK. By requiring an intent to destroy all or part of a particular “national, ethnical, racial or religious group,” the Convention appears to have protected Chams, ethnic Vietnamese and other minority populations in Cambodia, while arguably leaving the majority Khmer population without legal recourse.

One can argue that the CPK policies demonstrated an intent to destroy ethnic Khmer people, Cambodian nationals and Buddhists “in part.” However, that argument rests upon a reading of Article II which may or may not convince the court or tribunal responsible for the CPK trials. To interpret the Convention, the court or tribunal will consider not only the ordinary meaning of the relevant passage, but also its preparatory work (often called the travaux préparatoires of the treaty). While some scholarly analyses suggest that nothing in the text or preparatory work of the Genocide Convention justifies an interpretation excluding majority groups from the law’s protection, a valid argument can also be made that the Convention was drafted with the protection of minorities in mind.

Some human rights advocates have argued that the definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention does not represent the law applicable in 1975, because a broader definition had become part of “customary international law.” Although custom is accepted as one of the authoritative “sources” of international law, customary law is very difficult to ascertain, because it does not exist in any definite, written form. Therefore, customary law cannot resolve the issue clearly, and in the upcoming Khmer Rouge trials, the responsible court or tribunal will have to make an important legal determination, based upon the opposing arguments of lawyers, regarding the scope of groups protected under the applicable definition of genocide.

B. The Issue of the Required Intent

Whether the court or tribunal finds that majority Khmer victims of the CPK are protected by the Genocide Convention or not, a second controversial legal issue hovers over the definition of genocide: the standard of required intent. Proving that former leaders of the CPK intended to “destroy” one of the protected groups “in whole or in part” is likely to be the most difficult component of a Khmer Rouge prosecution for genocide. The language makes it clear that indiscriminate acts, even if they disproportionately impact a protected group, are not enough. The defendants must have actually intended to destroy all or part of the protected group. What constitutes an “intent to destroy,” and what fraction of a group constitutes a “part” under the convention, remain unclear. Again, the responsible court or tribunal will hear the competing arguments of the defense lawyers and the prosecutors and arrive at an important legal conclusion.

3. Conclusion: Challenges to the Prosecution

Regardless of the specific legal conclusions drawn by the court or tribunal, genocide will be a difficult crime to prove for the prosecution. Although a great deal of evidence exists to show that the CPK engaged in widespread persecution and killing, producing evidence that the CPK intended to destroy all or part of certain protected groups is much more difficult.

The most obvious way to prove that a former CPK official had the requisite intent would be to provide documentary evidence, such as signed orders or decrees demonstrating his intent. Witness accounts of speeches or oral communications are among the other effective means to demonstrate intent. Circumstantial evidence of the atrocities committed by the CPK against protected groups, including mass burial pits and witness testimony of genocidal acts, is also valuable.

(Continued)
Crimes against humanity are prohibited by customary international law. Because there is no authoritative multilateral treaty on the subject, it is necessary to explore a variety of instruments, declarations, and institutions to extract the elements of this prohibition. These disparate sources of law have generated a rather patchwork definition. As a result, it remains difficult to determine the current and historical scope of this offense. Early formulations of crimes against humanity appear to link the offense to a condition of war; it is unclear whether that nexus is still required today. As noted earlier, crimes against humanity must be perpetrated on a mass scale or as part of a systematic policy. Finally, some definitions of the offense require that the crimes be perpetrated because of a characteristic of the victim.

a. The War Nexus

The London charter, which provided for the prosecution of Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg, first announced the concept of crimes against humanity. The term described offenses that did not constitute war crimes, because they were perpetrated against a State’s own citizens or against the citizens of an ally. Article 6(c) of the Charter defined crimes against humanity as: “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.” In this way, the Charter originally defined crimes against humanity in connection to the war and with other crimes over which the Nuremberg Tribunal had jurisdiction, i.e. war crimes or crimes against the peace.

The Allies prosecuted additional war criminals in their respective zones of occupation under Allied Control Council Law No. 10 (“CCL 10”), which professed to incorporate international law. CCL 10 adopted a similar definition of crimes against humanity, but dropped the war nexus requirement and the connection with war crimes or crime against the peace.
CCL 10 defined crimes against humanity as: “atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. “According to one domestic court convened under CCL 10, the war nexus was deliberately dropped in CCL 10 to empower the domestic tribunals to assume jurisdiction over German defendants who had perpetrated inhumane acts against German nationals prior to the commencement of the war.

In 1946, the United Nations endorsed the principles of international law encompassed within the IMT Charter, and asked the International Law Commission (“ILC”) to prepare a Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (“Drat Code”) that would unite elements of the Nuremberg Principles with other offenses suggested by Governments. It was originally envisioned that only those offenses that would violate international law and “affect international relations in such a way as to be dangerous to the maintenance of peace” would be included in this compendium. In an initial draft of the Principles, the ILC retained the war nexus requirement, but in 1954 it voted to drop this requirement and adopt the following definition of crimes against humanity: “inhumane acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportations or persecutions, committed against any civilian population on social, political, racial, religious or cultural grounds by the authorities of a state or by private individuals acting at the instigation or with the toleration of such authorities.” The United Nation’s 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity also imagined a more expansive definition of crimes against humanity: “whether committed in time of war or in time of peace as they are defined in the charter of the International Military Tribunal.

Most recently, the Statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal appears to resurrect the war nexus first articulated by the IMT Charter. Article 5 empowers the Yugoslav Tribunal to assert jurisdiction over the following acts “when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population: murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds, and other inhumane acts.” Meron argues that the black letter retention of the war nexus can be explained by the “drafters’ concern that some members of the Security Council would be opposed to the criminalization of peacetime human rights abuses.” However, comments by the Secretary-General, who emphasized that crimes against humanity are prohibited “regardless of whether they are committed in an armed conflict, international or internal in character,” suggest that this limitation is jurisdictional rather than definitional. This avowal is supported by the Rwanda Tribunal Statute, which does not include the link: “the ... Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systemic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: (a) murder ...”

b. Mass Scale or Systematicity of the offenses

Individual actions may rise to the level of crimes against humanity only if they are of a mass (i.e. the number of victims must be large) or systematic (i.e. there must be evidence of a policy or some degree of coordinated premeditation) nature. (Continued)
(Continued)

A document in translation presented as evidence to the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary Genocide Trial staged by the People’s Republic of Kampuchea in 1979 appears to list the standing Committee in April 1977 as including Pol (Pot), Nuon (Chea), (Sao) Pheum, Ta Mok, Von (Vet), Van (Ieng Sary), (Ruoh) Nheum and Khiev (Son Sen). A Vietnamese translation of what is said to be a notebook of a cadre who attended the Party Congress of November 1978, after the suicide of Sao Pheum and arrest of Ruoh Nheum earlier that year, includes the following entry:

2 November 1978
1.) The matter of assignments in the organization of the Centre and the standing Committee.
Pol: Secretary for general matters, responsible for Party and Military affairs.
Nuon: Deputy Secretary, responsible for education and propaganda, health, social welfare, culture and indoctrination.
Mok: Deputy Secretary, in charge of the rural base areas/ agriculture.
Van: Standing Committee, responsible for economics and planning.
Khiev: Party/ Staff, National Defense
Koe: Deputy Secretary, Logistics.

However, even as this standing Committee’s composition was being noted down, Von Vet and Koe (alias Kung Sophâl alias Pôv Sou alias Kân), who was also Deputy Secretary of the Northwest Zone, were being arrested.

Military Committee of the Central Committee

Another body that the statutes did not mention, but the existence of which is confirmed in other documents and corroborated in various testimonies, was the “Military Committee of the Central Committee”. According to an official commentary on the statutes, such a body could be established in the name of the Central Committee as a “separate department” under its “direct or indirect charge”. It was later publicly revealed that a Military Committee had existed since at least 1970, from which time it had been chaired by Pol Pot. According to Ieng Sary, from 1970 to 1975 its other members were Nuon Chea, Sao Pheum, Ta Mok and Son Sen.

After 1975, Sary said, the Committee’s formal composition remained unchanged, but in practice its work was mostly conducted by Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and Son Sen, with the assistance of Son Sen’s wife, Yun Yat alias At. Sary said of Sao Pheum and Ta Mok that although in name, “they were still there” in the Military Committee, “in concrete terms, it was is if they weren’t in it.”

The translated notebook entries from the November 1978 Party Congress place the “Party Centre Military Committee...under the leadership of the Centre’s Standing Committee” and describe it as “responsible for all military” matters. They give its members and their duties as:
Pol: Chairman
Nuon: Deputy, responsible for political matters
Mok: Deputy, responsible for military matters
Van: Committee member
Khiev: Committee member,... Chairman of the staff Council.

Constitutions, Statutes, Decisions

Various documents and testimonies link the Military Committee of the Central Committee to security policies and practices that by-passed formal structures and processes that were supposed to deal with alleged activities by ordinary people and Party members deemed to be “criminal” or “treasonous”. On the other hand, these materials leave unresolved key questions about the relationships in practice among the Central Committee, the standing Committee, the Military Committee and other more or less covert bodies.

The structures and processes they by-passed
were set forth in the Democratic Kampuchea Constitution that came into force on 5 January 1976 and in the Party Statutes that were promulgated that same month.

The Constitution provided for an unspecified “highest level of punitive sanction” for “opposition and wrecking activities of a systematic character that endanger the state”, while declaring that other “crimes” must be dealt with through “re-education and refashioning within the context of state or popular organs”. The Constitution had also promised that “courts constituted as people’s Courts belonging to the people” would “embody the people’s justice and defend the people’s rights and democratic freedoms” while “punishing all counter-revolutionary activities and activities opposing the people’s state.” According to an official announcement, in April 1976, the then Deputy Secretary of the Southwest Zone and future Secretary of the new North Zone, Kâng Chap alias Sx, was appointed to chair a Judiciary Committee to oversee the people’s court system. However, there is no evidence either that any People’s Courts were ever established or that this Committee ever functioned.

The Party Statutes had provided that any Party member or Party echelon that oppose the political line of the Party, the ideological stance of the Party, the organizational stance of the Party or the Party Statutes; that causes fissures in the Party’s internal solidarity and unity; that creates factions; that conducts activities to wreck the Party, the revolution or the people; that abandons their Party duties; that brings about a breach in secrecy endangering the Party, revolution or people; that causes a loss of Party funds or property; that behaves immorally or as a hooligan, or that does not engage in lifestyle meetings for three consecutive months, etc, is in violation of the Party’s organizational discipline and must be lightly or severely disciplined, as follows:

a. criticism-warning;
b. transfer of/removal from duties;
c. exclusion from the Party/various punitive sanctions in accordance with the crime, eg, whether systematic anti-Party activities or Party-betraying activities.

This Party discipline must be implemented through a conscientious assessment, analysis and judgement premised absolutely on the principle of collectivity, and in this collective context, it is in addition imperative to endeavour to involve multiple echelons in accordance with the importance of the particular problem.

A set of 30 March 1976 “Decisions of the Central Committee on a Number or Problems” contained some clarification of what the Constitution meant by the “highest level of punitive sanctions” and what the severest form of Party discipline would mean, but ignored constitutional promised about “people’s courts” while whittling down the Party Statutes’ insistence on conscientiousness and collectivism and on multi-level consultation. One of the decisions explained that in order “that there should be parameters within which the work of implementing... revolutionary dictatorship is carried out”, and that “socialist democracy should be strengthened”, the “the right to decide on smashing within and outside the ranks” of the Party should be exercised as follows:

- In the grassroots context, the zone standing Committee decides.
- For the offices attached to the
Centre, the Committees of the Offices of the Centre decide.

♦ In independent Sectors, the Standing Committee decides.

♦ In the Army of the Centre, the General Staff decides.

It said nothing about how decisions affecting members of the Central Committee, much less the Standing committee, would be arrived at.

**Sâ-21 (Tuol Sleng)**

Similarly, neither the Constitution, nor the Party Statutes nor the Central Committee decisions mandated any police or security forces to deal with opposition activities or other possible forms of wrongdoing by ordinary people or Party members. This internal silence underpinned the formal public position of denying the existence of such forces. Thus, Pol Pot and other senior CPK officials would insist when asked by non-Communist foreign visitors that neither a “security organ” nor prisons existed in DK, and asserted that political killings were extremely limited or were simply not occurring. Although they admitted that some senior leaders of the old regime had been executed, the official position was that “civil servants, officers and soldiers...had, like other urban dwellers, been dispersed into peasant cooperatives,” where there were only “worksites for the re-education of dangerous and hardened repeat offenders”. Leading cadre of the DK Foreign Ministry echoed this position when they told visiting foreign Communists that the “thousands” of spies and agents who had supposedly established counter-revolutionary networks in Phnom Penh in hopes of sabotaging the revolution from within after the CPK victory had been dispersed by the general evacuation of the capital. It was stressed that these would-be counter-revolutionaries had been given a chance to mend their ways in the countryside, albeit under the close supervision of the peasants.

In fact, of course, the secret security (Sântesok) services, which both ran prisons and conducted executions, existed at the central level as the “Special Branch” (Sântebal) Office Sâ-21 and were replicated under local CPK control in the zones and sectors into which the Party divided the country and in the pre-Communist districts that continued as administrative units. At the most basic “grassroots” (Mulathan) level, they were reproduced by the chairmen of cooperatives and village administrative committees through the deployment of militia (or “guerillas”) known as Chhlop, who indeed were supposed to be assisted in their work by “the people”.

Sâ-21 was evidently first designated as such around October 1975 and became fully established at the former schoolground location dubbed Tuol Sleng in southern Phnom Penh by around May-June 1976. The Sâ-21 archives and other documents held at DC-Cam reveal that for purposes of indoctrination and administration, Sâ-21 was treated as the equivalent of one the armed forces divisions or independent regiments constituting the “mainforce army belonging to the Centre” mentioned in the Party Statutes, and that as such it was subordinated to General Staff of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea. Sâ-21 was thus under the oversight of Son Sen in his on-going capacity as Chairman of the General staff, and in line with responsibilities assigned to him at the October 1975 Standing Committee meeting that put him in charge of security. (Continued)
POINT OF VIEWS ON KHMER ROUGE TRIAL

By Doug Mastroianni

So far much of the drama of a Cambodian war crimes tribunal has been played out at the United Nations and in Washington D.C. The debate that has raged for months now has not focused on who was responsible for the tragic events of Pol Pot period, but on the seemingly prosaic issues of where the tribunal will be located and what countries the judges and prosecutors will come from. These are political questions that have mostly occupies the time and energy of politicians. Soon though, hopefully, and actual trial will commence and the would and, more importantly, the Cambodian people will hear and see evidence of what happened—what happened to their families, to themselves, to a beautiful and tragic country.

The mark that will be left on the trial by the politicians and diplomats will, of course, be indelible. A trial in the distant Hague under the sponsorship of the United Nations without attendance of ordinary Cambodians would be a vastly different experience for Cambodia than one in Phnom Penh. A trial conducted solely by foreign prosecutors and judges would also be a vastly different experience—one that would ironically reflect a paternalistic attitude toward Cambodia that arguably contributed to the rise of the Khmer Rouge in the first place.

Despite the political and diplomatic machinations that will eventually culminate in the trial, neither Koffi Anan nor Hun Sen will be in the courtroom sitting as judges or standing before the court as counsel for the prosecution or defense. When the trial begins the politicians and diplomats will hopefully recede into the background and the concrete questions of who did what and when, and what punishment will be meted out, if any, will occupy the Tribunal and the world.

What will be these concrete factual and legal questions taken up by Tribunal? One of the most interesting issues raised about the conduct of the trial itself in these months of pre-trial debate over the Tribunal’s composition, is whether the West’s support of the Khmer Rouge will be part of the defense presented at trial. It has been reported that Mr. Benson Samay, Ta Mok’s counsel, has declared that he will subpoena former world leaders like Margaret Thatcher and Henry Kissinger to testify about the role of the West in the rise and support of the Khmer Rouge. There have also been reports in the press that the PM has received advice from former American Attorney General Ramsey Clark who has suggested that the United States itself committed war crimes by secretly combing Cambodia.

Many historians believe that Western powers did indeed contribute, perhaps unwittingly, to the rise of the Khmer Rouge. Would the Khmer Rouge have taken control of Cambodia without years of French colony rule that neglected the civic education of the Cambodian people? Would the Khmer Rouge have risen to power without America’s carpet bombing of the Cambodian people and America’s abandonment of the Lon Nol government? An international public forum on these questions would provide an education to the West on its complicity in the rise of the Khmer Rouge and its destruction of Cambodian society. The trial could be a “crash-course” in Cambodian politics sorely needed in the West—especially by the United States which turns away from this shameful period of its history. One the other hand, does Cambodia want to see the trial hijacked by critics of American foreign policy who would divert the attention of the proceedings away from what is an essentially Cambodia tragedy?

But putting aside the political question, as a matter of trial procedure, are we likely to see former Western leaders in Phnom Penh testifying about their governments’ former policies in Southeast Asia? Probably not. First, the Tribunal cannot compel foreign nationals living abroad to testify. Just as a
Searching for the truth — Public Debate

Number 2, February 2000

British Court cannot compel testimony from Hun Sen, a Cambodian court cannot compel Margaret Thatcher or Henry Kissinger’s appearance. Without the testimony of world leaders who fashioned the Western powers’ policies toward Cambodia, evidence of those policies may be inadmissible. Second, the Judges will have the authority to decide which claims and defenses are supported by the law and exclude evidence of claims and defenses that are legally invalid. The Tribunal could take the view that the ultimate geopolitical causes of the rise of the Khmer Rouge are irrelevant to what the Khmer Rouge did once they took power. Certainly, the world needs to be educated about the West’s rule in the rise and support of the Khmer Rouge. However, the Tribunal may rule that Western policies—no matter how misguided—are not a legally valid defense to what the Khmer Rouge did. At best, those policies supply the basis for further indictments against other defendants, but do nothing to exonerate the Khmer Rouge.

This question is important because it illustrates the tension that exists in every advanced legal system between the awesome powers given to the state to indict, arrest, prosecute, and imprison alleged criminals, and the right of every accused person to a full and vigorous defense. The rights of the accused protect all citizens both the guilty and the innocent from arbitrary and overzealous prosecutors. How the Tribunal resolves this tension and decides what defenses will be permitted will be the subject of one of the first rulings from a Cambodian court to receive the full attention of the world. The decision of the Tribunal, should be up to the judges themselves exercising their best judgement in light of common sense, logic, and precedent—and without political interference from home or abroad.

KHIEU SAMPHAN’S THEORIES
(As Recorded in a Notebook of a Khmer Rouge Cadre)

1. The chaff, though colorful and beautiful, can never be used to make flour.
2. In the morning, birds usually fly to the farms, never do the farms fly to the birds.
3. Friends are not like knees, which can be bent back and forth as one wants.
4. Love is like an unbridled beast.
5. Better to befriend the wise than the ignorant.
6. Loving a girl without her knowing is like beating a small tree with a stick to get the dew down from it.
7. Keeping company with the ignorant, like a man with his fingers wounded, will make the wound swollen, bleeding and rotten.
8. If you want to walk fast, you must not go to meet wild lizards along the way.
9. Better to go alone than with the rogue.
10. Someone who sits on a place without choosing the [right] place to sit will stand up with hay and rubbish on his trousers.
11. A Woman, if nobody advises her, will have a husband who is a dancer.
12. A Woman is the cold water that can make a man die or the water deep enough to make a man drown.
13. We must not give up the work that has been tested.
14. A Wife is a house and husband is the one who furnishes it with wealth.
15. To be a householder, you have to have your ears deaf and your eyes blind, otherwise the family will be a ruin in the future.
16. Solitude is better than the company of rogues.
17. Houses built close to one another are not good, but hearts close to one another are.
18. If the question is silver, the answer will be golden.
19. One will eat more fruit after the buds grow.
20. The dog that is carried on the shoulder cannot catch deer.
21. A kingdom is like a wife or gun that can never be lent.
22. The clay can be molded while it is soft.
23. Even though the foxes preach day and night, the young goats will never trust them.
24. Anyone who has not crossed the river must not look down on someone who drowned in the river.
25. Better to be hated than scorned by ants.
26. Cloths can cover a man’s body but not his heredity.
It is very important, and can come as a shock to discover information regarding one’s lost, beloved relatives. Millions of people perished in the “Killing Fields” of Democratic Kampuchea between 1975-1979. It is now hoped that true justice will be found for these victims, one of whom was Chan Nhoung, known as Nuon. In a hoarse voice full of terror and despair, we hear Chan Nhoung on the audio-tape left behind by the Khmer Rouge in their hasty retreat from Phnom Penh. It is an appeal to all of us to continue our search for justice for Nuon and all the victims. Nuon’s audiotaped “confession” inspired the research team of the Documentation Center of Cambodia to search for members of his family at the place he identified as his home.

Nuon was a Deputy secretary of Battalion 331, Regiment 33 of Division 703 in Democratic Kampuchea. After being accused of “treachery”, he was made to become another person—a pitiful victim among the many thousands of victims who were held at Tuol Sleng Prison, or Office S-21, now known to the public as a center of torture where the Khmer Rouge leadership sought to extract detailed “confessions” from the inmates. Although the regime had a paper constitution proclaiming the existence of a judiciary, no legal process ever intervened in the workings of S-21. Chan Nhoung was forced to confess three times over a period of months. His confessions are preserved on the audio-tape, recorded on November 11, 1977, and in two handwritten confessions dated January 20 and February 16, 1978.

Chan Nhoung was born in Koh Thom Subdistrict, Koh Thom District of Kandal. The day before our arrival, Chan Nhoung’s niece, Tha, had had a vivid dream of her Uncle Nhoung. In the dream, she saw her uncle visiting her family. Witnessing such an unexpected occurrence, Srei remarked with surprise, “Mom, uncle Nhoung is bringing money for you. He said he really missed you, and in the meantime, he brought some money for you. Nhoung said he was still alive and living happily in a foreign country.” Is it believable that someone dead for over twenty years can cause another person to dream of him, claiming his survival? To this writer, personally, “good deeds are praised”. Yes. On the morning after the dream, I arrived...
Searching for the truth — Family Tracing

at Tha’s homestead and asked people around for a person named Nhoung. This question caused quite an uproar, with some people shouting and others rushing to my side with expressions of astonishment, eagerly questioning me about Nuon. An elderly woman, Soeun, Tha’s mother, pointed to Tha and exclaimed, “This woman has just narrated this morning about him, and now you come. Is it true that Nhoung is still alive?”

Chan Nhoung was a pitiful boy whose parents bereaved when he was a child of less than ten. Nuon’s aunt, an elderly woman named Bo, brought Chan Nhoung up to help with the housework. Bo has been dead for over seven years now. When he was young, Nuon and his aunt Bo often picked tamarind fruit to sell. In November, 1973, at the age of about seventeen, Nuon left Bo’s family to join the Khmer Rouge army in a Special Zone Military Unit, after having received political and military training at Wat Trabek for a period of one month. After that, Nuon never again visited his home. Chanthy, a beloved niece of Nuon who was the last to see him, recounted: “...He cried and said with despair that he had no choice because it was the end of his life. ‘Please look for the future’, he added.” Chanthy met with Nuon during his hospitalization at Po Ban Hospital, Koh Thom Sub-district, Koh Thom District, Kandal Province. Chanthy’s statements concur with Nuon’s forced confession of February 16, 1978, where he asserts that he was hospitalized at Po Ban Hospital in 1975, and that the Hospital was under the authority of Military Division 12, and supervised by one, “Kong”. Through tears, Chanthy recalled, “The place I still remember is Po Ban Hospital, where Nhoung, in a condition of physical deterioration, said that he would never again have the chance to meet me, and therefore asked me to have a final look at his face.”

Chanty had a chance to meet Nuon again when we brought to her the audio-tape, photographs, and “confession” documents. Although Chanty had not seen Nuon for over twenty years, when confronted with these things, her tears flowed. “Honestly” she said, “my heart is boiling. But I don’t know what to do. Everything is gone. However, I feel a relief. Her mother Srouen was also filled with emotion. ‘Thank you very much for your helpfulness in searching us out. Although he is dead, to hear his voice is precious to us. Without you, we would never have learned his fate.’” Tes Leang, one of Nuon’s relatives, gave his impression: “I myself also want justice and truth. I want to live in a land with justice.”

This interview with Cham Nhoung’s family took place in Kbal Koh Thom Village, Koh Thom Sub-district on January 22 and 26, 2000. With great sympathy, we gave Chan Nhoung’s family a small contribution so that they could hold a Buddhist traditional ceremony and pray for the soul of Chan Nhoung. The celebration was held on Sunday, January 30, 2000. May the soul of Chan Nhoung rest in peace. Our special thanks also go to Chor, Ouch Mut, Tes Leang, Him Sroeun, Tha, Chan Thy and all villagers in Kbal Koh Thom Village, Kbal Koh Thom Sub-district, Koh Thom District, Kandal Province.

SEARCHING FOR UNCLE

My name is Kim Peou Sotan, female. I lost my uncle named Rak Hong, 55 up to now. He was born in Ta Nup Village, Bati Sub-district, Ta Keo Province. Before the Khmer Rouge time (1975), he was a law student. In 1975, the Khmer Rouge evacuated my uncle and my mother to Bakan District, Pursat Province. My uncle worked in a cooperative of Chheu Puk for 2-3 months. My mother told me that he was taken by the Khmer Rouge for he was a rice seller in previous regimes. In 1978, the Khmer Rouge Angkar assigned him to cut tree seedlings. Since then he has never returned.

Please help search my uncle. My mother has been waiting for her younger brother for quite a long time.

I can be reached at: (012) 837 544

Thanks,
Sotan
During my second year at Phnom Penh University, I worked as a volunteer at the Documentation Center of Cambodia, later becoming a part-time staff member there. Through this work, I learned a great deal about the truth of this terrible period. Once I asked a researcher who was making a catalogue of confession documents whether I might find any clue about my missing uncle through the documents. I partly regretted having asked, because if the documents revealed that he had been killed by the regime, what would the news do to my aunt? While she herself knows that it is unlikely that her husband survived the regime, I can see that every time she is told that her husband might still be alive, there are two things fighting against each other in her mind. One is the extremely small chance that those Khmer Rouge monsters left her beloved husband alive. The other is the love for her husband that still has a place in her heart, and gives her hope that he is still alive. It is not easy to understand how Cambodian widows like my aunt must feel. Not only her husband’s life, but their entire world together was taken away. The year 1979 was a starting point of a new life, but unlike the new-born baby starting life surrounded by a loving and caring family, every Cambodian was born a second time into sorrow, with the loss of beloved people that left a big hole in their hearts. Many women came back as widows, left alone to bear the responsibilities of bringing up children.

I found the document written by him, my aunt’s husband. It is an 89-page confession that was written between December 13, 1978 and December 20, 1978. On the front page of the document there is a message addressed to the so-called “Angkar”, probably written by the Khmer Rouge cadre who was in charge of verifying the confession. At the end of the message there appears the signature of “Von”, who was an interrogator at Toul Sleng prison. According to the documents at DC-CAM, this person was responsible for interrogating the prisoners of Pourk Ti 3 of Krom Kdao (“Team 3” of “Hot Group”).

The confession reminded me of the Toul Sleng brochure that shows how the prisoners were tortured until they said what Angkar wanted to hear. This memory shook my heart, to think of how the confession I was holding came to exist. It took me a long time to finish reading the confession. It was written by the uncle that I never met an in-law that the family is so proud to have as a part of us. I always wanted to meet him, but I never thought that I would. Finally, I met his “confession”, talking...
indirectly and unknowingly. The terrifying picture that I saw in the brochure kept coming into my mind as I was reading the confession. I then thought of the feelings of my aunt. The picture would be clearer and more horrible in her memory because she suffered under that regime herself. Her young and innocent daughter was also killed by the Khmer Rouge regime, simply because the child wore glasses and was therefore accused of being intellectual. It is a very painful memory that my aunt has had to bear ever since.

Now it is time for justice. It is time to prove that Cambodians and the world value Cambodian lives as highly as the lives of others in other nations around the globe.

Even though the Khmer Rouge nightmare happened twenty years ago, the memories are still fresh in our hearts. My uncle’s innocent soul is still wandering, asking for justice.

(Continued from page 35)

Over the next few days the Vietnamese and their Cambodian assistants discovered in nearby houses thousands of documents in Khmer, thousands of mug-shot photographs and undeveloped negatives, hundreds of cadre notebooks, and stacks of DK publications. In a workshop near the front gate they found several recently completed, oversized concrete busts of the DK prime minister, Pol Pot, a concrete mold for the statues, and some portraits of him, apparently painted from photographs.

The Vietnamese had stumbled into a vicious and important Khmer Rouge facility. Documents found at the site soon revealed that it had been designated in the DK era by the code name S-21. The “S,” it seemed, stood for sala, or “hall,” while “21” was the code number assigned to santebal, a Khmer compound term that combined the words santisuk (security) and nokorbal (police). “S-21,” and santebal, were names for DK’s security police, or special branch.

Over the next few weeks the history of the site was pieced together. In the early 1960s, when Cambodia had been ruled by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, it had been a high school. It was named after Ponhea Yat, a semilegendary Cambodian king associated with the foundation of Phnom Penh. After Sihanouk was overthrown in 1970 - the event that sparked Cambodia’s civil war - the school had taken the name of the surrounding district, Tuol Svay Prey (hillock of the wild mango). An adjoining primary school was called Tuol Sleng (hillock of the sleng tree). This name was used to designate the entire compound after it became the Museum of Genocidal Crimes in 1980, perhaps because the sleng tree bears poisonous fruit.
COOPERATIVE FARMERS ARE HAPPY TO HARVEST

Compiled by Sayana Ser

The transplanted rice seedlings have been pollinated and have ripened. The clusters are so heavy that the rice plants bend. The sounds of rice cutting sharpen. Women have been harvesting for nearly a month.

The cool wind from the northeast makes the tips of fingers numb. Next to the threshing terrace, there are many baskets. People collect the rice crops and carry rice bundles. The winnowing groups are bathed in sweat.

The harvested rice is pilled high like mountains. Uncles are working hard at bagging the rice to have it to the granaries by noon.

Twined dikes are waiting for the plowshare’s craftsmanship. The harvest should not be finished so fast. We must gather together the craftsmen’s support, then finish the harvest later.

Our rice fields are a carpet of color and so shiny that grand parents, aunts and uncles marvel that this year’s crop will be even better than last.

Uncles come down from the craftsmanship hall. As the morning comes, they cheerfully lead the many carts to the rice fields. Some people forego horses and walk toward the rice fields.

Aunts are anxious to harvest, no matter whether the rice plants are high or low. They carefully harvest and carry the rice.

Youths, soldiers and mobile groups harvest professionally, while newly organized female groups harvest the Neang Tei and Neang Minh rices.